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Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
Potential Competition And Antitrust Analysis: Monopoly Profits Exceed Duopoly Profits, Steven C. Salop
Potential Competition And Antitrust Analysis: Monopoly Profits Exceed Duopoly Profits, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This short note prepared for an OECD meeting in June 2021 examines several antitrust issues involving analysis of potential competition. While the analysis is not new, it is still useful to collect them together in a unified fashion to show how they are related. In this regard, all the analysis and conclusions flow from the overarching (and obvious) points that exclusionary conduct and agreements that maintain monopoly power very often harm consumers, and that monopoly profits typically exceed the combined duopoly profits earned by the dominant firm and the entrant, if there is successful entry. While this is not inevitably …
Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis
Vertical Mergers In A Model Of Upstream Monopoly And Incomplete Information, Serge Moresi, David Reitman, Steven C. Salop, Yianis Sarafidis
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
We examine the role of private information on the impact of vertical mergers. A vertical merger can improve the information that is available to an upstream monopolist because, after the merger, the monopolist can observe the cost of its downstream merger partner. In the pre-merger world, because the costs of the downstream firms are private information, the monopolist has incomplete information and cannot implement the monopoly outcome: The expected pre-merger equilibrium price of the downstream product is lower than the monopoly price. After a vertical merger, the equilibrium input price that is charged to the downstream rival can either increase …
When Vertical Is Horizontal: How Vertical Mergers Lead To Increases In “Effective Concentration”, Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop
When Vertical Is Horizontal: How Vertical Mergers Lead To Increases In “Effective Concentration”, Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article explains the inherent loss of an indirect competitor and reduction in competition when a vertical merger raises input foreclosure concerns. We then calculate a measure of the effective increase in the HHI measure of concentration for the downstream market, and we refer to this “proxy” measure as the “dHHI.” We derive the dHHI measure by comparing the pricing incentives and associated upward pricing pressure (“UPP”) involved in two alternative types of acquisitions: (i) vertical mergers that raise unilateral input foreclosure concerns (and the associated vertical GUPPI measures), and (ii) horizontal acquisitions of partial ownership interests among …
Recommendations And Comments On The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop, Fiona Scott Morton
Recommendations And Comments On The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy L. Rose, Steven C. Salop, Fiona Scott Morton
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
These recommendations and comments respond to the request by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division for public comment on the draft 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. We commend the agencies for updating the 1984 non-horizontal merger guidelines by recognizing the substantial advances in economic thinking about vertical mergers in the thirty-five years since those guidelines were issued. Our comments emphasize four issues: (i) the treatment of the elimination of double marginalization (“EDM”), particularly that the draft vertical merger guidelines appear inappropriately to make proof of cognizability part of the agencies burden and that they appear to …
Quantifying The Increase In “Effective Concentration” From Verticle Mergers That Raise Input Foreclosure Concerns: Comment On The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop
Quantifying The Increase In “Effective Concentration” From Verticle Mergers That Raise Input Foreclosure Concerns: Comment On The Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines, Serge Moresi, Steven C. Salop
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This comment responds to the request by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division for public comment on the draft 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. In this comment, we show that there is an inherent loss of an indirect competitor and competition when a vertical merger raises input foreclosure concerns. We also show that it then is possible to calculate an effective increase in the HHI measure of concentration for the downstream market. We refer to this “proxy” measure as the “dHHI.” We derive the dHHI measure by comparing the pricing incentives and associated upward …