Law and Economics Commons^™

Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory Of Law In Market Transition, Robert B. Ahdieh

Robert B. Ahdieh

Securities markets are commonly assumed to spring forth at the intersection of an adequate supply of, and a healthy demand for, investment capital. In recent years, however, seemingly failed market transitions - the failure of new markets to emerge and of existing markets to evolve - have called this assumption into question. From the developed economies of Germany and Japan to the developing countries of central and eastern Europe, securities markets have exhibited some inability to take root. The failure of U.S. securities markets, and particularly the New York Stock Exchange, to make greater use of computerized trading, communications, and …

Tying And Bundled Discounts: An Equilibrium Analysis Of Antitrust Liability Tests, Melanie S. Williams

Melanie S. Williams

Courts have struggled with determining when bundled discounts constitute unlawfully anticompetitive behavior. The current circuit split reflects an absence of consensus. This lack of legal guidance creates uncertainty in the market, with firms being given inconsistent – and sometimes contradictory - standards on how to avoid antitrust liability.

For the most part, we consider a standard paradigm for analyzing bundled discounts. Suppose that there are two firms. Firm 1 produces a monopoly product, A, and also another product, B, which competes with another version of B produced by Firm 2. The concern is the extent to which the price paid …

The Moral Hazard Problem In Global Economic Regulation, Frank J. Garcia

Frank J. Garcia

Global regulation of international business transactions presents a particular form of the moral hazard problem. Global firms use economic and political power to manipulate state and state-controlled multilateral regulation to preserve their opportunity to externalize the social costs of global economic activity with impunity. Unless other actors can effectively counter this at the national and global regulatory levels, globalization re-creates the conditions for under-regulated or “robber baron” capitalism at the global level. This model of economic activity has been rejected at the national level by the same modern democratic capitalist states which currently dominate globalization, creating a crisis of legitimacy …

Agências E Falácias, Ivo T. Gico

Ivo Teixeira Gico Jr.

O autor faz uma revisão crítica acerca das afirmações do ex-Ministro Bresser-Pereira sobre estabelecer mandatos para dirigentes das agências reguladoras e suas conseqüências.

The author makes a critical review on the former Minister Bresser-Pereira statements on establishing mandates for leaders of regulatory agencies and its consequences.