Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Bernkrant v. Fowler (1)
- Constitutional Criminal Procedure (1)
- Economic Rights (1)
- Exclusionary Rule (1)
- Fact Finding (1)
-
- Fifth Amendment (1)
- Functional choice-of-law theory (1)
- Hearsay Declarations (1)
- Illegally-Obtained Evidence (1)
- Individual Rights (1)
- James v. Illinois (1)
- Judicial Intervention (1)
- Legal doctrine (1)
- Legal instrumentalism (1)
- Legal thought (1)
- Local regulation of multistate disputes (1)
- Lochner (1)
- New Deal (1)
- Private international law (1)
- Prosecutorial Neglect (1)
- Right to Contract (1)
- Sixth Amendment (1)
- Substantive Due Process (1)
- Technical legal devices (1)
- Walder v. United States (1)
Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Legal History
A New Agenda For The Cultural Study Of Law: Taking On The Technicalities, Annelise Riles
A New Agenda For The Cultural Study Of Law: Taking On The Technicalities, Annelise Riles
Annelise Riles
This article urges humanistic legal studies to take the technical dimensions of law as a central focus of inquiry. Using archival and ethnographic investigations into developments in American Conflict of Laws doctrines as an example, and building on insights in the anthropology of knowledge and in science and technology studies that focus on technical practices in scientific and engineering domains, it aims to show that the technologies of law - an ideology that law is a tool and an accompanying technical aesthetic of legal knowledge - are far more central and far more interesting dimensions of legal practice than humanists …
The Concept Of Function And The Basis Of Regulatory Interests Under Functional Choice-Of-Law Theory: The Significance Of Benefit And The Insignificance Of Intention, Gregory S. Alexander
The Concept Of Function And The Basis Of Regulatory Interests Under Functional Choice-Of-Law Theory: The Significance Of Benefit And The Insignificance Of Intention, Gregory S. Alexander
Gregory S Alexander
Recent literature and judicial opinions have recognized the need for control and consistency in choice of law. Although the formulation of choice-of-law theory in terms of the states' interests in the conflicting rules at issue has gained wide acceptance, the courts have been unable to agree upon criteria for determining when a state has a valid interest in dispute resolution. Moreover, courts frequently appear all too eager to use contemporary choice-of-law analysis to justify local regulation of multistate disputes despite insubstantial local relationships. The inconsistency and local bias both stem from the lack of a coherent theory for discerning the …
Historical Framework For Reviving Constitutional Protection For Property And Contract Rights , James L. Kainen
Historical Framework For Reviving Constitutional Protection For Property And Contract Rights , James L. Kainen
James L. Kainen
Post-New Deal constitutionalism is in search of a theory that justifies judicial intervention on behalf of individual rights while simultaneously avoiding the charge of "Lochnerism."' The dominant historical view dismisses post-bellum substantive due process as an anomalous development in the American constitutional tradition. Under this approach, Lochner represents unbounded protection for economic rights that permitted the judiciary to read laissez faire, pro-business policy preferences into the constitutional text. Today's revisionists have mounted a substantial challenge to the dismissive views of traditionalists. Indeed, some claim Lochner reached the right result, but for the wrong reason. The revisionists characterize substantive due process …
Impeachment Exception To The Exclusionary Rules: Policies, Principles, And Politics, The , James L. Kainen
Impeachment Exception To The Exclusionary Rules: Policies, Principles, And Politics, The , James L. Kainen
James L. Kainen
The exclusionary evidence rules derived from the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments continue to play an important role in constitutional criminal procedure, despite the intense controversy that surrounds them. The primary justification for these rules has shifted from an "imperative of judicial integrity" to the "deterrence of police conduct that violates... [constitutional] rights." Regardless of the justification it uses for the rules' existence, the Supreme Court continues to limit their breadth "at the margin," when "the acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational system of criminal justice" outweigh the deterrent effects of exclusion. The most notable limitation on …
Truth, Deterrence, And The Impeachment Exception , James L. Kainen
Truth, Deterrence, And The Impeachment Exception , James L. Kainen
James L. Kainen
James v. Illinois permits illegally-obtained evidence to impeach defendants, but not defense witnesses. Thus far, all courts have construed James to allow impeachment of defendants' hearsay declarations. This article argues against allowing illegally-obtained evidence to impeach defendants' hearsay declarations because doing so unduly diminishes the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect. The distinction between impeaching defendants and defense witnesses disappears when courts allow prosecutors to impeach defendants' hearsay declarations. Because defense witnesses report exculpatory conduct of a defendant who always has a substantial interest in disguising his criminality, their testimony routinely incorporates defendant hearsay. Defense witness testimony thus routinely paves the way …