Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law and Economics Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics

From Federal Rules To Intersystemic Governance In Securities Regulation, Robert B. Ahdieh Oct 2007

From Federal Rules To Intersystemic Governance In Securities Regulation, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

In this brief essay, prepared as part of a symposium on The New Federalism: Plural Governance in a Decentered World, I explore the regulatory dynamics at work: (1) in the operation of Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, (2) in the interventions of then-Attorney General Eliot Spitzer in the national securities markets, and (3) in recent steps by the Securities and Exchange Commission to reconcile U.S. and international accounting standards. In each case, a distinct dynamic of regulatory interaction - what I term intersystemic governance - can be observed. In such cases, overlapping jurisdiction combines with various sources of interdependence to …


Mission Possible: Reciprocal Deference Between Domestic Regulatory Structures And The Wto, Elizabeth Trujillo Jan 2007

Mission Possible: Reciprocal Deference Between Domestic Regulatory Structures And The Wto, Elizabeth Trujillo

Faculty Scholarship

One of the goals of Article III of GATT is to invalidate domestic regulatory measures, including taxes and non-fiscal policies that amount to non-tariff barriers to trade (NTB) and therefore violate the principles of national treatment. While internal policies that directly discriminate between products based on nationality or origin are clearly in violation of national treatment principles, it is the facially neutral regulatory measures with protectionist and discriminatory effects that are more difficult to assess, even within transparent regulatory processes. However, with their emphasis on the likeness of the products in question, WTO panels run the risk of alienating member …


Least Cost Avoidance: The Tragedy Of Common Safety, Nuno M. Garoupa, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci Jan 2007

Least Cost Avoidance: The Tragedy Of Common Safety, Nuno M. Garoupa, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

Faculty Scholarship

This paper shows that the least cost avoider approach in tort is not necessarily the optimal way to attain least cost avoidance when accidents can be avoided by either of two parties. When parties do not observe each other's costs of care at the time of the accident and are unable to determine which party is the least cost avoider, they fail to anticipate the outcome of the adjudication. Under these circumstances, accident avoidance becomes a commons problem because care by each individual party reduces the prospect of liability for both parties. As a result parties suboptimally invest in care. …