Legal History Commons^™

Framing The Chicago School Of Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Fiona Scott Morton

All Faculty Scholarship

The Chicago School of antitrust has benefited from a great deal of law office history, written by admiring advocates rather than more dispassionate observers. This essay attempts a more neutral stance, looking at the ideology, political impulses, and economics that produced the Chicago School of antitrust policy and that account for its durability.

The origins of the Chicago School lie in a strong commitment to libertarianism and nonintervention. Economic models of perfect competition best suited these goals. The early strength of the Chicago School of antitrust was that it provided simple, convincing answers to everything that was wrong with antitrust …

‘Jogalkotási Javaslatok Megfogalmazása A Jogtudományban’ [Policy Proposals And Legal Scholarship], Péter Cserne, György Gajduschek

Péter Cserne

This is the manuscript of a chapter written for a Hungarian handbook on legal scholarship. It provides an historical overview and a theoretical defense of a policy oriented, in contrast to doctrinal, study of law. The chapter also provides an introduction to the foundations and methodological tools of public policy analysis, including regulatory impact assessment.

Szerződésértelmezés Hermeneutika És Jogpolitika Között. A Contra Proferentem Szabály [Contract Interpretation Between Hermeneutics And Policy: The Contra Proferentem Rule], Péter Cserne

Péter Cserne

This paper discusses why contract interpretation is substantially different from the interpretation of literary works and illustrates the argument with the analysis of the contra proferentem rule. It is a substantially revised version of my ‘Policy considerations in contract interpretation: the contra proferentem rule from a comparative law and economics perspective’ (2009)

Jogelmélet Jog Nélkül? [Legal Theory Without Law?], Péter Cserne

Péter Cserne

No abstract provided.

The Limits Of Preference-Based Legal Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

America's political institutions are built on the principle that individual preferences are central to the formation of policy. The two most important institutions in our system, democracy and the market, make individual preference decisive in the formation of policy and the allocation of resources. American legal traditions have always reflected the centrality of preference in policy determination. In private law, the importance of preference is reflected mainly in the development and persistence of common-law rules, which are intended to facilitate private transactions over legal entitlements. In constitutional law, the centrality of preference is reflected in the high position we assign …