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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Legal History
Szerződésértelmezés Hermeneutika És Jogpolitika Között. A Contra Proferentem Szabály [Contract Interpretation Between Hermeneutics And Policy: The Contra Proferentem Rule], Péter Cserne
Péter Cserne
This paper discusses why contract interpretation is substantially different from the interpretation of literary works and illustrates the argument with the analysis of the contra proferentem rule. It is a substantially revised version of my ‘Policy considerations in contract interpretation: the contra proferentem rule from a comparative law and economics perspective’ (2009)
Citizens Not United: The Lack Of Stockholder Voluntariness In Corporatepolitical Speech, Elizabeth Pollman
Citizens Not United: The Lack Of Stockholder Voluntariness In Corporatepolitical Speech, Elizabeth Pollman
All Faculty Scholarship
As the Supreme Court reconsiders prior decisions upholding limits on corporate electioneering from general funds, this Essay suggests that the longstanding concern about the lack of stockholder assent to corporate political speech is more compelling than ever. Patterns of U.S. stockholding have significantly changed in the past several decades so as to heighten the concern and caution against a broad overruling of precedents. Stockholders' ability to sell their securities or pursue a derivative action, and other means of "corporate democracy," do not alleviate the concern. A broad decision in favor of Citizens United could leave even stockholders who carefully screen …
Originalism Is Bunk, Mitchell N. Berman
Invisible Ink In The Eighth Arrondissement, Karl T. Muth
Invisible Ink In The Eighth Arrondissement, Karl T. Muth
Karl T Muth
IMPORTANT: This document may prompt you for a username and password. If this occurs, please simply click "cancel" and the document will load. Thank you. This Article deals with the history of the secret contract that governs the distribution of economic rents enjoyed by Formula One. It further explores the environment in which this secret contract evolved and briefly discusses applications for secret contracts in other scenarios and industries.
Paternalism In Policy: Prospects And Limitations Of An Economic Analysis, Péter Cserne
Paternalism In Policy: Prospects And Limitations Of An Economic Analysis, Péter Cserne
Péter Cserne
No abstract provided.
A Közteherviselés (70/I. §) [The Constitutional Duty To Contribute To Public Expenditures. Hungary 1989-2009], Péter Cserne
A Közteherviselés (70/I. §) [The Constitutional Duty To Contribute To Public Expenditures. Hungary 1989-2009], Péter Cserne
Péter Cserne
This is a chapter in the 2 volume commentary on the (pre-2012) Hungarian constitution, edited by Andras Jakab. It provides a legal doctrinal analysis of the constitutional power to tax, as regulated in Art 70/I of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (the duty to contribute to public expenditures) and interpreted by the Hungarian Constitutional Court.