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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Legal History
Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
What did the “Decision of 1789” decide about presidential removal power, if anything? It turns out that an emerging consensus of scholars agrees that there was not much consensus in the First Congress.
Two more questions follow: Is the “unitary executive theory” based on originalism, and if so, is originalism a reliable method of interpretation based on historical evidence?
The unitary executive theory posits that a president has exclusive and “indefeasible” executive powers (i.e., powers beyond congressional and judicial checks and balances). This panel was an opportunity for unitary executive theorists and their critics to debate recent historical research questioning …
Major Questions About Presidentialism: Untangling The “Chain Of Dependence” Across Administrative Law, Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Jodi L. Short
Major Questions About Presidentialism: Untangling The “Chain Of Dependence” Across Administrative Law, Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Jodi L. Short
Faculty Scholarship
A contradiction about the role of the president has emerged between the Roberts Court’s Article II jurisprudence and its Major Questions Doctrine jurisprudence. In its appointment and removal decisions, the Roberts Court claims that the president is the “most democratic and politically accountable official in Government” because the president is “directly accountable to the people through regular elections,” an audacious new interpretation of Article II; and it argues that tight presidential control of agency officials lends democratic legitimacy to the administrative state. We identify these twin arguments about the “directly accountable president” and the “chain of dependence” as the foundation …
Immigration Unilateralism And American Ethnonationalism, Robert L. Tsai
Immigration Unilateralism And American Ethnonationalism, Robert L. Tsai
Faculty Scholarship
This paper arose from an invited symposium on "Democracy in America: The Promise and the Perils," held at Loyola University Chicago School of Law in Spring 2019. The essay places the Trump administration’s immigration and refugee policy in the context of a resurgent ethnonationalist movement in America as well as the constitutional politics of the past. In particular, it argues that Trumpism’s suspicion of foreigners who are Hispanic or Muslim, its move toward indefinite detention and separation of families, and its disdain for so-called “chain migration” are best understood as part of an assault on the political settlement of the …
The Dependent Origins Of Independent Agencies: The Interstate Commerce Commission, The Tenure Of Office Act, And The Rise Of Modern Campaign Finance, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
The Dependent Origins Of Independent Agencies: The Interstate Commerce Commission, The Tenure Of Office Act, And The Rise Of Modern Campaign Finance, Jed Handelsman Shugerman
Faculty Scholarship
Independent regulatory agencies are some of the most powerful institutions in the United States, and we think of them today as designed to be insulated from political control. This Article shows that their origins were the opposite: this model first emerged in the late nineteenth century because it offered more political control.
The modern executive's design of unitary presidential control over most offices, alongside "independent" regulatory agencies, took shape in the winter of 1886-1887. Congress repealed the Tenure of Office Act, giving the President the unchecked power to dismiss principal officers and ending the Senate's power to protect those officers. …