Law and Economics Commons^™

Human Survival, Risk, And Law: Considering Risk Filters To Replace Cost-Benefit Analysis, John William Draper

Librarian Scholarship at Penn Law

Selfish utilitarianism, neo-classical economics, the directive of short-term income maximization, and the decision tool of cost-benefit analysis fail to protect our species from the significant risks of too much consumption, pollution, or population. For a longer-term survival, humanity needs to employ more than cost-justified precaution.

This article argues that, at the global level, and by extension at all levels of government, we need to replace neo-classical economics with filters for safety and feasibility to regulate against significant risk. For significant risks, especially those that are irreversible, we need decision tools that will protect humanity at all scales. This article describes …

The Key Elements For Developing A Securities Market To Drive Economic Growth: A Roadmap For Emerging Markets, Ziven Scott Birdwell

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Public Choice And Environmental Policy: A Review Of The Literature, Christopher H. Schroeder

Faculty Scholarship

This paper is a draft of a chapter for a forthcoming book, Research Handbook in Public Law and Public Choice, edited by Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph O'Connell, to be published by Elgar. It reviews the public choice literature on environmental policy making, first generally and then with respect to four fundamental environmental policy questions: (1) whether or not government action is warranted; (2) if it is, the scope and stringency of the government action, including the manner in which a bureaucracy will implement and enforce any statutory standards; (3) the level of government that assumes responsibility; and (4) the …

Behavioral Economics And The Sec, Stephen J. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Not all investors are rational. Quite apart from the obvious examples of credulity in the face of the latest Ponzi scheme, there is no shortage of evidence that many investors' decisions are influenced by systematic biases that impair their abilities to maximize their investment returns. For example, investors will often hold onto poorly performing stocks longer than warranted, hoping to recoup their losses. Other investors will engage in speculative trading, dissipating their returns by paying larger commissions than more passive investors. And we are not just talking about widows and orphans here. There is evidence that supposedly sophisticated institutional investors-mutual …

Economic And Social Impacts Of Agriculture-To-Urban Water Transfers: The Arkansas Valley Of Colorado, Charles W. Howe, Jeffrey K. Lazo

Moving the West's Water to New Uses: Winners and Losers (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

20 pages.

Contains 1 page of references.

Least Cost Approaches For Satisfying Water Demand: An Alternatives Analysis, Zach Willey

Western Water: Expanding Uses/Finite Supplies (Summer Conference, June 2-4)

27 pages.

Contains references.

Agenda: Western Water: Expanding Uses/Finite Supplies, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center

Western Water: Expanding Uses/Finite Supplies (Summer Conference, June 2-4)

Conference organizers and/or faculty included University of Colorado School of Law professors James N. Corbridge, Jr., Lawrence J. MacDonnell and David H. Getches.

This conference featured luncheon talks by Colorado Governor Richard D. Lamm and Undersecretary of the Department of the Interior Ann McLaughlin. The conference attracted 115 registrants from 19 states plus the District of Columbia.

The Legalization Of American Society: Economic Regulation, Peter O. Steiner

Michigan Law Review

My central thesis is that regulation may be insightfully classified into three broad types of response to perceived market failure, and I will merely touch examples of each. The first is protection of competitive results. I shall focus on natural monopoly regulation, although anti-trust would do as well. The second is protection from competitive results, such as entry control and setting of minimum prices. The third is regulation of externalities such as pollution and accidents arising as byproducts of more usual production.