Legal History Commons^™

The Original Meaning Of The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause, The Right Of Natural Liberty, And Executive Discretion, John Harrison

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause of Article I, Section 9, is primarily a limit on Congress’s authority to authorize detention by the executive. It is not mainly concerned with the remedial writ of habeas corpus, but rather with the primary right of natural liberty. Suspensions of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are statutes that vest very broad discretion in the executive to decide which individuals to hold in custody. Detention of combatants under the law of war need not rest on a valid suspension, whether the combatant is an alien or a citizen of the United States. …

The Lost Promise Of Progressive Formalism, Andrea Scoseria Katz

Scholarship@WashULaw

Today, any number of troubling government pathologies—a lawless presidency, a bloated and unaccountable administrative state, the growth of an activist bench—are associated with the emergence of a judicial philosophy that disregards the “plain meaning” of the Constitution for a loose, unprincipled “living constitutionalism.” Many trace its origins to the Progressive Era
(1890–1920), a time when Americans turned en masse to government as the solution to emerging problems of economic modernity—financial panics, industrial concentration, worsening workplace conditions, and skyrocketing unemployment and inequality—and, the argument goes, concocted a flexible, new constitutional philosophy to allow the federal government to take on vast, new …

Understanding The Spirit Of The Constitution On Corruption: Emoluments, Impeachment, And The Primacy Of Political Virtue, Lea Mano

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

No abstract provided.

Black Women And Girls And The Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Constitutional Connections, Activist Intersections, And The First Wave Youth Suffrage Movement, Mae C. Quinn

Seattle University Law Review

On this 100th anniversary of the Nineteenth Amendment—and on the cusp of the fiftieth anniversary of the Twenty-sixth Amendment—this article seeks to expand the voting rights canon. It complicates our understanding of voting rights history in the United States, adding layers to the history of federal constitutional enfranchisement and encouraging a more intersectional telling of our suffrage story in the days ahead.

Thus, this work not only seeks to acknowledge the Twenty-sixth Amendment as important constitutional content, as was the goal of the article I wrote with my law student colleagues for a conference held at the University of Akron …

The Abraham Lincoln Lecture On Constitutional Law, Steven G. Calabresi

Northwestern University Law Review

These introductory remarks to the Inaugural Abraham Lincoln Lecture on Constitutional Law were delivered at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law on April 6, 2017.

The Vice Presidency In The Twenty-First Century, Jody C. Baumgartner

Pepperdine Law Review

The vice presidency has undergone almost revolutionary change since its inception 227 years ago. Conceived as a convenient solution to a problem created by the Electoral College, the Vice President has only two constitutional functions—to serve as a successor to the President and as the President of the Senate. However, over the past sixty years, vice presidents have become increasingly part of and integral to American governance, and the last three (Al Gore, Dick Cheney, and Joe Biden) have been exceptionally active executive actors. What was once an all-but forgotten office is now an essential part of a president’s administration. …

The Vice President-More Than An Afterthought?, Richard B. Cheney, Edwin Meese Iii, Douglas W. Kmiec

Pepperdine Law Review

A round-table discussion among former U.S. Vice President Richard B. Cheney, Caruso Family Professor of Law and retired U.S. Ambassador Douglas Kmiec, and former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese III considered the practical implications of conceiving the Vice President as a legislative officer, an executive officer, or both. It was noted that until the second half of the twentieth century, the Office of the Vice President was conceived as legislative. Funding for the Office appeared in budget lines relating to Congress and physically, the Vice President’s office was in the Capitol. Beginning with Walter Mondale’s service as Vice President, presidents …

A Constitutional Afterthought: The Origins Of The Vice Presidency, 1787 To 1804, Edward J. Larson

Pepperdine Law Review

At the origins of the office, even though the Vice President was, as its first occupant John Adams declared, “only one breath” away from the presidency, the Office of the Vice President was an afterthought of the Constitutional Convention. Never discussed during the first three months of the four-month long Convention, the Committee of Eleven introduced the vice presidency as a byproduct of how it resolved to fix the presidential selection process. Under this process, the Electoral College emerged, with each state assigned the same number of electors as its members in the House of Representatives and Senate. Each elector …

The Commander In Chief's Authority To Combat Climate Change, Mark P. Nevitt

Mark P Nevitt

Climate change is the world’s greatest environmental threat. And it is increasingly understood as a threat to domestic and international peace and security. In recognition of this threat, the President has taken the initiative to prepare for climate change’s impact – in some cases drawing sharp objections from Congress. While both the President and Congress have certain constitutional authorities to address the national security threat posed by climate change, the precise contours of their overlapping powers are unclear. As Commander in Chief, the President has the constitutional authority to repel sudden attacks and take care that the laws are faithfully …

Three-Dimensional Sovereign Immunity, Sarah L. Brinton

Sarah L Brinton

The Supreme Court has erred on sovereign immunity. The current federal immunity doctrine wrongly gives Congress the exclusive authority to waive immunity (“exclusive congressional waiver”), but the Constitution mandates that Congress share the waiver power with the Court. This Article develops the doctrine of a two-way shared waiver and then explores a third possibility: the sharing of the immunity waiver power among all three branches of government.

Disclosure's Effects: Wikileaks And Transparency, Mark Fenster

Mark Fenster

Bridging The Divide: Finding Common Ground On The Modern Chevron Debate, Nicholas C. Stewart

Nicholas C Stewart

Traditionally, when reviewing an administrative agency’s adjudication or rulemaking under National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), courts would ask whether the question before them was one of law or a mixed question of law and fact. While the former was accorded no deference, the latter received a great deal. Despite this seemingly simple construct, courts persistently confused questions of law with mixed questions, and vice versa, resulting in the inconsistent application of standards of review. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court drastically …

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …

John Mccain's Citizenship: A Tentative Defense, Stephen E. Sachs

Stephen E. Sachs

Sen. John McCain was born a U.S. citizen and is eligible to be president. The most serious challenge to his status, recently posed by Prof. Gabriel Chin, contends that the statute granting citizenship to Americans born abroad did not include the Panama Canal Zone, where McCain was born in 1936. When Congress amended the law in 1937, he concludes, it was too late for McCain to be "natural born." Even assuming, however, that McCain's citizenship depended on this statute - and ignoring his claim to citizenship at common law - Chin's argument may be based on a misreading. When the …

Why John Mccain Was A Citizen At Birth, Stephen E. Sachs

Stephen E. Sachs

Senator John McCain was born a citizen in 1936. Professor Gabriel J. Chin challenges this view in this Symposium, arguing that McCain’s birth in the Panama Canal Zone (while his father was stationed there by the Navy) fell into a loophole in the governing statute. The best historical evidence, however, suggests that this loophole is an illusion and that McCain is a "natural born Citizen" eligible to be president.

The Unitary Executive During The Third Half-Century, 1889-1945, Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, Laurence D. Nee

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent Supreme Court decisions and the impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress's authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to restrict the President's control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitution rejected the executive by committee employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a unitary executive, in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such established features …

The Unitary Executive During The Second Half-Century, Steven G. Calabresi, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent Supreme Court decisions and political events have reinvigorated the debate over Congress's authority to restrict the President's control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitutional Convention rejected the executive by committee employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a unitary executive in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has turned towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such established features of the constitutional landscape as to preempt arguments in favor of the unitary executive. …

The Legalization Of The Presidencey: A Twenty-Five Year Watergate Retrospective, Michael A. Fitts

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Unitary Executive During The First Half-Century, Steven G. Calabresi, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent Supreme Court decisions and the impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress’s authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to restrict the President’s control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitution rejected the “executive by committee” employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a “unitary executive,” in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such established features …