Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons^™

Qualified Immunity, Sovereign Immunity, And Systemic Reform, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Publications

Qualified immunity has become a central target of the movement for police reform and racial justice since George Floyd’s murder. And rightly so. Qualified immunity, which shields government officials from damages for constitutional violations even in many egregious cases, should have no place in federal law. But in critical respects, qualified immunity has become too much a focus of the conversation about constitutional-enforcement reform. The recent reappraisal offers unique opportunities to explore deeper problems and seek deeper solutions.

This Article argues that the public and policymakers should reconsider other aspects of the constitutional-tort system—especially sovereign immunity and related protections for …

The Supreme Court's Reticent Qualified Immunity Retreat, Katherine Mims Crocker

Faculty Publications

The recent outcry against qualified immunity, a doctrine that disallows damages actions against government officials for a wide swath of constitutional claims, has been deafening. But when the Supreme Court in November 2020 and February 2021 invalidated grants of qualified immunity based on reasoning at the heart of the doctrine for the first time since John Roberts became Chief Justice, the response was muted. With initial evaluations and competing understandings coming from legal commentators in the months since, this Essay explores what these cases appear to say about qualified immunity for today and tomorrow.

The Essay traces idealistic, pessimistic, and …

Rethinking The Reasonable Response: Safeguarding The Promise Of Kingsley For Conditions Of Confinement, Hanna Rutkowski

Michigan Law Review

Nearly five million individuals are admitted to America’s jails each year, and at any given time, two-thirds of those held in jail have not been convicted of a crime. Under current Supreme Court doctrine, these pretrial detainees are functionally protected by the same standard as convicted prisoners, despite the fact that they are formally protected by different constitutional amendments. A 2015 decision, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, declared that a different standard would apply to pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners in the context of use of force: consistent with the Constitution’s mandate that they not be punished at all, pretrial detainees …

The Failure Of The Criminal Procedure Revolution, William T. Pizzi

Publications

No abstract provided.

Wrong Turn On The Ex Post Facto Clause, Paul D. Reingold, Kimberly Thomas

Articles

The Ex Post Facto Clause bars any increase in punishment after the commission of a crime. But deciding what constitutes an increase in punishment can be tricky. At the front end of a criminal case, where new or amended criminal laws might lengthen prisoners’ sentences if applied retroactively, courts have routinely struck down such changes under the Ex Post Facto Clause. At the back end, however, where new or amended parole laws or policies might lengthen prisoners’ sentences in exactly the same way if applied retroactively, courts have used a different standard and upheld the changes under the Ex Post …

The Constitutional Law Of Incarceration, Reconfigured, Margo Schlanger

Articles

On any given day, about 2.2 million people are confined in U.S. jails and prisons—nearly 0.9% of American men are in prison, and another 0.4% are in jail. This year, 9 or 10 million people will spend time in our prisons and jails; about 5000 of them will die there. A decade into a frustratingly gradual decline in incarceration numbers, the statistics have grown familiar: We have 4.4% of the world’s population but over 20% of its prisoners. Our incarceration rate is 57% higher than Russia’s (our closest major country rival in imprisonment), nearly four times the rate in England, …

From Grace To Grids: Rethinking Due Process Protections For Parole., Kimberly A. Thomas, Paul D. Reingold

Articles

Current due process law gives little protection to prisoners at the point of parole, even though the parole decision, like sentencing, determines whether or not a person will serve more time or will go free. The doctrine regarding parole, which developed mostly in the late 1970s, was based on a judicial understanding of parole as an experimental, subjective, and largely standardless art—rooted in assessing the individual “character” of the potential parolee. In this Article we examine the foundations of the doctrine, and conclude that the due process inquiry at the point of parole should take into account the stark changes …

To Seek A Newer World: Prisoners’ Rights At The Frontier, David M. Shapiro

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Prisoners’ rights lawyers have long faced a dismal legal landscape. Yet, 2015 was a remarkable year for prison litigation that could signal a new period for this area of law—the Supreme Court handed down decisions that will reverberate in prison jurisprudence for decades to come. New questions have been asked, new avenues opened. This piece is about what the Court has done recently, and what possibilities it has opened for the future. More broadly, I suggest that the Court may be subjecting prison officials to greater scrutiny and that this shifting judicial landscape reflects an evolving social discourse about prison …

The Firing Squad As "A Known And Available Alternative Method Of Execution" Post-Glossip, Deborah W. Denno

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article does not address the medical debate surrounding the role of midazolam in executions; the problems associated with using the drug have been persuasively argued elsewhere. Nor does it question the soundness of the Glossip Court’s “alternative method of execution” requirement. Rather, this Article’s proposed reform is a constitutionally acceptable alternative that meets the Glossip Court’s standard, rendering moot—at least for the purposes of the following discussion—very real concerns regarding the validity of that dictate. Part I of this Article pinpoints several areas where the Glossip Court goes wrong in glaringly inaccurate or misleading ways, given the vast history …

The Demise Of Habeas Corpus And The Rise Of Qualified Immunity: The Court's Ever Increasing Limitations On The Development And Enforcement Of Constitutional Rights And Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, Stephen R. Reinhardt

Michigan Law Review

The collapse of habeas corpus as a remedy for even the most glaring of constitutional violations ranks among the greater wrongs of our legal era. Once hailed as the Great Writ, and still feted with all the standard rhetorical flourishes, habeas corpus has been transformed over the past two decades from a vital guarantor of liberty into an instrument for ratifying the power of state courts to disregard the protections of the Constitution. Along with so many other judicial tools meant to safeguard the powerless, enforce constitutional rights, and hold the government accountable, habeas has been slowly eroded by a …

Banning The Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement Is Cruel And Far Too Usual Punishment, Elizabeth Bennion

Indiana Law Journal

The United States engages in extreme practices of solitary confinement that maximize isolation and sensory deprivation of prisoners. The length is often indefinite and can stretch for weeks, months, years, or decades. Under these conditions, both healthy prisoners and those with preexisting mental-health issues often severely deteriorate both mentally and physically. New science and data provide increased insight into why and how human beings (and other social animals) deteriorate and suffer in such environments. The science establishes that meaningful social contacts and some level of opportunity for sensory enrichment are minimum human necessities. When those necessities are denied, the high …

Federal Incarceration By Contract In A Post-Minneci World: Legislation To Equalize The Constitutional Rights Of Prisoners, Allison L. Waks

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In the 2012 case Minneci v. Pollard, the United States Supreme Court held that federal prisoners assigned to privately-run prisons may not bring actions for violations of their Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment and may instead bring actions sounding only in state tort law. A consequence of this decision is that the arbitrary assignment of some federal prisoners to privately-run prisons deprives them of an equal opportunity to vindicate this federal constitutional right and pursue a federal remedy. Yet all federal prisoners should be entitled to the same protection under the United States Constitution-regardless of the type …

The Policeman's Duty And The Law Pertaining To Citizen Encounters, Charles M. Oberly Iii

Pepperdine Law Review

In this article the author, by case analysis, identifies the confusion facing police officers when dealing with stop and frisk situations and suggests adoption of the Model Rules of Stop and Frisk as a possible solution to the problem.

Plata V. Brown And Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, And Politics, Margo Schlanger

Articles

The year 2011 marked an important milestone in American institutional reform litigation. That year, a bare majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion in Brown v. Plata by Justice Anthony Kennedy, affirmed a district court order requiring California to remedy its longstanding constitutional deficits in prison medical and mental health care by reducing prison crowding. Not since 1978 had the Court ratified a lower court's crowding-related order in a jail or prison case, and the order before the Court in 2011 was fairly aggressive; theoretically, it could have (although this was never a real prospect) induced the release …

Dubious Delegation: Article Iii Limits On Mental Health Treatment Decisions, Adam Teitelbaum

Michigan Law Review

A common condition of supervised release requires a defendant, post-incarceration, to participate in a mental health treatment program. Federal district courts often order probation officers to make certain decisions ancillary to these programs. However Article III delegation doctrine places limits on such actions. This Note addresses the constitutionality of delegating the "treatment program" decision, in which a probation officer decides which type of treatment the defendant must undergo; the choice is often between inpatient treatment and other less restrictive alternatives. The resolution of this issue ultimately depends on whether this decision constitutes a "judicial act." Finding support in lower court …

J.D.B. V. North Carolina And The Reasonable Person, Christopher Jackson

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

This Term, the Supreme Court was presented with a prime opportunity to provide some much-needed clarification on a "backdrop" issue of law-one of many topics that arises in a variety of legal contexts, but is rarely analyzed on its own terms. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court considered whether age was a relevant factor in determining if a suspect is "in custody" for Miranda purposes, and thus must have her rights read to her before being questioned by the police. Miranda, like dozens of other areas of law, employs a reasonable person test on the custodial question: it asks …

Don't Answer The Door: Montejo V. Louisiana Relaxes Police Restrictions For Questioning Non-Custodial Defendants, Emily Bretz

Michigan Law Review

In 2009, the Supreme Court held in Montejo v. Louisiana that a defendant may validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during police interrogation, even if police initiate interrogation after the defendant's invocation of the right at the first formal proceeding. This Note asserts that Montejo significantly altered the Sixth Amendment protections available to represented defendants. By increasing defendants' exposure to law enforcement, the decision allows police to try to elicit incriminating statements and waivers of the right to counsel after the defendant has expressed a desire for counsel. In order to protect the defendant's constitutional guarantee of a …

Miranda's Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared The Landmark Confession Case, But Weakened Its Impact, Yale Kamisar

Articles

June marks the 40th anniversary of one of the most praised, most maligned-and probably one of the most misunderstood-U.S. Supreme Court cases in American history, Miranda v. Arizona. The opinion by Chief Justice Earl Warren conditions police questioning of people in custody on the giving of warnings about the right to remain silent, the right to counsel and the waiver of those rights. 384 U.S. 436. This ruling represents a compromise of sorts between the former elusive, ambiguous and subjective voluntariness/totality-of-the-circumstances test and extreme proposals that would have eliminated police interrogation altogether. But William H. Rehnquist didn't see Miranda that …

Congress' Arrogance, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Does Dickerson v. U.S., reaffirming Miranda and striking down §3501 (the federal statute purporting to "overrule" Miranda), demonstrate judicial arrogance? Or does the legislative history of §3501 demonstrate the arrogance of Congress? Shortly after Dickerson v. U.S. reaffirmed Miranda and invalidated §3501, a number of Supreme Court watchers criticized the Court for its "judicial arrogance" in peremptorily rejecting Congress' test for the admissibility of confessions. The test, pointed out the critics, had been adopted by extensive hearings and debate about Miranda's adverse impact on law enforcement. The Dickerson Court did not discuss the legislative history of §3501 at all. However, …

The New American Caste System: The Supreme Court And Discrimination Among Civil Rights Plaintiffs, Melissa L. Koehn

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Fifteen percent of the decisions issued by the Supreme Court during its 1996-97 Term centered around section 1983. Section 1983 provides civil rights plaintiffs with a procedural mechanism for vindicating their federally protected rights, including those enshrined in the Constitution. The Court's decisions from its 1996-97 Term reflect a continuation of the alarming trend that has permeated section 1983 for the last two decades-a movement to decrease the scope of section 1983, regardless of the impact on constitutional rights. The Supreme Court appears to be creating a hierarchy both of constitutional rights and of plaintiffs: free speech and takings claims …

The “Midnight Assassination Law” And Minnesota’S Anti-Death Penalty Movement, John Bessler

All Faculty Scholarship

This article traces the history of Minnesota's anti-death penalty movement and the 1889 Minnesota law - dubbed by contemporaries as the "midnight assassination law" - requiring private, nighttime executions. That law, authored by Minnesota legislator John Day Smith, restricted the number of execution spectators, prohibited newspapers from printing any execution details, and provided that only the fact of the execution could be lawfully printed. Also commonly referred to as the "John Day Smith law," this Minnesota statute was challenged as being unconstitutional by Minnesota newspapers after those newspapers printed details of a botched hanging and were charged with violating the …

Chopping Miranda Down To Size, Michael Chertoff

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Confessions, Truth, and the Law by Joseph D. Grano

A Holistic Approach To Criminal Justice Scholarship, William T. Pizzi

Publications

No abstract provided.

Incorporating The Suspension Clause: Is There A Constitutional Right To Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners?, Jordan Steiker

Michigan Law Review

In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court adopted generous standards governing federal habeas petitions by state prisoners. At that time, the Court suggested, rather surprisingly, that its solicitude toward such petitions might be constitutionally mandated by the Suspension Clause, the only provision in the Constitution that explicitly refers to the "Writ of Habeas Corpus." Now, thirty years later, the Court has essentially overruled those expansive rulings, and Congress has considered, though not yet enacted, further limitations on the availability of the writ. Despite these significant assaults on the habeas forum, the constitutional argument appears to have been entirely abandoned. The …

Guilt: Henry Friendly Meets The Maharal Of Prague, Irene Merker Rosenberg, Yale L. Rosenberg

Michigan Law Review

So while the overnight deliberation rule is at least partially bound up with the question of reliability and relates to the judicial process itself, the broader and more fundamental issue raised by this law is whether we should free the guilty to preserve a value that we deem necessary to proper working of the criminal justice process, regardless of the culpability of individual defendants. To this Judge Friendly's answer is generally no, 113 and the MaHaRaL's is yes.

Confusing The Fifth Amendment With The Sixth: Lower Court Misapplication Of The Innis Definition Of Interrogation, Jonathan L. Marks

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines how these courts have applied or misapplied Innis, and concludes that, while many of these decisions are consistent with Miranda and Innis, too many others are not. In order to evaluate these cases, it is first necessary to understand the meaning and significance of Innis. Part I thus considers Innis and its background. Part II then examines lower court decisions applying the Innis test, dividing these decisions into six groups based on the most common factual scenarios. Because the cases deal with factually specific police practices, this method constitutes the most useful way to …

Police-Obtained Evidence And The Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, Arnold H. Loewy

Michigan Law Review

The article will consider four different types of police-obtained evidence: evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation, confessions and lineup identifications obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel, and coerced confessions. My conclusions are that evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure is excluded because of the police misconduct by which it was obtained. On the other hand, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation is (or ought to be) excluded because use of that evidence compromises the defendant's procedural right not to be compelled to be a witness against …

Duckworth V. Eagan: A Little-Noticed Miranda Case That May Cause Much Mischief, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Professor Yale Kamisar, the country's foremost scholar of Miranda and police interrogation, presents an analysis and critique of the Supreme Court's latest interpretation of Miranda. In Duckworth, a 5-4 Court upheld the "if and when" language systematically used by the Hammond, Indiana, Police Department: "We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court." The real issue was whether the police effectively conveyed the substance of a vital part of Miranda: the right to have a lawyer appointed prior to any questioning. Professor Kamisar …

Salvaging Proportionate Prison Sentencing: A Reply To Rummel V. Estelle, Thomas F. Cavalier

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Part I of this Note provides a capsule of the Court's holding in Rummel. Part II argues, contrary to Rummel, that precedential support can be mustered to support eighth amendment review of sentence length. Finally, part 11,1 discusses the continued viability of the proportionality test as a vehicle for assessing challenges to the length of imprisonment, and discounts the concerns voiced in Rummel regarding the difficulty of judicial review of legislative sentencing decisions.

A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The 'New' Fifth Amendment And The Old 'Voluntariness' Test, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

If the several conferences and workshops (and many lunch conversations) on police interrogation and confessions in which I have participated this past summer are any indication, Miranda v. Arizona has evoked much anger and spread much sorrow among judges, lawyers and professors. In the months and years ahead, such reaction is likely to be translated into microscopic analyses and relentless, probing criticism of the majority opinion. During this period of agonizing appraisal and reappraisal, I think it important that various assumptions and assertions in the dissenting opinions do not escape attention.