Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Constitutional Law (8)
- Jurisprudence (4)
- Supreme Court of the United States (4)
- Criminal Law (3)
- Criminal Procedure (3)
-
- Administrative Law (2)
- Law and Politics (2)
- Legal Education (2)
- President/Executive Department (2)
- Admiralty (1)
- Courts (1)
- Fourteenth Amendment (1)
- Fourth Amendment (1)
- Jurisdiction (1)
- Law Enforcement and Corrections (1)
- Law and Philosophy (1)
- Law and Society (1)
- Legal Writing and Research (1)
- Legislation (1)
- Public Law and Legal Theory (1)
- Second Amendment (1)
- Securities Law (1)
- Tax Law (1)
- Keyword
-
- Admiralty (1)
- Arrest warrants (1)
- Delegation (1)
- Executive (1)
- Executive power (1)
-
- Founding (1)
- Fourth Amendment (1)
- Habeas corpus (1)
- History (1)
- Inferior officers (1)
- Insular (1)
- Insular cases (1)
- Jurisprudence (1)
- Legal history (1)
- Legislative facts (1)
- Magna carta (1)
- Nonunitary (1)
- Policy (1)
- Probable cause (1)
- Rational basis review (1)
- Removal power (1)
- Search warrants (1)
- Social movements (1)
- State admissions (1)
- Supreme court (1)
- Unitary executive (1)
- Warrants (1)
- Warrants of commitment (1)
Articles 1 - 17 of 17
Full-Text Articles in Legal History
Admiralty, Abstention, And The Allure Of Old Cases, Maggie Gardner
Admiralty, Abstention, And The Allure Of Old Cases, Maggie Gardner
Notre Dame Law Review
The current Supreme Court has made clear that history matters. But doing history well is hard. There is thus an allure to old cases because they provide a link to the past that is more accessible for nonhistorian lawyers. This Article warns against that allure by showing how the use of old cases also poses methodological challenges. The Article uses as a case study the emerging doctrine of foreign relations abstention. Before the Supreme Court, advocates argued that this new doctrine is in fact rooted in early admiralty cases. Those advocates did not, however, canvass the early admiralty practice, relying …
Rethinking Legislative Facts, Haley N. Proctor
Rethinking Legislative Facts, Haley N. Proctor
Notre Dame Law Review
As the factual nature of legal inquiry has become increasingly apparent over the past century, courts and commentators have fallen into the habit of labeling the facts behind the law “legislative facts.” Loosely, legislative facts are general facts courts rely upon to formulate law or policy, but that definition is as contested as it is vague. Most agree that legislative facts exist in some form or another, but few agree on what that form is, on who should find them, and how. This Article seeks to account for and resolve that confusion. Theories of legislative fact focus on the role …
Pretrial Commitment And The Fourth Amendment, Laurent Sacharoff
Pretrial Commitment And The Fourth Amendment, Laurent Sacharoff
Notre Dame Law Review
Today, the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause governs arrest warrants and search warrants only. But in the founding era, the Warrant Clause governed a third type of warrant: the “warrant of commitment.” Judges issued these warrants to jail defendants pending trial. This Article argues that the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause, with its oath and probable cause standard, should be understood today to apply to this third type of warrant. That means the Warrant Clause would govern any initial appearance where a judge first commits a defendant—a process that currently falls far short of fulfilling its constitutional and historical function. History supports …
Democracy's Forgotten Possessions: U.S. Territories' Right To Statehood Through Constitutional Liquidation, Joshua Stephen Ebiner
Democracy's Forgotten Possessions: U.S. Territories' Right To Statehood Through Constitutional Liquidation, Joshua Stephen Ebiner
Notre Dame Law Review
This Note argues that the Territories must be granted statehood consistent with the equal footing doctrine. This thesis does not challenge Congress’s power to acquire or govern territory, or its constitutional authority to admit (and place reasonable conditions on the admission of) territory into the Union as states. These matters have long been settled through constitutional practice. Neither does this thesis suggest that acquired territory must be immediately annexed into the Union, since there are valid reasons to delay such a decision. Instead, the claim is that permanently inhabited territories that have longstanding, constitutionally significant relationships with the United States …
Interring The Unitary Executive, Christine Kexel Chabot
Interring The Unitary Executive, Christine Kexel Chabot
Notre Dame Law Review
The President’s power to remove and control subordinate executive officers has sparked a constitutional debate that began in 1789 and rages on today. Leading originalists claim that the Constitution created a “unitary executive” President whose plenary removal power affords her “exclusive control” over subordinates’ exercise of executive power. Text assigning the President a removal power and exclusive control appears nowhere in the Constitution, however, and unitary scholars have instead relied on select historical understandings and negative inferences drawn from a supposed lack of independent regulatory structures at the Founding. The comprehensive historical record introduced by this Article lays this debate …
The Traditions Of American Constitutional Law, Marc O. Degirolami
The Traditions Of American Constitutional Law, Marc O. Degirolami
Notre Dame Law Review
This Article identifies a new method of constitutional interpretation: the use of tradition as constitutive of constitutional meaning. It studies what the Supreme Court means by invoking tradition and whether what it means remains constant across the document and over time. Traditionalist interpretation is pervasive, consistent, and recurrent across the Court’s constitutional doctrine. So, too, are criticisms of traditionalist interpretation. There are also more immediate reasons to study the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation. The Court’s two newest members, Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, have indicated that tradition informs their understanding of constitutional meaning. The study of traditionalist …
Glorious Revolution To American Revolution: The English Origin Of The Right To Keep And Bear Arms, Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain
Glorious Revolution To American Revolution: The English Origin Of The Right To Keep And Bear Arms, Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain
Notre Dame Law Review
It is definitively not my intention to wade into such debates about the wisdom of the Second Amendment or to deal with pending or recent court interpretations. Rather, I want to explore how it came to be and what role British history had in its genesis. For Americans like myself, such history helps us to understand the meaning of our own Constitution. For the Britons, it is a powerful example of how your own constitutional principles shaped the legal landscape of far-flung countries once within the British Empire. And for those simply interested in law as a discipline, irrespective of …
The Depravity Of The 1930s And The Modern Administrative State, Steven G. Calabresi, Gary Lawson
The Depravity Of The 1930s And The Modern Administrative State, Steven G. Calabresi, Gary Lawson
Notre Dame Law Review
Gillian Metzger’s 2017 Harvard Law Review foreword, entitled 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, is a paean to the modern administrative state, with its massive subdelegations of legislative and judicial power to so-called “expert” bureaucrats, who are layered well out of reach of electoral accountability yet do not have the constitutional status of Article III judges. We disagree with this celebration of technocratic government on just about every level, but this Article focuses on two relatively narrow points.
First, responding more to implicit assumptions that pervade modern discourse than specifically to Professor Metzger’s analysis, we challenge the normally …
Securities Law In The Sixties: The Supreme Court, The Second Circuit, And The Triumph Of Purpose Over Text, A.C. Pritchard, Robert B. Thompson
Securities Law In The Sixties: The Supreme Court, The Second Circuit, And The Triumph Of Purpose Over Text, A.C. Pritchard, Robert B. Thompson
Notre Dame Law Review
This Article analyzes the Supreme Court’s leading securities cases from 1962 to 1972—SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.; J.I. Case Co. v. Borak; Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.; Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.; and Affiliated Ute of Utah v. United States—relying not just on the published opinions, but also the Justices’ internal letters, memos, and conference notes. The Sixties Court did not simply apply the text as enacted by Congress, but instead invoked the securities laws’ purposes as a guide to interpretation. The Court became a partner of Congress …
The Canon Of Rational Basis Review, Katie R. Eyer
The Canon Of Rational Basis Review, Katie R. Eyer
Notre Dame Law Review
The modern constitutional law canon fundamentally misdescribes rational basis review. Through a series of errors—of omission, simplification, and recharacterization—we have largely erased a robust history of the use of rational basis review by social movements to generate constitutional change. Instead, the story the canon tells is one of dismal prospects for challengers of government action—in which rational basis review is an empty, almost meaningless form of review.
This Article suggests that far from the weak and ineffectual mechanism that most contemporary accounts suggest, rational basis review has, in the modern era, served as one of the primary equal protection entry …
The Attorney General And Early Appointments Clause Practice, Aditya Bamzai
The Attorney General And Early Appointments Clause Practice, Aditya Bamzai
Notre Dame Law Review
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I provide an overview of the Appointments Clause and the officer-employee line as it currently stands in caselaw and in executive branch practice. I also summarize the Appointments Clause practices of the First Congress. In Part II, I address the opinions of the Attorneys General, and their attempt to rationalize and to explain the statutes enacted by the First Congress and the appointments practices of the nation. In Part III, I derive some implications and conclusions, generally for the Appointments Clause and specifically for the Administrative Law Judge controversy that is currently …
Preclusion And Criminal Judgment, Lee Kovarsky
Preclusion And Criminal Judgment, Lee Kovarsky
Notre Dame Law Review
The defining question in modern habeas corpus law involves the finality
of a state conviction: What preclusive effect does (and should) a criminal
judgment have? Res judicata and collateral estoppel —the famous preclusion
rules for civil judgments—accommodate basic legal interests in fairness,
certitude, and sovereignty. Legal institutions carefully calibrate the preclusive
effect of civil judgments because judicial resources are scarce, because
the reliability and legitimacy of prior process can vary, and because courts
wield the authority of a repeat-playing sovereign that will find its own civil
judgments attacked in foreign litigation. In stark contrast to the legal sophistication
lavished on …
Beyond Law And Fact: Jury Evaluation Of Law Enforcement, Lauren M. Ouziel
Beyond Law And Fact: Jury Evaluation Of Law Enforcement, Lauren M. Ouziel
Notre Dame Law Review
Criminal trials today are as much about the adequacy and legitimacy of the defendant’s accusers—police and prosecutors—as the alleged deeds of the accused. Yet we lack theory to conceptualize this reality, doctrine to set its parameters, and institutional mechanisms to adapt to it. The traditional framework used by courts and scholars to delineate the jury’s role—along the continuum between “fact-finding” and “law-finding”—is inadequate to the task. Jury evaluations of law enforcement are more accurately conceptualized as enforcement-finding, a process that functions both in and outside that continuum. In considering enforcement-finding’s justification and proper scope, history offers a useful analytical frame. …
A “Second Magna Carta”: The English Habeas Corpus Act And The Statutory Origins Of The Habeas Privilege, Amanda L. Tyler
A “Second Magna Carta”: The English Habeas Corpus Act And The Statutory Origins Of The Habeas Privilege, Amanda L. Tyler
Notre Dame Law Review
In my own scholarship, Fallon and Meltzer’s work on habeas models prompted me to dig deeper into the historical backdrop that informed ratification of the Suspension Clause and think harder about the relevance of that history for questions of constitutional interpretation. This, in turn, has spurred work that has occupied me for many years since. In the spirit of engaging with my federal courts professor one more time, this Article tells the story of the statutory origins of the habeas privilege—what Blackstone called a “second magna carta”—and argues that any explication of the constitutional privilege and discussion of how …
Originalism And The Colorblind Constitution, Michael B. Rappaport
Originalism And The Colorblind Constitution, Michael B. Rappaport
Notre Dame Law Review
In this Article, I challenge the claim that the original meaning clearly allows the states to engage in affirmative action. I argue that the original meaning does not plainly establish that affirmative action by the states is constitutional. Instead, there is, at the least, a reasonable argument to be made that state government affirmative action is unconstitutional. In fact, based on the available evidence, I believe that the case for concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning prohibits affirmative action as to laws within its scope is stronger than the case for concluding that it allows affirmative action. I do …
Nfib V. Sebelius And The Transformation Of The Taxing Power, Barry Cushman
Nfib V. Sebelius And The Transformation Of The Taxing Power, Barry Cushman
Notre Dame Law Review
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a majority of five Justices in holding that the “shared responsibility payment” required by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) constituted an imposition of a “tax” rather than a “penalty.” Thus, even though the Chief Justice and four other Justices had concluded that the provision was not a legitimate exercise of the commerce power, the Court held that it was a valid exercise of the taxing power.
The origin of the distinction between taxes and penalties in taxing power jurisprudence is found in the 1922 …
The Appointment And Removal Of William J. Marbury And When An Office Vests, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash
The Appointment And Removal Of William J. Marbury And When An Office Vests, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash
Notre Dame Law Review
Scholars have ignored the most important question in one of the most famous constitutional law cases, obscuring the machinations that spawned the dispute. This Article sheds light on the events that precipitated Marbury v. Madison and also explains when an appointment vests. Thomas Jefferson famously refused to deliver a commission to William J. Marbury, causing the latter to seek a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court. The received wisdom supposes that Jefferson’s refusal rested on the grounds that Marbury had not been appointed a justice of the peace precisely because he never had received a commission. In fact, Jefferson’s …