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Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Laws And Norms With (Un)Observable Actions, Claude Fluet, Murat C. Mungan
Laws And Norms With (Un)Observable Actions, Claude Fluet, Murat C. Mungan
Faculty Scholarship
We analyze the interactions between social norms, the prevalence of acts, and policies when people cannot directly observe actors’ behavior and must rely on noisy proxies. Norms provide ineffective incentives when acts are committed either very frequently or very infrequently, because noisy signals of behavior are then too weak to alter people’s beliefs about others’ behavior. This cuts against the dynamics of the ‘honor-stigma’ model (Bénabou and Tirole 2006; 2011), and leads to the opposite positive and normative conclusions with even modest errors. The review process through which public signals are provided is then an additional policy variable. When the …
Distributed Governance Of Medical Ai, W. Nicholson Price Ii
Distributed Governance Of Medical Ai, W. Nicholson Price Ii
Law & Economics Working Papers
Artificial intelligence (AI) promises to bring substantial benefits to medicine. In addition to pushing the frontiers of what is humanly possible, like predicting kidney failure or sepsis before any human can notice, it can democratize expertise beyond the circle of highly specialized practitioners, like letting generalists diagnose diabetic degeneration of the retina. But AI doesn’t always work, and it doesn’t always work for everyone, and it doesn’t always work in every context. AI is likely to behave differently in well-resourced hospitals where it is developed than in poorly resourced frontline health environments where it might well make the biggest difference …
The Law And Economics Of Behavioral Regulation, Avishalom Tor
The Law And Economics Of Behavioral Regulation, Avishalom Tor
Journal Articles
This article examines the law and economics of behavioral regulation (“nudging”), which governments and organizations increasingly use to substitute for and complement traditional instruments. To advance its welfare-based assessment, Section 1 examines alternative nudging definitions and Section 2 considers competing nudges taxonomies. Section 3 describes the benefits of nudges and their regulatory appeal, while Section 4 considers their myriad costs—most notably the private costs they generate for their targets and other market participants. Section 5 then illustrates the assessment of public and private welfare nudges using cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, and rationality-effects analysis.