Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
- Institution
Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law and Society
Dual Rationality Of Same-Sex Marriage: Creation Of New Rights In The Shadow Of Incomplete Contract Paradigm, Saby Ghoshray
Dual Rationality Of Same-Sex Marriage: Creation Of New Rights In The Shadow Of Incomplete Contract Paradigm, Saby Ghoshray
University of Massachusetts Law Review
In an effort to reconcile the inconsistency between liberal ideals and inequitable adjudication of marriage rights amongst our citizens, this article will seek answers to these issues. By straddling the contractual confines of marriage via law and economic analysis, Part II of the article explores the contractual paradigm of marriage to examine whether the framework is independent of sexual orientation and it the deliberately incomplete nature of marriage can provide consistencies for all types of marriages. Part III examines whether the private aspiration of marriage should necessarily be linked with public consequences by evaluating the impact of marriage’s social cost …
Managing Systemic Risk In Legal Systems, J. B. Ruhl
Managing Systemic Risk In Legal Systems, J. B. Ruhl
Indiana Law Journal
The American legal system has proven remarkably robust even in the face of vast and often tumultuous political, social, economic, and technological change. Yet our system of law is not unlike other complex social, biological, and physical systems in exhibiting local fragility in the midst of its global robustness. Understanding how this “robust yet fragile” (RYF) dilemma operates in legal systems is important to the extent law is expected to assist in managing systemic risk—the risk of large local or even system-wide failures—in other social systems. Indeed, legal system failures have been blamed as partly responsible for disasters such as …
Judicial Independence And Social Welfare, Michael D. Gilbert
Judicial Independence And Social Welfare, Michael D. Gilbert
Michigan Law Review
Judicial independence is a cornerstone of American constitutionalism. It empowers judges to check the other branches of government and resolve cases impartially and in accordance with law. Yet independence comes with a hazard. Precisely because they are independent, judges can ignore law and pursue private agendas. For two centuries, scholars have debated those ideas and the underlying tradeoff: independence versus accountability. They have achieved little consensus, in part because independence raises difficult antecedent questions. We cannot decide how independent to make a judge until we agree on what a judge is supposed to do. That depends on one’s views about …
Aborted Emotions: Regret, Relationality, And Regulation, Jody Lyneé Madeira
Aborted Emotions: Regret, Relationality, And Regulation, Jody Lyneé Madeira
Michigan Journal of Gender & Law
Regret is a deeply contested emotion within abortion discourse. It is present in ways that we are both afraid of and afraid to talk about. Conventional pro-life and pro-choice narratives link regret to defective decision making. Both sides assert that the existence of regret reveals abortion’s harmfulness or harmlessness, generating a narrow focus on the maternal-fetal relationship and women’s “rights.” These incomplete, deeply flawed constructions mire discourse in a clash between regret and relief and exclude myriad relevant relationships. Moreover, they distort popular understandings of abortion that in turn influence women, creating cognitive dissonance and perhaps distress for those with …
Common Law Decision-Making, Constitutional Shadows, And The Value Of Consistency: The Jurisprudence Of William F. Batchelder, Lawrence Friedman
Common Law Decision-Making, Constitutional Shadows, And The Value Of Consistency: The Jurisprudence Of William F. Batchelder, Lawrence Friedman
The University of New Hampshire Law Review
[Excerpt] “This is an essay about common law decision-making, with an emphasis on the value of consistency as it relates to claims about the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking. The legitimacy of judicial lawmaking is ever an issue, particularly, of course, in the cases at the margins—those instances in which precedent points the court in no obviously correct direction, a choice must be made between plausible alternative paths, and “a decision one way or the other,” as Benjamin Cardozo observed, “will count for the future, will advance or retard, sometimes much, sometimes little, the development of the law.””