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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics
After Ftx: Can The Original Bitcoin Use Case Be Saved?, Mark Burge
After Ftx: Can The Original Bitcoin Use Case Be Saved?, Mark Burge
Faculty Scholarship
Bitcoin and the other cryptocurrencies spawned by the innovation of blockchain programming have exploded in prominence, both in gains of massive market value and in dramatic market losses, the latter most notably seen in connection with the failure of the FTX cryptocurrency exchange in November 2022. After years of investment and speculation, however, something crucial has faded: the original use case for Bitcoin as a system of payment. Can cryptocurrency-as-a-payment-system be saved, or are day traders and speculators the actual cryptocurrency future? This article suggests that cryptocurrency has been hobbled by a lack of foundational commercial and consumer-protection law that …
Optional Price Discrimination, Lee Anne Fennell
Optional Price Discrimination, Lee Anne Fennell
Texas A&M Law Review
Price discrimination generates considerable angst. As merchants develop ever-more-powerful mechanisms for gathering and compiling information about consumers, the specter of fully personalized pricing seems to loom as an ominous threat. Yet a parallel phenomenon quietly coexists with all this distress over tailored prices: models that encourage people to voluntarily contribute, typically in varying amounts, the sums necessary to cover the fixed costs of producing particular goods and services. This Article proposes enabling customers to opt into price discrimination in a more structured way across a broader range of markets. Optional price differentiation can make markets fairer and more inclusive by …
The Failure Of Market Efficiency, William Magnuson
The Failure Of Market Efficiency, William Magnuson
Faculty Scholarship
Recent years have witnessed the near total triumph of market efficiency as a regulatory goal. Policymakers regularly proclaim their devotion to ensuring efficient capital markets. Courts use market efficiency as a guiding light for crafting legal doctrine. And scholars have explored in great depth the mechanisms of market efficiency and the role of law in promoting it. There is strong evidence that, at least on some metrics, our capital markets are indeed more efficient than they have ever been. But the pursuit of efficiency has come at a cost. By focusing our attention narrowly on economic efficiency concerns—such as competition, …
A Proposed Sec Cyber Data Disclosure Advisory Commission, Lawrence J. Trautman, Neal Newman
A Proposed Sec Cyber Data Disclosure Advisory Commission, Lawrence J. Trautman, Neal Newman
Faculty Scholarship
Constant cyber threats result in: intellectual property loss; data disruption; ransomware attacks; theft of valuable company intellectual property and sensitive customer information. During March 2022, The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a proposed rule addressing Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure, which requires: 1. Current reporting about material cybersecurity incidents; 2. Periodic disclosures about a registrant’s policies and procedures to identify and manage cybersecurity risks; 3. Management’s role in implementing cybersecurity policies and procedures; 4. Board of directors’ cybersecurity expertise, if any, and its oversight of cybersecurity risk; 5. Registrants to provide updates about previously reported cybersecurity …
Scaling Commercial Law In Indian Country, Marc Lane Roark
Scaling Commercial Law In Indian Country, Marc Lane Roark
Texas A&M Law Review
How do you drive economic enterprise in a financial desert? Indian tribes, academics, economists, and policy makers have considered the means and methods for energizing economic growth for forty years. Efforts such as the creation and promotion of the Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act (“MTSTA”) promise much toward creating conditions that would gather financial opportunity to tribal regions that experience poverty at a strikingly higher rate than any other place in the United States. And yet, while the law has been available for more than ten years, tribes have been reticent to adopt it. This Article fills the vacuum in …
Is Incorporation Really Better Than Central Management And Control For Testing Corporate Residency? An Answer To Corporate Tax Evasion And Inversion, Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln Iv
Is Incorporation Really Better Than Central Management And Control For Testing Corporate Residency? An Answer To Corporate Tax Evasion And Inversion, Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln Iv
Student Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
In this Reply, I respond to comments by Bill Bratton, Larry Cunningham, and Todd Henderson on my recent paper - Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for Corporate Governance. I begin by reiterating my basic thesis - that state competition should be understood to have little consequence for corporate governance, if (as charter competition's advocates assume) capital-market-driven managerial competition is also at work. I then consider some of the thoughtful critiques of this claim, before suggesting ways in which the comments highlight just the kind of comparative institutional analysis my paper counsels. Rather than a stark choice …
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate governance has - for some thirty years - been asking the wrong questions. Rather than a singular race among states, whether to the bottom or the top, the synthesis of William Cary and Ralph Winter’s famous exchange is better understood as two competitions, each serving distinct normative ends. Managerial competition advances the project that has motivated corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means - effective regulation of the separation of ownership and control. State competition, by contrast, does not promote a race to …
Dialectical Regulation, Robert B. Ahdieh
Dialectical Regulation, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
While theories of regulation abound, woefully inadequate attention has been given to growing patterns of "intersystemic" and "dialectical" regulation in the world today. In this rapidly expanding universe of interactions, independent regulatory agencies, born of autonomous jurisdictions, nonetheless face a combination of jurisdictional overlap with, and regulatory dependence on, one another. Here, the cross-jurisdictional interaction of regulators is no longer the voluntary interaction embraced by transnationalists; it is, instead, an unavoidable reality of acknowledgement and engagement, potentially culminating in the integration of discrete sets of regulatory rules into a collective whole.
Such patterns of regulatory engagement are increasingly evident, across …
Between Mandate And Market: Contract Transition In The Shadow Of The International Order, Robert B. Ahdieh
Between Mandate And Market: Contract Transition In The Shadow Of The International Order, Robert B. Ahdieh
Faculty Scholarship
Boilerplate in sovereign debt contracts issued in the United States has long dictated the unanimous consent of bondholders to any debt restructuring. This requirement persisted for decades, notwithstanding wide consensus that such unanimous action provisions increased transaction costs, produced inefficient delays in debt restructuring, enhanced the moral hazards of the sovereign debt market, and otherwise encouraged collective action failures. Yet the sovereign debt markets has recently made an about-face, replacing the unanimity requirement for debt restructuring with a less demanding provision for collective, or majority, action by creditors. Completed over the course of just a few months in 2003, this …