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Full-Text Articles in Legal History
The Tenuous Case For Conscience, Steven D. Smith
The Tenuous Case For Conscience, Steven D. Smith
Steven D. Smith
If there is any single theme that has provided the foundation of modern liberalism and has infused our more specific constitutional commitments to freedom of religion and freedom of speech, that theme is probably “freedom of conscience.” But some observers also perceive a progressive cheapening of conscience– even a sort of degradation. Such criticisms suggest the need for a contemporary rethinking of conscience. When we reverently invoke “conscience,” do we have any idea what we are talking about? Or are we just exploiting a venerable theme for rhetorical purposes without any clear sense of what “conscience” is or why it …
Cosmopolitanism And Constitutional Self-Government, Vlad F. Perju
Cosmopolitanism And Constitutional Self-Government, Vlad F. Perju
Vlad Perju
This paper, which was selected for presentation at the 2010 Yale/Stanford Junior Faculty Forum, articulates the theoretical steps by which self-government in a free community of equals leads constitutional analysis outside the boundaries of that political community. Openness to the experiences in self-government of other peoples is commonly assumed to undermine political legitimacy by loosing citizens’ control over their political fate. But is it possible that such openness might in fact render that control more effective? Could it actually enhance political and constitutional legitimacy? This paper articulates and defends the following claims: 1) The legitimacy of a political order is …
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz
Justin Schwartz
This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …