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Full-Text Articles in Legal History
Textualism And The Problem Of Scrivener's Error, John David Ohlendorf
Textualism And The Problem Of Scrivener's Error, John David Ohlendorf
Maine Law Review
Scrivener’s errors make easy prey for the gentle comedy of the bench and bar, much in the way that typographical errors in billboards, newspaper headlines, and church bulletins form an endless source of humor for late night talk show hosts. But theorists of legal interpretation have long seen that scrivener’s errors pose a more serious problem. The doctrine surrounding scrivener’s error stands considered as something of a cousin to the absurdity doctrine, which has roots extending to the earliest days of the American Republic. More recently, the post-legal-process revival of formalist approaches to statutory interpretation on the bench, and their …
The Injustice Of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, Anthony D'Amato
The Injustice Of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, Anthony D'Amato
Faculty Working Papers
How can we possibly plan our lives on the basis of the law of tomorrow when we can't predict what that law will be? Are courts that are attracted to dynamic statutory interpretation teaching us that we can no longer know and rely on the rule of law in our daily lives because months or years later they can use policy considerations to make new law and apply that law retroactively to us? Doesn't dynamic statutory interpretation amount to unconstitutional ex post facto legislation? Hasn't justice become impossible to get from courts if judges insist on upsetting both sides' expectations …
Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation Of Statutes?, Anthony D'Amato
Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation Of Statutes?, Anthony D'Amato
Faculty Working Papers
An aspect of the battle over deconstruction is whether resort to legislative intent might help to determine the content of a statutory text that otherwise, in splendid isolation, could be deconstructed by simply positing different interpretive contexts. I examine the same issue by recounting my own quest for determinate meaning in statutes—a sort of personal legislative history. I do not claim for jurisprudence the role of ensuring faithful reception of the legislature's message, for that is impossible. At best, jurisprudential theory only reduces the degrees of interpretive freedom, and then only probably, not necessarily. The more significant thesis of this …