Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Mens rea (4)
- Punishment (4)
- Responsibility (4)
- Culpability (3)
- Legal theory (3)
-
- Mitigation (3)
- Sentencing (3)
- Brain (2)
- Compulsion (2)
- Corrections (2)
- Criminal justice (2)
- Criminal law (2)
- Evidence (2)
- FMRI (2)
- Juvenile justice (2)
- Law and neuroscience (2)
- Mental states (2)
- Moral intuitions & judgments (2)
- Neurolaw (2)
- Neurosciences (2)
- Rationality (2)
- Social psychology (2)
- Addiction (1)
- Adolescent (1)
- Adolescent development (1)
- Alcoholism (1)
- American Bar Association Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards (1)
- Bail (1)
- Behavioral causation (1)
- Behavioral prediction (1)
Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Law Enforcement and Corrections
Against The Received Wisdom: Why The Criminal Justice System Should Give Kids A Break, Stephen J. Morse
Against The Received Wisdom: Why The Criminal Justice System Should Give Kids A Break, Stephen J. Morse
All Faculty Scholarship
Professor Gideon Yaffe’s recent, intricately argued book, The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal Responsibility, argues against the nearly uniform position in both law and scholarship that the criminal justice system should give juveniles a break not because on average they have different capacities relevant to responsibility than adults, but because juveniles have little say about the criminal law, primarily because they do not have a vote. For Professor Yaffe, age has political rather than behavioral significance. The book has many excellent general analyses about responsibility, but all are in aid of the central thesis about …
Mental Disorder And Criminal Justice, Stephen J. Morse
Mental Disorder And Criminal Justice, Stephen J. Morse
All Faculty Scholarship
This paper is a chapter that will appear in REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A REPORT OF THE ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN SCHOLARSHIP AND REFORM (Erik Luna ed., Academy for Justice 2018). The criminal law treats some people with severe mental disorders doctrinally and practically differently at virtually every stage of the criminal justice process, beginning with potential incompetence to stand trial and ending with the question of competence to be executed, and such people have special needs when they are in the system. This chapter begins by exploring the fundamental mental health information necessary to make informed judgements …
How Should Justice Policy Treat Young Offenders?, B J. Casey, Richard J. Bonnie, Andre Davis, David L. Faigman, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, Read Montague, Stephen J. Morse, Marcus E. Raichle, Jennifer A. Richeson, Elizabeth S. Scott, Laurence Steinberg, Kim A. Taylor-Thompson, Anthony D. Wagner
How Should Justice Policy Treat Young Offenders?, B J. Casey, Richard J. Bonnie, Andre Davis, David L. Faigman, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, Read Montague, Stephen J. Morse, Marcus E. Raichle, Jennifer A. Richeson, Elizabeth S. Scott, Laurence Steinberg, Kim A. Taylor-Thompson, Anthony D. Wagner
All Faculty Scholarship
The justice system in the United States has long recognized that juvenile offenders are not the same as adults, and has tried to incorporate those differences into law and policy. But only in recent decades have behavioral scientists and neuroscientists, along with policymakers, looked rigorously at developmental differences, seeking answers to two overarching questions: Are young offenders, purely by virtue of their immaturity, different from older individuals who commit crimes? And, if they are, how should justice policy take this into account?
A growing body of research on adolescent development now confirms that teenagers are indeed inherently different from adults, …
Addiction, Choice And Criminal Law, Stephen J. Morse
Addiction, Choice And Criminal Law, Stephen J. Morse
All Faculty Scholarship
This chapter is a contribution to a volume, Addiction and Choice, edited by Nick Heather and Gabriel Segal that is forthcoming from Oxford University Press. Some claim that addiction is a chronic and relapsing brain disease; others claim that it is a product of choice; yet others think that addictions have both disease and choice aspects. Which of these views holds sway in a particular domain enormously influences how that domain treats addictions. With limited exceptions, Anglo-American criminal law has implicitly adopted the choice model and a corresponding approach to responsibility. Addiction is irrelevant to the criteria for the …
Criminal Law And Common Sense: An Essay On The Perils And Promise Of Neuroscience, Stephen J. Morse
Criminal Law And Common Sense: An Essay On The Perils And Promise Of Neuroscience, Stephen J. Morse
All Faculty Scholarship
This article is based on the author’s Barrock Lecture in Criminal Law presented at the Marquette University Law School. The central thesis is that the folk psychology that underpins criminal responsibility is correct and that our commonsense understanding of agency and responsibility and the legitimacy of criminal justice generally are not imperiled by contemporary discoveries in the various sciences, including neuroscience and genetics. These sciences will not revolutionize criminal law, at least not anytime soon, and at most they may make modest contributions to legal doctrine, practice, and policy. Until there are conceptual or scientific breakthroughs, this is my story …
Neuroprediction: New Technology, Old Problems, Stephen J. Morse
Neuroprediction: New Technology, Old Problems, Stephen J. Morse
All Faculty Scholarship
Neuroprediction is the use of structural or functional brain or nervous system variables to make any type of prediction, including medical prognoses and behavioral forecasts, such as an indicator of future dangerous behavior. This commentary will focus on behavioral predictions, but the analysis applies to any context. The general thesis is that using neurovariables for prediction is a new technology, but that it raises no new ethical issues, at least for now. Only if neuroscience achieves the ability to “read” mental content will genuinely new ethical issues be raised, but that is not possible at present.
Law And Neuroscience: Recommendations Submitted To The President's Bioethics Commission, Owen D. Jones, Richard J. Bonnie, B. J. Casey, Andre Davis, David L. Faigman, Morris Hoffman, Read Montague, Stephen J. Morse, Marcus E. Raichle, Jennifer A. Richeson, Elizabeth Scott, Laurence Steinberg, Kim Taylor-Thompson, Anthony Wagner, Gideon Yaffe
Law And Neuroscience: Recommendations Submitted To The President's Bioethics Commission, Owen D. Jones, Richard J. Bonnie, B. J. Casey, Andre Davis, David L. Faigman, Morris Hoffman, Read Montague, Stephen J. Morse, Marcus E. Raichle, Jennifer A. Richeson, Elizabeth Scott, Laurence Steinberg, Kim Taylor-Thompson, Anthony Wagner, Gideon Yaffe
All Faculty Scholarship
President Obama charged the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues to identify a set of core ethical standards in the neuroscience domain, including the appropriate use of neuroscience in the criminal-justice system. The Commission, in turn, called for comments and recommendations. The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience submitted a consensus statement, published here, containing 16 specific recommendations. These are organized within three main themes: 1) what steps should be taken to enhance the capacity of the criminal justice system to make sound decisions regarding the admissibility and weight of neuroscientific evidence?; 2) to what extent …
A Good Enough Reason: Addiction, Agency And Criminal Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse
A Good Enough Reason: Addiction, Agency And Criminal Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse
All Faculty Scholarship
The article begins by contrasting medical and moral views of addiction and how such views influence responsibility and policy analysis. It suggests that since addiction always involves action and action can always be morally evaluated, we must independently decide whether addicts do not meet responsibility criteria rather than begging the question and deciding by the label of ‘disease’ or ‘moral weakness’. It then turns to the criteria for criminal responsibility and shows that the criteria for criminal responsibility, like the criteria for addiction, are all folk psychological. Therefore, any scientific information about addiction must be ‘translated’ into the law’s folk …
The Disutility Of Injustice, Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin, Michael Reisig
The Disutility Of Injustice, Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin, Michael Reisig
All Faculty Scholarship
For more than half a century, the retributivists and the crime-control instrumentalists have seen themselves as being in an irresolvable conflict. Social science increasingly suggests, however, that this need not be so. Doing justice may be the most effective means of controlling crime. Perhaps partially in recognition of these developments, the American Law Institute's recent amendment to the Model Penal Code's "purposes" provision – the only amendment to the Model Code in the 47 years since its promulgation – adopts desert as the primary distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment. That shift to desert has prompted concerns by two …
A Core Of Agreement, Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman
A Core Of Agreement, Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman
All Faculty Scholarship
In this short comment, we respond to papers by Robinson, Kurzban, and Jones (RKJ) and by Darley, who replied to our paper, Punishment Naturalism. We align ourselves wholeheartedly with Darley’s argument that intuitions of criminal wrongdoing, while mediated by cognitive mechanisms that are largely universal, consist in evaluations that vary significantly across cultural groups. RKJ defend their finding of “universal” intuitions of “core” of criminal wrongdoing. They acknowledge, however, that their method for identifying the core excludes by design factors that predictably generate cultural variance in what behavior counts as murder, rape, theft and other “core” offenses. On this basis, …
Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman
Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman
All Faculty Scholarship
In this paper we critique the increasingly prominent claims of punishment naturalism – the notion that highly nuanced intuitions about most forms of crime and punishment are broadly shared, and that this agreement is best explained by a particular form of evolutionary psychology. While the core claims of punishment naturalism are deeply attractive and intuitive, they are contradicted by a broad array of studies and depend on a number of logical missteps. The most obvious shortcoming of punishment naturalism is that it ignores empirical research demonstrating deep disagreements over what constitutes a wrongful act and just how wrongful it should …
Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse
Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, Stephen J. Morse
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Not So Hard (And Not So Special), After All: Comments On Zimring's "The Hardest Of The Hard Cases", Stephen J. Morse
Not So Hard (And Not So Special), After All: Comments On Zimring's "The Hardest Of The Hard Cases", Stephen J. Morse
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Objectivist Vs. Subjectivist Views Of Criminality: A Study In The Role Of Social Science In Criminal Law Theory, Paul H. Robinson, John M. Darley
Objectivist Vs. Subjectivist Views Of Criminality: A Study In The Role Of Social Science In Criminal Law Theory, Paul H. Robinson, John M. Darley
All Faculty Scholarship
The authors use social science methodology to determine whether a doctrinal shift-from an objectivist view of criminality in the common law to a subjectivist view in modern criminal codes-is consistent with lay intuitions of the principles of justice. Commentators have suggested that lay perceptions of criminality have shifted in a way reflected in the doctrinal change, but the study results suggest a more nuanced conclusion: that the modern lay view agrees with the subjectivist view of modern codes in defining the minimum requirements of criminality, but prefers the common law's objectivist view of grading the punishment deserved. The authors argue …
Immaturity And Irresponsibility, Stephen J. Morse
Immaturity And Irresponsibility, Stephen J. Morse
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Insanity As A Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, David W. Louisell, Geoffrey Hazard
Insanity As A Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, David W. Louisell, Geoffrey Hazard
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.