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Full-Text Articles in Law and Society
Judging In A Vacuum, Or, Once More, Without Feeling: How Justice Scalia's Jurisprudential Approach Repeats Errors Made In Plessy V. Ferguson, Chris Edelson
Akron Law Review
James Fleming argues that “[Justice Clarence] Thomas’s concurrence in Adarand and dissent in Grutter reflect the Plessy worldview.” I argue in Part V of this article that Justice Antonin Scalia follows the Plessy approach in several of his dissenting opinions. One of this article’s goals is to explain these incongruencies—how can it be that each of these Justices believes he is true to the legacy of Brown, but is inadvertently adopting the reasoning used by the majority in Plessy? The key to resolving this paradox depends on identifying precisely how Plessy went wrong in its reasoning and how Brown corrected …
"Law Is Coercion": Revisiting Judicial Power To Provide Equality In Public Education, José F. Anderson
"Law Is Coercion": Revisiting Judicial Power To Provide Equality In Public Education, José F. Anderson
All Faculty Scholarship
This article is an attempt to start a conversation about where we find ourselves in the plight to help our most challenged public schools. It is not intended to be a comprehensive solution to the problem, but rather a hard look at how, after decades of many efforts, we are further away from the equal education contemplated by the United States Supreme Court's historic decision in Brown v. Board of Education. This article does not desire to simply cast blame for the failures of our children, but to send a reminder that, as Frederick Douglass would say, we can hardly …
The Ironies Of Affirmative Action, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
The Ironies Of Affirmative Action, Kermit Roosevelt Iii
All Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court’s most recent confrontation with race-based affirmative action, Fisher v. University of Texas, did not live up to people’s expectations—or their fears. The Court did not explicitly change the current approach in any substantial way. It did, however, signal that it wants race-based affirmative action to be subject to real strict scrutiny, not the watered-down version featured in Grutter v. Bollinger. That is a significant signal, because under real strict scrutiny, almost all race-based affirmative action programs are likely unconstitutional. This is especially true given the conceptual framework the Court has created for such programs—the way …