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Legal History Commons

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Law and Society

BLR

2006

Law and Economics

Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Legal History

A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp Oct 2006

A Complete Property Right Amendment, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

The trend of the eminent domain reform and "Kelo plus" initiatives is toward a comprehensive Constitutional property right incorporating the elements of level of review, nature of government action, and extent of compensation. This article contains a draft amendment which reflects these concerns.


Developing Development Theory: Law & Development Orthodoxies And The Northeast Asian Experience, John K.M. Ohnesorge Jul 2006

Developing Development Theory: Law & Development Orthodoxies And The Northeast Asian Experience, John K.M. Ohnesorge

ExpressO

None of the orthodox theories about law and economic development produced in recent decades has been based on a study of the "miracle" economies of Northeast Asia, nor have any of these orthodoxies seriously been tested against the Northeast Asian experience of law and development. This article conducts such a test, finding that none of these orthodoxies fares well when its claims are tested against the Northeast Asian experience. Rather than using Northeast Asia's experience to produce yet another orthodoxy, however, this article instead proposes rethinking how we understand the task of legal technical assistance, a rethinking which is based …


Bond Repudiation, Tax Codes, The Appropriations Process And Restitution Post-Eminent Domain Reform, John H. Ryskamp Jun 2006

Bond Repudiation, Tax Codes, The Appropriations Process And Restitution Post-Eminent Domain Reform, John H. Ryskamp

ExpressO

This brief comment suggests where the anti-eminent domain movement might be heading next.


Before Competition: Origins Of The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Frederick Tung Mar 2006

Before Competition: Origins Of The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Frederick Tung

ExpressO

To the modern corporate scholar and lawyer, the internal affairs doctrine seems in the natural order of things. Corporate law is state law. Each corporation is formed under the law of its chosen state of incorporation. To ensure consistency and predictability, that law must govern the corporation’s internal affairs. Yet the origin of such a doctrine is puzzling. Respecting the firm’s choice of corporate law, the doctrine forces state legislatures into competition to attract incorporations. But how did legislatures come to concede their traditional territorial regulatory authority, and instead agree to compete? This Article solves this puzzle, offering the first …


Justice And The Evolution Of The Common Law, Richard O. Zerbe Feb 2006

Justice And The Evolution Of The Common Law, Richard O. Zerbe

ExpressO

Empirical evidence shows, and theory suggests, that the common law tends toward economic efficiency. While various theories attempt to explain this phenomenon, no single one is well accepted. This article provides a simple explanation. It suggests that efficiency arises as a matter of justice. Justice is sought because justice-seeking is a social norm with its own sanctioning force. Justice is sought and efficiency achieved because they substantially overlap. Limitations in the traditional definition of efficiency, however, ensure that efficiency is not congruent with justice. This paper suggests that it can be: the congruence of justice and efficiency will be greater …


Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo Feb 2006

Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo

ExpressO

Legislation and Legitimation:

Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s

Abstract

Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy …