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Law and Race Commons

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Civil Rights and Discrimination

University of Michigan Law School

Journal

1989

United States Supreme Court

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law and Race

Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action And The Elusive Meaning Of Constitutional Equality, Michel Rosenfeld Jun 1989

Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action And The Elusive Meaning Of Constitutional Equality, Michel Rosenfeld

Michigan Law Review

This Article first briefly considers the conceptual and constitutional framework out of which the controversy in Croson emerges. Next, the Article turns to Croson itself, and focuses on the Court's adoption of the strict scrutiny test, on the disagreement among the Justices concerning the test's meaning and implications, and on the Court's use of decontextualization to manipulate the key conceptual and factual issues at stake. Finally, drawing upon the principle of equality of opportunity, the Article endeavors to demonstrate how the adoption of particular principles of substantive equality can lead to a comprehensive and coherent constitutional resolution of the affirmative …


The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical Interpretation, David D. Meyer May 1989

The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical Interpretation, David D. Meyer

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical Interpretation by Charles A. Lofgren


Legislative Inaction And The Patterson Case, Earl M. Maltz Feb 1989

Legislative Inaction And The Patterson Case, Earl M. Maltz

Michigan Law Review

In its October 1988 issue,1 the Michigan Law Review published a symposium on Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, a case in which the Supreme Court has requested reargument on the question of whether Runyon v. McCrary should be overruled or modified. Each of the three distinguished contributors to the symposium concludes that the Court should not overrule Runyon. In reaching this conclusion, Professor William N. Eskridge and Professor Daniel A. Farber rely heavily on the view that because Congress has recognized the existence of the Runyon doctrine and has refused to overrule the decision, the doctrine of stare decisis …