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Law and Race Commons

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Affirmative action

University of Michigan Law School

Jurisprudence

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Full-Text Articles in Law and Race

What Can The Brothers Malone Teach Us About Ficher V. University Of Texas?, Charlie Gerstein Jun 2012

What Can The Brothers Malone Teach Us About Ficher V. University Of Texas?, Charlie Gerstein

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In 1975, the Brothers Malone took the entrance exam for the Boston Fire Department. At the time, the Department was under a court-ordered affirmative action plan: it divided its pool of test-takers into groups of black and white applicants and gave substantial preference to those in the former. The Brothers listed themselves as white and didn't make the cut. In 1977, the Brothers Malone again took the entrance exam for the Boston Fire department, this time listing themselves as black. The Brothers became firemen. Within a few years, someone at the Fire Department grew suspicious of the Malones. An investigation …


The Politicization Of Clarence Thomas, Jagan Nicholas Ranjan May 2003

The Politicization Of Clarence Thomas, Jagan Nicholas Ranjan

Michigan Law Review

Perception often shapes memory. In particular, the way one perceives a noteworthy public figure often shapes that figure's historical legacy. For example, history largely remembers John Coltrane as one of the greatest jazz saxophone players of our time. His improvisational skill, innovative style, and mastery over his instrument all serve to classify him in the public memory as the ultimate jazz performer. Yet, as the example of Coltrane might demonstrate, perception is unjustly deficient. Coltrane was not merely a great saxophone player; he was first and foremost a religious figure whose spirituality drove his creativity and manifested itself in prayerful …


The Underrepresentation Of Minorities In The Legal Profession: A Critical Race Theorist's Perspective, Alex M. Johnson Jr. Feb 1997

The Underrepresentation Of Minorities In The Legal Profession: A Critical Race Theorist's Perspective, Alex M. Johnson Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Over the last four years, I have taught a course in Critical Race Theory at the University of Virginia School of Law three times. Although each course is different, given the interplay between the teacher and the students and the integration of new developments into the course, there has been one constant subject that the students and I address: Of what import is the development of Critical Race Theory for the legal profession and larger society? Can Critical Race Theory have a positive or any effect for those outside legal academia? This article represents an attempt to explore that question …


An Analysis Of The Supreme Court's Reliance On Racial "Stigma" As A Constitutional Concept In Affirmative Action Cases, Andrew F. Halaby, Stephen R. Mcallister Jan 1997

An Analysis Of The Supreme Court's Reliance On Racial "Stigma" As A Constitutional Concept In Affirmative Action Cases, Andrew F. Halaby, Stephen R. Mcallister

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

The Article's focus is confined to discussions of race-based affirmative action; it does not consider stigmatization arguments in the context of discrimination involving gender or disabilities, for example. Further, the Article's scope is limited to the stigmatization issue as between Whites and African Americans. Although similar issues exist with respect to other ethnic or racial groups, we view the White/African American paradigm as providing the clearest framework for analysis. Moreover, the cases of Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education, joint progenitors of stigmatization as a concept having constitutional significance in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of …


Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny Of Affirmative Action, Brent E. Simmons Jan 1996

Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny Of Affirmative Action, Brent E. Simmons

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

Under the artificial constraints of strict scrutiny, however, the courts are free to veto the government's choice of more effective, race-conscious means. The Supreme Court's unfortunate and ill-conceived adoption of strict scrutiny as the constitutional standard for reviewing race-conscious affirmative action should be reconsidered for several reasons. This Article examines those reasons.