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Full-Text Articles in Legal History

Beyond The Written Constitution: A Short Analysis Of Warren Court, Thiago Luis Santos Sombra Jul 2015

Beyond The Written Constitution: A Short Analysis Of Warren Court, Thiago Luis Santos Sombra

Thiago Luís Santos Sombra

This essay propose an analysis about how Warren Court became one of the most particular in American History by confronting Jim Crow law, especially by applying the Bill of Rights. In this essay, we propose an analysis of how complex the unwritten Constitution is. Cases like Brown vs. Board of Education will be analyzed from a different point of view to understand the methods of the Court.


North Carolina’S Superintendent Of Public Instruction: Defining A Constitutional Office, Andrew P. Owens Jan 2013

North Carolina’S Superintendent Of Public Instruction: Defining A Constitutional Office, Andrew P. Owens

Andrew P. Owens

In 2009 a superior court case determined the fate of the Governor’s initiative to streamline education leadership by promoting a State Board of Education member while greatly reducing the Superintendent of Public Instruction’s powers. The judge’s decision in favor of Superintendent Atkinson turned on “the inherent constitutional authority” of her office; yet no one really knows what authority is inherent to the office, where that authority derives, or how to go about analyzing the office’s constitutional role. In short: what does it mean to be the Superintendent of Public Instruction? This paper explains the origins and meaning of the Superintendent …


Founding-Era Conventions And The Meaning Of The Constitution’S “Convention For Proposing Amendments”, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2013

Founding-Era Conventions And The Meaning Of The Constitution’S “Convention For Proposing Amendments”, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

Under Article V of the U.S. Constitution, two thirds of state legislatures may require Congress to call a “Convention for proposing Amendments.” Because this procedure has never been used, commentators frequently debate the composition of the convention and the rules governing the application and convention process. However, the debate has proceeded almost entirely without knowledge of the many multi-colony and multi-state conventions held during the eighteenth century, of which the Constitutional Convention was only one. These conventions were governed by universally-accepted convention practices and protocols. This Article surveys those conventions and shows how their practices and protocols shaped the meaning …


The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding Of Original Intent, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2012

The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding Of Original Intent, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This Article addresses whether the American Founders expected evidence of their own subjective views to guide future interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. The Article considers a range of evidence largely overlooked or misunderstood in earlier studies, such as contemporaneous rules of legal interpretation, judicial use of legislative history, early American public debate, and pronouncements by state ratifying conventions. Based on this evidence, the Article concludes that the Founders were “original-understanding originalists.” This means that they anticipated that constitutional interpretation would be guided by the subjective understanding of the ratifiers when such understanding was coherent and recoverable and, otherwise, by the …


A Republic, Not A Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, And The Constitution's Guarantee Clause, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2012

A Republic, Not A Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, And The Constitution's Guarantee Clause, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This article debunks the myth, first arising in the 1840s, that the Founders sharply distinguished between a "republic" and a "democracy." It explains that by a "republic," most of the Founders meant a government controlled by the citizenry, following the rule of law, and without a king. Accordingly, state provisions for initiative and referendum are fully consistent with the Constitution's requirement that each state have a republican form of government; in fact, most of the governments the Founders called "republics" had featured analogous forms of direct democracy.


Paper Money And The Original Understanding Of The Coinage Clause, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2012

Paper Money And The Original Understanding Of The Coinage Clause, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

Over a century ago, the Supreme Court decided the Legal Tender Cases, holding that Congress could authorize legal tender paper money in addition to metallic coin. In recent years, some commentators have argued that this holding was incorrect as a matter of original understanding or original meaning, but that any other holding would be absolutely inconsistent with modern needs. They further argue that the impracticality of functioning without paper money demonstrates that originalism is not a workable method of constitutional interpretation. Those who rely on the Legal Tender Cases to discredit originalism are, however, in error. This Article shows that …


The Estate Planning Perils Of 2010 And Beyond, Brett T. Bradford Nov 2010

The Estate Planning Perils Of 2010 And Beyond, Brett T. Bradford

Brett T. Bradford

This paper explores the confusion surrounding the repeal of the federal estate tax for the year 2010. The Economic Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act gradually scaled down the federal estate tax and eventually repealed the tax in 2010. The Act has a sunset provision that would return the tax to a much higher rate than has been seen in recent times. This paper explores the history, intent and purpose of federal estate taxes; the intent and purpose behind the repeal in EGTRAA; and what attempts congress has made to fix the mess.


Color-Blind: Procedure's Quiet But Crucial Role In Achieving Racial Justice, Benjamin V. Madison Iii Jan 2010

Color-Blind: Procedure's Quiet But Crucial Role In Achieving Racial Justice, Benjamin V. Madison Iii

Benjamin V Madison, III

This article explores the role of procedural institutions, both in the Constitution and in other laws related to the judicial system, that promote impartial justice. The article explores the twin principles of human fallibility and the equality of all human beings as the fundamental bases of the judicial system. The role of procedure in enabling federal courts to enforce the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education is a featured part of the article.


The Original Meaning Of The Constitution's “Executive Vesting Clause”—Evidence From Eighteenth Century Drafting Practice, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2009

The Original Meaning Of The Constitution's “Executive Vesting Clause”—Evidence From Eighteenth Century Drafting Practice, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

Advocates of presidential power from the days of George Washington at least to the time of George W. Bush have claimed that the Constitution’s so-called “Executive Vesting Clause,” the first sentence of Article II, not only designates the President as chief executive, but also confers broad authority. Some commentators support that view, while others maintain that the President’s powers are limited to those enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution. This study addresses the previously-overlooked question of which interpretation is more consistent with contemporaneous drafting customs. It concludes that treating the “Executive Vesting Clause” as a mere designation is consistent with those …


The Original Meaning Of The Privileges And Immunities Clause, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2009

The Original Meaning Of The Privileges And Immunities Clause, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This article explains the meaning of the U.S. Constitution's Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, as the Founders understood it. It explains that the terms "privileges" and "immunities" had well-understood content in 18th century law---as benefits created by government. The Clause protects states from discriminating against visitors as to the benefits of citizenship (such as access to the courts), but does not address "natural rights" such as freedom of speech and religion.


Judicial Review Of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause And The Fiduciary Law Of The Founders, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2007

Judicial Review Of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause And The Fiduciary Law Of The Founders, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This article surveys the principles of 18th century fiduciary law that the Founders incorporated into the U.S. Constitution-- principles they referred to as rules of "public trust." The article also suggests standards the courts can use to determine if particular congressional appropriations are within the "general welfare" limitation of the Constitution's so-called Spending Clause


The Original Understanding Of The Indian Commerce Clause, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2007

The Original Understanding Of The Indian Commerce Clause, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

The United States Congress claims plenary and exclusive power over federal affairs with the Indian tribes, based primarily on the Constitution’s Indian Commerce Clause. This article is the first comprehensive analysis of the original meaning of, and understanding behind, that constitutional provision. The author concludes that, as originally understood, congressional power over the tribes was to be neither plenary nor exclusive.


Federal Land Retention And The Constitution's Property Clause: The Original Understanding, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2005

Federal Land Retention And The Constitution's Property Clause: The Original Understanding, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This article examines the original meaning of the Constitution's clauses authorizing federal land ownership. It finds that the power granted to Congress was broad enough to include land ownership for enumerated purposes, even without complying the procedures necessary for the creation of federal enclaves. But it finds that the power was not broad enough to include indefinite landholding for unenumerated purposes.


The Agency Law Origins Of The Necessary And Proper Clause, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2004

The Agency Law Origins Of The Necessary And Proper Clause, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This is the first of several writings by the author on the original meaning of the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause. It explains part of the legal background of the Clause, identifies it as a recital (not an independent grant of power) of the 18th century doctrine of incidental powers, and explains the content of that doctrine. The article has since been updated and supplemented by the author's signed chapters in Lawson, Miller, Natelson & Seidman, The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010).


The General Welfare Clause And The Public Trust: An Essay In Original Understanding, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2004

The General Welfare Clause And The Public Trust: An Essay In Original Understanding, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This article explains the original meaning/understanding of the Constitution's General Welfare Clause, including the scope of the taxing and spending power granted to Congress


The Constitution And The Public Trust, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2004

The Constitution And The Public Trust, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

The American Founders believed that public officials were bound by fiduciary obligations, and they wrote that view into the Constitution. This article copiously documents their position.


The Enumerated Powers Of States, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2003

The Enumerated Powers Of States, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This article lists and discusses the powers reserved exclusively to the states, according the representations made to the ratifying public during the debates over the U.S. Constitution.


The Constitutional Contributions Of John Dickinson, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2003

The Constitutional Contributions Of John Dickinson, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This article reviews the impact on the drafting and adoption of the U.S. Constitution of the man sometimes referred to as the most underappreciated Founder


Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders' View, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2003

Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders' View, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

The article explains the extent to which the Founders' Constitution permitted and prohibited retroactive legislation, and the provisions in that document relevant to the question.


A Reminder: The Constitutional Values Of Sympathy And Independence, Robert G. Natelson Jan 2003

A Reminder: The Constitutional Values Of Sympathy And Independence, Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

Nearly all participants in the American Founding shared constitutiona/ values of "sympathy" and "independence." According to the ideal of sympathy, government actors should mirror the full range of popular attitudes. According to the ideal of independence, voters should remain independent of other citizens and of governmental entities, and those entities should remain independent of, and competitive with, each other. Sympathy and independence were central, not peripheral, to the Founders' Constitution, so the document cannot be interpreted properly without keeping them in view. The author provides examples of how constitutional practice might be altered had these central values not been overlooked.


James Madison And The Constitution's “Convention For Proposing Amendments", Robert G. Natelson Jan 2001

James Madison And The Constitution's “Convention For Proposing Amendments", Robert G. Natelson

Robert G. Natelson

This article traces the progress of James Madison's thought on the Constitution's "convention for proposing amendments as a way for states to assert themselves against the federal government. Madison saw the convention as an important part of the Constitution, and a constitutional alternative to nullification.


Constituição, Soberania E Ditadura Em Carl Schmitt, Ronaldo Porto Macedo Junior Jan 1997

Constituição, Soberania E Ditadura Em Carl Schmitt, Ronaldo Porto Macedo Junior

Ronaldo Porto Macedo Junior

On the basis of a reconstruction of Schmitt's decisionism and of the analysis of its effects on key terms of his conception like democracy, sovereignty and dictatorship, Schmitt'sthought is examined regarding his theoretical and practical positions on the constitutional issues of Weimar's Germany and of National-socialism. Special attention is given to how for him the unity and the hierarchy of the political powers and of the lae demand a strong State and a centralized command instead of a pluralistic balance.