Legal History Commons^™

Law As Instrumentality, Jeremiah A. Ho

All Faculty Scholarship

Our conceptions of law affect how we objectify the law and ultimately how we study it. Despite a century’s worth of theoretical progress in American law—from legal realism to critical legal studies movements and postmodernism—the formalist conception of “law as science,” as promulgated by Christopher Langdell at Harvard Law School in the late-nineteenth century, still influences methodologies in American legal education. Subsequent movements of legal thought, however, have revealed that the law is neither scientific nor “objective” in the way the Langdellian formalists once envisioned. After all, the Langdellian scientific objectivity of law itself reflected the dominant class, gender, power, …

Legal Realism And The Conflict Of Laws, Kermit Roosevelt Iii

All Faculty Scholarship

What did legal realism bring to the conflict of laws? Why was the realist critique of the received wisdom so successful? And why, despite that success, is the realist movement in conflict of laws—and, indeed, the whole American choice of law revolution—seen as a failure?

In this Response, I suggest some brief answers to those questions. Realism, I suggest, is more successful than its critics think—though its project remains unfinished. A better understanding of realism's contributions can show us what work remains in the realist project.