Legal History Commons^™

Multifactoral Free Speech, Alexander Tsesis

Northwestern University Law Review

This Article presents a multifactoral approach to free speech analysis. Difficult cases present a variety of challenges that require judges to weigh concerns for the protection of robust dialogue, especially about public issues, against concerns that sound in common law (such as reputation), statutory law (such as repose against harassment), and in constitutional law (such as copyright). Even when speech is implicated, the Court should aim to resolve other relevant individual and social issues arising from litigation. Focusing only on free speech categories is likely to discount substantial, and sometimes compelling, social concerns warranting reflection, analysis, and application. Examining the …

The Democratic First Amendment, Ashutosh Bhagwat

Northwestern University Law Review

Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court and most First Amendment scholars have taken the position that the primary reason why the First Amendment protects freedom of speech is to advance democratic self-governance. In this Article, I will argue that this position, while surely correct insofar as it goes, is also radically incomplete. The fundamental problem is that the Court and, until recently, scholars have focused exclusively on the Religion Clauses and the Free Speech Clause. The rest of the First Amendment—the Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses—might as well not exist. The topic of this Article is the five …

The Prosser Myth Of Transferred Intent, Peter B. Kutner

Indiana Law Journal

The main theme of this Article is that Prosser advanced a mythical doctrine of transferred intent. What Prosser asserted to be the law was not the law when he wrote his article on transferred intent and amended his treatise. The cases he relied on to support his conclusions on transferred intent did not support them. Moreover, despite Prosser’s great influence on American tort law, Prosser’s position on transferred intent is not the law now and should not be. Its consequences are undesirable. Recognition of transferred intent as a basis of liability is due primarily to its inclusion in the First …

The Scrivener’S Error, Ryan D. Doerfler

Northwestern University Law Review

It is widely accepted that courts may correct legislative drafting mistakes, i.e., so-called scrivener’s errors, if and only if such mistakes are “absolutely clear.” The rationale is that if a court were to recognize a less clear error, it might be “rewriting” the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.

This Article argues that the standard is much too strict. The current rationale ignores that courts can “rewrite,” i.e., misinterpret, a statute both by recognizing an error and by failing to do so. Accordingly, because the current doctrine is designed to protect against one type of mistake (false positives) but …

Some Comparative Legal History: Robbery And Brigandage, Bernard S. Jackson

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Juvenile Culpability And The Felony Murder Rule: Applying The Enmund Standard To Juveniles Facing Felony Murder Charges, Sterling Root

Senior Theses and Projects

Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has issued decisions in numerous cases (Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, Miller v. Alabama, and Montgomery v. Louisiana) involving juvenile sentencing that have radically transformed our juvenile criminal justice system. While some of these cases did involve juveniles convicted of felony murder, the Supreme Court never directly addressed how to handle juvenile sentencing in felony murder cases. This leaves a gap in society’s understanding of juvenile felony murder sentencing that must be addressed. Otherwise, many juveniles that never intended, attempted, or wished that a life be taken might spend the rest of …

The English East India Company And The Modern Corporation: Legacies, Lessons, And Limitations, Philip J. Stern

Seattle University Law Review

The English East India Company was first chartered in 1600, endured until the late nineteenth century, and, in a clever act of corporate resurrection, has even recently returned as a global, upmarket retail outlet selling fine foods and commemorative coins. It has also endured in the popular imagination and culture, churning out heroes and villains alike in film, television, and video games. The script writer for a forthcoming BBC miniseries, in which the East India Company stars as the prime antagonist, even noted recently that the Company was like “the CIA, the NSA, and the biggest, baddest multinational corporation on …

Creating A Literature For The King’S Courts In The Later Thirteenth Century: Hengham Magna, Fet Asaver, And Bracton, Thomas J. Mcsweeney

Faculty Publications

The early common law produced a rich literature. This article examines two of the most popular legal treatises of the second half of the thirteenth century, Hengham Magna and Fet Asaver. It has long been recognized that these two treatises bear some relationship to each other. This article will attempt to establish that relationship, arguing that Hengham Magna and Fet Asaver were written by different people; that Fet Asaver borrows from Hengham Magna; and that the authors of both texts had independent access to the Bracton treatise. The article concludes by suggesting a new way to think about the legal …

A Cautionary Look At A Cautionary Doctrine, Andrew W. Fine

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

Optimism is an indispensable element of effective salesmanship. It is therefore quite natural for the directors of public companies to want to optimistically tout the potential long-term benefits of investing in their companies. After all, directors of public companies must be empowered to attract the attention and money of American investors. But what happens if these long-term projections fail to come true? Who is to blame for long-term projections that are simply unrealistic? A doctrine called the “bespeaks caution” doctrine has emerged in order to govern these inquiries, and holds that these optimistic forward-looking statements are legally immunized provided that …

Lights Hidden Under Bushel's Case, Thomas A. Green

Book Chapters

Some forty years ago, Charlie Donahue created a course which he titled "Law, Morals and Society." Designed for undergraduates, and situated among the offerings of the University of Michigan's interdisciplinary Medieval and Renaissance Collegium, the course reflected the approach to doing history that, as this volume recognizes, Charlie has followed throughout his long and enormously influential career as scholar, teacher, lecturer, and inepressible master of well-timed interventions during conference-panel discussion periods. "LMS" was composed of four units. Charlie, who taught two of them, led off with the legal basis for the deposition of Richard II; I followed with the law …

The Magna Carta And The Beginning Of Modern Legal Thought, Vincent R. Johnson

Faculty Articles

As the Magna Carta, England's Great Charter of Liberties, marks its eighth centennial, it is appropriate to ask what's in it. The answer, it turns out, lives up to the legend. What's in the Magna Carta is the beginning of modern legal thought. The Great Charter set the expectations that for 800 years have shaped the development of the law in England, America, and around the globe. Like a blazing light piercing the medieval darkness, the Magna Carta illuminated the importance of legal principles, fair procedures, proportional punishment, official accountability, and respect for human dignity. It was unlike any legal …

Law And Regime Change: The Common Law, Knowledge Regimes, And Democracy Between The Nineteenth And Twentieth Centuries, Kunal Parker

Articles

Using a change in knowledge regime as a paradigm of regime change, this paper explores the career of common law thinking in the United States between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It shows how, under the pressures of anti-foundational thinking, knowledge moved from a nineteenth-century regime of “knowledge that,” a regime of foundational knowledge, to an early-twentieth-century regime of “knowledge how,” a regime of anti-foundational knowledge concerned with the procedures, processes, and protocols of arriving at knowledge. It then shows how common law thinkers adapted to this change in knowledge regimes, transforming the common law from a body of substantive …

Cases And Case-Lawyers, Richard A. Danner

Faculty Scholarship

In the nineteenth century, the term “case-lawyer” was used as a label for lawyers who seemed to care more about locating precedents applicable to their current cases than understanding the principles behind the reported case law. Criticisms of case-lawyers appeared in English journals in the late 1820s, then in the United States, usually from those who believed that every lawyer needed to know and understand the unchanging principles of the common law in order to resolve issues not found in the reported cases. After the Civil War, expressions of concern about caselawyers increased with the significant growth in the amount …

Incumbent Landscapes, Disruptive Uses: Perspectives On Marijuana-Related Land Use Control, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan