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Full-Text Articles in Legal History

A Good Step In The Right Direction: Illinois Eliminates The Conflict Between Attorneys And Guardians, 38 J. Legal Prof. 161 (2013), Alberto Bernabe Jan 2013

A Good Step In The Right Direction: Illinois Eliminates The Conflict Between Attorneys And Guardians, 38 J. Legal Prof. 161 (2013), Alberto Bernabe

UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


'Simple' Takes On The Supreme Court, Robert Tsai Jan 2013

'Simple' Takes On The Supreme Court, Robert Tsai

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

This essay assesses black literature as a medium for working out popular understandings of America’s Constitution and laws. Starting in the 1940s, Langston Hughes’s fictional character, Jesse B. Semple, began appearing in the prominent black newspaper, the Chicago Defender. The figure affectionately known as “Simple” was undereducated, unsophisticated, and plain spoken - certainly to a fault according to prevailing standards of civility, race relations, and professional attainment. Butthese very traits, along with a gritty experience under Jim Crow, made him not only a sympathetic figure but also an armchair legal theorist. In a series of barroom conversations, Simple ably critiqued …


Treaty Options: Towards A Behavioral Understanding Of Treaty Design, Jean Galbraith Jan 2013

Treaty Options: Towards A Behavioral Understanding Of Treaty Design, Jean Galbraith

All Faculty Scholarship

Rational choice theory is the dominant paradigm through which scholars of international law and international relations approach treaty design. In this Article, I suggest a different approach using a combination of empirical observations of state behavior and theoretical insights from behavioral economics. I focus on one aspect of multilateral treaty design: namely, treaty reservations and associated legal mechanisms which allow states to vary the degree of their formal commitments to treaties. I call these mechanisms “treaty options.” I argue that the framing of treaty options matters powerfully — and does so in ways inconsistent with rational choice theory, but consistent …