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Legal History

Cornell University Law School

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Pragmatic instrumentalism

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Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Legal History

Summers's Primer On Fuller's Jurisprudence – A Wholly Disinterested Assessment Of The Reviews By Professors Wueste And Lebel, Robert S. Summers Jan 1986

Summers's Primer On Fuller's Jurisprudence – A Wholly Disinterested Assessment Of The Reviews By Professors Wueste And Lebel, Robert S. Summers

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


On Identifying And Reconstructing A General Legal Theory – Some Thoughts Prompted By Professor Moore’S Critique, Robert S. Summers Jan 1983

On Identifying And Reconstructing A General Legal Theory – Some Thoughts Prompted By Professor Moore’S Critique, Robert S. Summers

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Pragmatic Instrumentalism In Twentieth Century American Legal Thought—A Synthesis And Critique Of Our Dominant General Theory About Law And Its Use, Robert S. Summers Jan 1981

Pragmatic Instrumentalism In Twentieth Century American Legal Thought—A Synthesis And Critique Of Our Dominant General Theory About Law And Its Use, Robert S. Summers

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence And America's Dominant Philosophy Of Law, Robert S. Summers Dec 1978

Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence And America's Dominant Philosophy Of Law, Robert S. Summers

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The late Lon L. Fuller played an influential role in the development of American jurisprudence, but his views have not always prevailed. In this tribute to the memory of Professor Fuller, Professor Summers outlines the major tenets of what he perceives to be our dominant philosophy of law – “pragmatic instrumentalism” – by way of contrasting that philosophy with the views of Professor Fuller. Professor Summers concludes that these two philosophies differ in many important respects and that our dominant philosophy of law should accommodate, and may indeed already be in the process of accommodating, the thought of Professor Fuller.