Legal History Commons^™

Preclusion And Criminal Judgment, Lee Kovarsky

Notre Dame Law Review

The defining question in modern habeas corpus law involves the finality

of a state conviction: What preclusive effect does (and should) a criminal

judgment have? Res judicata and collateral estoppel —the famous preclusion

rules for civil judgments—accommodate basic legal interests in fairness,

certitude, and sovereignty. Legal institutions carefully calibrate the preclusive

effect of civil judgments because judicial resources are scarce, because

the reliability and legitimacy of prior process can vary, and because courts

wield the authority of a repeat-playing sovereign that will find its own civil

judgments attacked in foreign litigation. In stark contrast to the legal sophistication

lavished on …

Beyond Law And Fact: Jury Evaluation Of Law Enforcement, Lauren M. Ouziel

Notre Dame Law Review

Criminal trials today are as much about the adequacy and legitimacy of the defendant’s accusers—police and prosecutors—as the alleged deeds of the accused. Yet we lack theory to conceptualize this reality, doctrine to set its parameters, and institutional mechanisms to adapt to it. The traditional framework used by courts and scholars to delineate the jury’s role—along the continuum between “fact-finding” and “law-finding”—is inadequate to the task. Jury evaluations of law enforcement are more accurately conceptualized as enforcement-finding, a process that functions both in and outside that continuum. In considering enforcement-finding’s justification and proper scope, history offers a useful analytical frame. …

A “Second Magna Carta”: The English Habeas Corpus Act And The Statutory Origins Of The Habeas Privilege, Amanda L. Tyler

Notre Dame Law Review

In my own scholarship, Fallon and Meltzer’s work on habeas models prompted me to dig deeper into the historical backdrop that informed ratification of the Suspension Clause and think harder about the relevance of that history for questions of constitutional interpretation. This, in turn, has spurred work that has occupied me for many years since. In the spirit of engaging with my federal courts professor one more time, this Article tells the story of the statutory origins of the habeas privilege—what Blackstone called a “second magna carta”—and argues that any explication of the constitutional privilege and discussion of how …