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Full-Text Articles in Law and Race
The First Justice Harlan By The Numbers: Just How Great Was "The Great Dissenter?", Gabriel J. Chin
The First Justice Harlan By The Numbers: Just How Great Was "The Great Dissenter?", Gabriel J. Chin
Akron Law Review
Considering these kinds of evidence together may offer an informed picture of a judge’s disposition. By these measures, Harlan cannot be regarded as a defender of Asian civil rights. Based on his voting record, he was the most ardent defender of African American civil rights. By contrast, his record in Asian cases was one of the worst. His votes in favor of African American civil rights were in critical cases. In most of the critical cases with respect to Asian litigants, he voted against them.
Private Problem, Public Solution: Affirmative Action In The 21st Century, Darlene C. Goring
Private Problem, Public Solution: Affirmative Action In The 21st Century, Darlene C. Goring
Akron Law Review
This Article will explore the origins of the Court’s color-blind interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the role that this interpretation plays in the development of new barriers against challenges to race-based affirmative action programs. Part II of this Article traces the development and application of the strict scrutiny test to evaluate the constitutionality of both invidious and benign racial classifications. Part III examines Justice Powell’s position that racial classifications used as remedial measures may overcome the presumption of constitutional invalidity associated with the use of race-based classifications. In this context, the Court recognizes that the continued impact of past …
Judging In A Vacuum, Or, Once More, Without Feeling: How Justice Scalia's Jurisprudential Approach Repeats Errors Made In Plessy V. Ferguson, Chris Edelson
Akron Law Review
James Fleming argues that “[Justice Clarence] Thomas’s concurrence in Adarand and dissent in Grutter reflect the Plessy worldview.” I argue in Part V of this article that Justice Antonin Scalia follows the Plessy approach in several of his dissenting opinions. One of this article’s goals is to explain these incongruencies—how can it be that each of these Justices believes he is true to the legacy of Brown, but is inadvertently adopting the reasoning used by the majority in Plessy? The key to resolving this paradox depends on identifying precisely how Plessy went wrong in its reasoning and how Brown corrected …