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Full-Text Articles in Legal History
A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp
A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp
ExpressO
The trend of the eminent domain reform and "Kelo plus" initiatives is toward a comprehensive Constitutional property right incorporating the elements of level of review, nature of government action, and extent of compensation. This article contains a draft amendment which reflects these concerns.
Bond Repudiation, Tax Codes, The Appropriations Process And Restitution Post-Eminent Domain Reform, John H. Ryskamp
Bond Repudiation, Tax Codes, The Appropriations Process And Restitution Post-Eminent Domain Reform, John H. Ryskamp
ExpressO
This brief comment suggests where the anti-eminent domain movement might be heading next.
Review Essay: Using All Available Information, Max Huffman
Review Essay: Using All Available Information, Max Huffman
ExpressO
This is a review essay entitled “Using All Available Information,” in which I review and comment on Justice Stephen Breyer’s new book, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, published in September 2005. Justice Breyer’s book, adapted from the Tanner Lectures given in 2005 at Harvard Law School, serves partly as a response to Justice Scalia’s 1997 volume A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. I review Justice Breyer’s book in part by comparison to and contrast with Justice Scalia’s. I propose that much about Justice Breyer’s interpretive philosophy, which centers on determining the “purposes” of texts and interpreting …
Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo
Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo
ExpressO
Legislation and Legitimation:
Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s
Abstract
Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy …