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Full-Text Articles in Legal History
Reasons For Justice, Rights And Future Generations, Gianluigi Palombella
Reasons For Justice, Rights And Future Generations, Gianluigi Palombella
Gianluigi Palombella
This article focuses on some very "fundamental threats" to future generations' leaving, and considers whether most essential interests of future persons not to be harmed can be construed as rights, and in particular as human rights, as much as present persons'. The framework refers essentially to a conceptual grammar of justice. Moreover, it is suggested to articulate rights through the lens of "disposability" and "non-disposability" principles. Finally, the article shows the reasons for separating what we owe to future persons under the challenge of those threats for humanity, i.e. a matter of justice, from our right to hand down our …
Why Not A Justice School? On The Role Of Justice In Legal Education And The Construction Of A Pedagogy Of Justice, Peter L. Davis
Why Not A Justice School? On The Role Of Justice In Legal Education And The Construction Of A Pedagogy Of Justice, Peter L. Davis
Scholarly Works
Why are law schools not named schools of justice, or, at least, schools of law and justice? Of course, virtually every law school will reply that this is nit-picking; all claim to be devoted to the study of justice. But our concern is not so easily dismissed. The names of institutions carry great significance; they deliver a political, social, or economic message. . . This Article contends that not only do law schools virtually ignore justice – a concept that is supposed to be the goal of all legal systems – they go so far as to denigrate it and …
Dworkin V. The Philosophers: A Review Essay On Justice In Robes, Michael S. Green
Dworkin V. The Philosophers: A Review Essay On Justice In Robes, Michael S. Green
Faculty Publications
In this review essay, Professor Michael Steven Green argues that Dworkin's reputation among his fellow philosophers has needlessly suffered because of his refusal to back down from his "semantic sting" argument against H. L. A. Hart. Philosophers of law have uniformly rejected the semantic sting argument as a fallacy. Nevertheless Dworkin reaffirms the argument in Justice in Robes, his most recent collection of essays, and devotes much of the book to stubbornly, and unsuccessfully, defending it. This is a pity, because the failure of the semantic sting argument in no way undermines Dworkin's other arguments against Hart.