Law and Economics Commons^™

The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions Of The Regulatory State, Robert B. Ahdieh

Robert B. Ahdieh

We live in a coordination economy. As one surveys the myriad challenges of modern social and economic life, an ever increasing proportion is defined not by the need to reconcile competing interests, but by the challenge of getting everyone on the same page. Conflict is not absent in these settings. It is not, however, the determinative factor in shaping our behaviors and resulting interactions. That essential ingredient, instead, is coordination.

Such coordination is commonly understood as the function of the market. As it turns out, however, optimal coordination will not always emerge, as if led “by an invisible hand.” Even …

Take It To The Limit: The Illegal Regulation Prohibiting The Take Of Any Threatened Species Under The Endangered Species Act, Jonathan Wood

Jonathan Wood

The Endangered Species Act forbids the “take” – any activity that adversely affects – any member of an endangered species, but only endangered species. The statute also provides for the listing of threatened species, i.e. species that may become endangered, but protects them only by requiring agencies to consider the impacts of their projects on them. Shortly after the statute was adopted, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service reversed Congress’ policy choice by adopting a regulation that forbids the take of any threatened species. The regulation is not authorized by the Endangered Species Act, but …

Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, Dalie Jimenez

Dalie Jimenez

More than 77 million Americans have a debt in collections. Many of these debts will be sold to debt buyers for pennies, or fractions of pennies, on the dollar. This Article details the perilous path that debts travel as they move through the collection ecosystem. Using a unique dataset of 84 consumer debt purchase and sale agreement, it examines the manner in which debts are sold, oftentimes as simple data on a spreadsheet, devoid of any documentary evidence. It finds that in many contracts, sellers disclaim all warranties about the underlying debts sold or the information transferred. Sellers also sometimes …

A Framework For Understanding Property Regulation And Land Use Control From A Dynamic Perspective, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

Regulatory Institutions Of The Global South: Why Are They Different And What Can Be Done About It?, Yugank Goyal

Yugank Goyal

Developing countries suffer from underperforming regulatory agencies compared to those in the developed world. The paper attempts to theorize general reasons behind such divergence. It argues that the differences lie in developing countries’ (a) higher priorities for redistribution, (b) structurally different institutional endowments, especially at informal level, and (c) limited informational channels. The paper proposes that a multi-stakeholder (with increased emphasis on judiciary and civil society) approach has potential to address the shortcomings. It tests these claims through studying cases of telecom and electricity regulation in India.

Revenue Adequacy: The Good, The Bad And The Ugly, John W. Mayo

John W Mayo

Abstract: The concept of “revenue adequacy” made its way into the legal governance of the rail industry prior to the industry’s substantial deregulation via the Staggers Rail Act in 1980. This seemingly quiet feature of rail legislation has, however, increasingly grown central to the regulatory-deregulatory fault line in the 21st century rail industry. This paper examines the concept of revenue adequacy, a benchmark of United States railroad firms' financial performance calculated annually by regulatory oversight bodies. The paper addresses questions around the origins, measurement, informational provisions, value and policy benefits and costs of revenue adequacy. An examination of the historical …

Nuevo Sistema De Amparo, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

A Negative Externality By Any Other Name: Using Emissions Caps As Models For Constraining Dead-Weight Costs Of Regulation, Scott A. Shepard

Scott A. Shepard

Emissions caps work on a simple and compelling premise. Regulated entities, in the process of creating something desirable, like energy, create and expel some problematic by-product, such as carbon. They do this because they particularly reap a significant set of benefits (e.g., profits, market share, job security) from their efforts, while only diffusely and incidentally, along with the rest of society, suffering the harms caused by their emissions. These emissions, paid for primarily by the rest of society, are called negative externalities. Emissions-cap regimes are designed to make regulated entities more directly accountable for the costs of their emissions and …

Reguladores Y Autonomía, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Artículo 129 Fracción Xiii, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Incentivos Y Más Incentivos, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Hacer (Bien) Las Reformas, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Protocolo De Madrid, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Expropiaciones, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

La Suprema Corte Y La Cofetel, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Arreglos Institucionales De Los Órganos De Mejora Regulatoria: Una Propuesta De Reforma Para La Cofemer, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Iniciativa Anticorrupción, ¿Paso Firme?, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Diseño Institucional De Órganos Reguladores En México, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Organos Reguladores En México: Fragilidades Y Áreas De Oportunidad, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Inversión Extranjera En Paquetería, Mensajería Y Transporte De Carga: ¿Resistencia O Estado De Derecho?, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Fortalecer A Los Reguladores: Cambiando Las Reglas Del Juego En México (Presentación Libro), Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Fortalecer A Los Reguladores, Cambiando Las Reglas Del Juego En México, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Problemas Con La Desregulación "Base Cero", Boletín De La Red Mexicana De Competencia Y Regulación Del Cidac, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Ripe Standing Vines And The Jurisprudential Tasting Of Matured Legal Wines – And Law & Bananas: Property And Public Choice In The Permitting Process, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

From produce to wine, we only consume things when they are ready. The courts are no different. That concept of “readiness” is how courts address cases and controversies as well. Justiciability doctrines, particularly ripeness, have a particularly important role in takings challenges to permitting decisions. The courts largely hold that a single permit denial does not give them enough information to evaluate whether the denial is in violation of law. As a result of this jurisprudential reality, regulators with discretion have an incentive to use their power to extract rents from those that need their permission. Non-justiciability of permit denials …

Neutral Investment Revisited, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Major Expropriation Case Decided By The Mexican Supreme Court Of Justice, The Due Process Requirement And Its Correlation With International Treaties, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.

Runoff And Reality: Externalities, Economics, And Traceability Issues In Urban Runoff Regulation, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

It has long eluded regulators and private enforcers how to control the imposition of negative externalities. This paper will examine: (1) Whether existing authorities (like the Clean Water Act) are capable of providing regulation of urban runoff; (2) Whether, in light of economic controls, regulation of these activities are necessary; (3) A summary of recent runoff litigation; and (4) What is next; what should be next? Although each of these questions form background, the primary emphasis currently anticipated for this presentation is on traceability, collective action, and free rider problems that motivate regulation in this area. Often runoff is described …

Complying With Mexico's National Registry Of Foreign Investment, Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

Alejandro Faya Rodriguez

No abstract provided.