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Full-Text Articles in Legal History

The Commander In Chief's Authority To Combat Climate Change, Mark P. Nevitt Dec 2015

The Commander In Chief's Authority To Combat Climate Change, Mark P. Nevitt

Mark P Nevitt

Climate change is the world’s greatest environmental threat. And it is increasingly understood as a threat to domestic and international peace and security. In recognition of this threat, the President has taken the initiative to prepare for climate change’s impact – in some cases drawing sharp objections from Congress. While both the President and Congress have certain constitutional authorities to address the national security threat posed by climate change, the precise contours of their overlapping powers are unclear. As Commander in Chief, the President has the constitutional authority to repel sudden attacks and take care that the laws are faithfully …


Three-Dimensional Sovereign Immunity, Sarah L. Brinton Mar 2013

Three-Dimensional Sovereign Immunity, Sarah L. Brinton

Sarah L Brinton

The Supreme Court has erred on sovereign immunity. The current federal immunity doctrine wrongly gives Congress the exclusive authority to waive immunity (“exclusive congressional waiver”), but the Constitution mandates that Congress share the waiver power with the Court. This Article develops the doctrine of a two-way shared waiver and then explores a third possibility: the sharing of the immunity waiver power among all three branches of government.


Bridging The Divide: Finding Common Ground On The Modern Chevron Debate, Nicholas C. Stewart Jan 2012

Bridging The Divide: Finding Common Ground On The Modern Chevron Debate, Nicholas C. Stewart

Nicholas C Stewart

Traditionally, when reviewing an administrative agency’s adjudication or rulemaking under National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944), courts would ask whether the question before them was one of law or a mixed question of law and fact. While the former was accorded no deference, the latter received a great deal. Despite this seemingly simple construct, courts persistently confused questions of law with mixed questions, and vice versa, resulting in the inconsistent application of standards of review. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court drastically …


Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz Jan 2011

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …


Just The Facts: Solving The Corporate Privilege Waiver Dilemma, Don R. Berthiaume Jan 2010

Just The Facts: Solving The Corporate Privilege Waiver Dilemma, Don R. Berthiaume

Don R Berthiaume

How can corporations provide “just the facts” — which are, in fact, not privileged — without waiving the attorney client privilege and work product protection? This article argues for an addition to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure based upon Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows civil litigants to issue a subpoena to an organization and cause them to “designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf … about information known or reasonably available to the organization.”[6] Why should we look to Fed. …


John Mccain's Citizenship: A Tentative Defense, Stephen E. Sachs Aug 2008

John Mccain's Citizenship: A Tentative Defense, Stephen E. Sachs

Stephen E. Sachs

Sen. John McCain was born a U.S. citizen and is eligible to be president. The most serious challenge to his status, recently posed by Prof. Gabriel Chin, contends that the statute granting citizenship to Americans born abroad did not include the Panama Canal Zone, where McCain was born in 1936. When Congress amended the law in 1937, he concludes, it was too late for McCain to be "natural born." Even assuming, however, that McCain's citizenship depended on this statute - and ignoring his claim to citizenship at common law - Chin's argument may be based on a misreading. When the …


Why John Mccain Was A Citizen At Birth, Stephen E. Sachs Jan 2008

Why John Mccain Was A Citizen At Birth, Stephen E. Sachs

Stephen E. Sachs

Senator John McCain was born a citizen in 1936. Professor Gabriel J. Chin challenges this view in this Symposium, arguing that McCain’s birth in the Panama Canal Zone (while his father was stationed there by the Navy) fell into a loophole in the governing statute. The best historical evidence, however, suggests that this loophole is an illusion and that McCain is a "natural born Citizen" eligible to be president.


Functional Explanation And Metaphysical Individualism, Justin Schwartz Jan 1993

Functional Explanation And Metaphysical Individualism, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

A number of (present or former) analytical Marxists, such as Jon Elster, have argued that functional explanation has almost no place in the social sciences. (Although the discussion is framed in terms of a debate among analytical Marxists, the point is quite general, and Marxism is used for illustrative purposes.) Functional explanation accounts for what is to be explained by reference to its function; thus, sighted organism have eyes because eyes enable them to see. Elster and other critics of functional explanation argue that this pattern of explanation is inconsistent with "methodological individualism," the idea, as they understand it, that …