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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law and Society
Anticompetitive Patent Settlements And The Supreme Court's Actavis Decision, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Anticompetitive Patent Settlements And The Supreme Court's Actavis Decision, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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In FTC v. Actavis the Supreme Court held that settlement of a patent infringement suit in which the patentee of a branded pharmaceutical drug pays a generic infringer to stay out of the market may be illegal under the antitrust laws. Justice Breyer's majority opinion was surprisingly broad, in two critical senses. First, he spoke with a generality that reached far beyond the pharmaceutical generic drug disputes that have provoked numerous pay-for-delay settlements.
Second was the aggressive approach that the Court chose. The obvious alternatives were the rule that prevailed in most Circuits, that any settlement is immune from antitrust …
Resource Movement And The Legal System, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Resource Movement And The Legal System, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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In "The Problem of Social Cost" Ronald Coase considered several common law disputes among neighbors whose economic activities conflicted with one another. For example, Sturges v. Bridgman was a nineteenth century nuisance case involving a pediatrician whose practice was hindered by his neighbor, a confectioner whose operation required a noisy mechanical mortar & pestle. Coase showed that if high transaction costs did not interfere, private bargaining would provide a solution which he characterized as efficient -- namely, that the right to continue would be given to the person who valued it most. For example, if the pediatrician valued the right …
Institutional Advantage In Competition And Innovation Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Institutional Advantage In Competition And Innovation Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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In the United States responsibility for innovation policy and competition policy are assigned to different agencies with different authority. The principal institutional enforcers of patent policy are the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the International Trade Commission (ITC), and the federal district courts as overseen by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court. While competition policy is not an explicit part of patent policy, competition issues arise frequently, even when they are not seen as such.
Since early in the twentieth century antitrust courts have had to confront practices that …
Secondary-Line Differential Pricing And The Robinson-Patman Act, E. Thomas Sullivan, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Howard A. Shelanski, Christopher R. Leslie
Secondary-Line Differential Pricing And The Robinson-Patman Act, E. Thomas Sullivan, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Howard A. Shelanski, Christopher R. Leslie
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Because it is taught infrequently, the full text of Chapter 8 of our antitrust casebook, on the Robinson-Patman Act, is now posted online and free for anyone to use. This chapter covers all issues related to secondary-line enforcement, the "cost justification," "meeting competition," and other defenses, as well as buyers' liability. Primary-line enforcement is still covered with the materials on predatory pricing in Chapter 6.
Bankruptcy And Economic Recovery, Thomas H. Jackson, David A. Skeel Jr.
Bankruptcy And Economic Recovery, Thomas H. Jackson, David A. Skeel Jr.
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To measure economic growth or recovery, one traditionally looks to metrics such as the unemployment rate and the growth in GDP. And in terms of figuring out institutional policies that will stimulate economic growth, the focus most often is on policies that encourage investment, entrepreneurial enterprises, and reward risk-taking with appropriate returns. Bankruptcy academics that we are, we tend to add our own area of expertise to this stable— with the firm belief that thinking critically about bankruptcy policy is an important element of any set of institutions designed to speed economic recovery. In this paper, written for a book …
The Law And Economics Of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical And Empirical Review, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman
The Law And Economics Of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical And Empirical Review, Tom Baker, Peter Siegelman
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We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on the law and economics of liability insurance. The canonical Shavell model predicts that, despite the presence of some ex ante moral hazard (care-reduction by insureds), liability insurance will generally raise welfare because its risk-spreading gains will likely be larger than its adverse effects on precautionary activities. We discuss the numerous features of liability insurance contracts that are designed to reduce ex ante moral hazard, and examine the evidence of their effects. Most studies conclude that these features work reasonably well, so that liability insurance probably does not generate substantial ex ante moral …