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The Price Of Corruption, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

The Supreme Court recently held that campaign contributions under $5200 do not create a “cognizable risk of corruption.” It was wrong. This Essay describes a nexus of timely contributions and special-interest legislation. In the most noteworthy case, a CEO made a first-time $1000 donation to a member of Congress. The next day that representative introduced a securities bill tailored to the interests of the CEO’s firm.

Armed with this real-world account of how small-dollar campaign contributions coincided with favorable legislative action, the Essay reads McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission with a critical eye. In McCutcheon the Supreme Court assumed that …

When Rhetoric Obscures Reality: The Definition Of Corruption And Its Shortcomings, Jessica Medina

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

Due to public scorn after the unraveling of the Watergate scandal, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act’s restrictions on political contributions and expenditures. Buckley v. Valeo established that no legitimate government interest existed to justify restrictions on campaign expenditures, and only the prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption could justify restrictions on campaign contributions. Since then, the Court has struggled to articulate a definition of corruption that balances First Amendment protections with the potential for improper influence. This Article argues that the Court’s current definition of corruption is too narrow, and proposes …

Making Campaign Finance Law Enforceable: Closing The Independent Expenditure Loophole, John P. Relman

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note explores the problems posed by present attempts to define "coordination." Part I discusses generally the complexities of the coordination problem under Buckley, setting forth the rationale behind the Buckley rule and examining present efforts by Congress and the FEC to enforce the Buckley standards. Part I concludes by proposing a new definition for "coordination" designed to improve enforcement of the Buckley rule. Part II presents an alternative means for remedying the coordination problem. Rather than relying on a redefinition of coordination for proper enforcement of federal election law, this section proposes prophylactic legislation designed to regulate independent …