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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Legal History
The Paradox Of Ideology, Justin Schwartz
The Paradox Of Ideology, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
A standard problem with the objectivity of social scientific theory in particular is that it is either self-referential, in which case it seems to undermine itself as ideology, or self-excepting, which seem pragmatically self-refuting. Using the example of Marx and his theory of ideology, I show how self-referential theories that include themselves in their scope of explanation can be objective. Ideology may be roughly defined as belief distorted by class interest. I show how Marx thought that natural science was informed by class interest but not therefore necessarily ideology. Capitalists have an interest in understanding the natural world (to a …
Functional Explanation And Metaphysical Individualism, Justin Schwartz
Functional Explanation And Metaphysical Individualism, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
A number of (present or former) analytical Marxists, such as Jon Elster, have argued that functional explanation has almost no place in the social sciences. (Although the discussion is framed in terms of a debate among analytical Marxists, the point is quite general, and Marxism is used for illustrative purposes.) Functional explanation accounts for what is to be explained by reference to its function; thus, sighted organism have eyes because eyes enable them to see. Elster and other critics of functional explanation argue that this pattern of explanation is inconsistent with "methodological individualism," the idea, as they understand it, that …
A Contemporary Definition Of The International Norm Of Self-Determination, S. James Anaya
A Contemporary Definition Of The International Norm Of Self-Determination, S. James Anaya
Publications
No abstract provided.
A Survey Of Article Iii Procedural Issues Considered At The Federal Circuit During Its First Decade, 27 J. Marshall L. Rev. 25 (1993), Jerry R. Selinger
A Survey Of Article Iii Procedural Issues Considered At The Federal Circuit During Its First Decade, 27 J. Marshall L. Rev. 25 (1993), Jerry R. Selinger
UIC Law Review
No abstract provided.
Legal Realism And The Social Contract: Fuller’S Public Jurisprudence Of Form, Private Jurisprudence Of Substance, James Boyle
Legal Realism And The Social Contract: Fuller’S Public Jurisprudence Of Form, Private Jurisprudence Of Substance, James Boyle
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Natural Law Ambiguities, Robin West
Natural Law Ambiguities, Robin West
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
I share with Fred Schauer the relatively unpopular belief that the positivist insistence that we keep separate the legal "is" from the legal "ought" is a logical prerequisite to meaningful legal criticism, and therefore, in the constitutional context, is a logical prerequisite to meaningful criticism of the Constitution. As Schauer argues, despite the modern inclination to associate positivism with conservatism, the positivist "separation thesis," properly understood, facilitates legal criticism and legal reform, not reactionary acquiescence. If we want to improve law, we must resist the urge to see it through the proverbial rose-colored glasses; we must be clear that a …
Rethinking The Rule Of Law: A Demonstration That The Obvious Is Plausible, Francis J. Mootz Iii
Rethinking The Rule Of Law: A Demonstration That The Obvious Is Plausible, Francis J. Mootz Iii
Scholarly Works
In this Article, I defend the Rule of Law from its detractors in the academy by uncovering and criticizing the unsound presuppositions driving their critiques. I acknowledge that these critiques raise two different problems for those who defend the plausibility of the Rule of Law: The problem of ensuring legal innovation and the problem of supplying effective constraint. In response to these problems, I locate our faith in the Rule of Law in the hermeneutical practice in which we are engaged as lawyers. Jurisprudential characterizations of the problems of constraint and innovation are misguided reactions to the narrow Enlightenment conception …
Is The Rule Of Law Possible In A Postmodern World?, Francis J. Mootz Iii
Is The Rule Of Law Possible In A Postmodern World?, Francis J. Mootz Iii
Scholarly Works
The Rule of Law is the core of our political and legal ideology, but the Rule of Law increasingly is attacked as an unattainable goal. Postmodern theorists challenge whether it makes sense to believe that rules can be formulated for general application and then later neutrally applied by decision makers. Postmodern theorists reject the Enlightenment world view and its political corollary, classical liberalism. The author agrees with the spirit of the postmodern critique, but argues that we can understand the Rule of Law in a manner consonant with postmodern thought. Drawing on the Continental tradition of hermeneutics, or the philosophy …
The Right To Privacy In The Pennsylvania Constitution, Seth F. Kreimer
The Right To Privacy In The Pennsylvania Constitution, Seth F. Kreimer
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.