Labor and Employment Law Commons^™

Sixth Circuit Undermines Labor Statute, Angela B. Cornell

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Sharing The Prosperity: Why We Still Need Organized Labor, Angela B. Cornell

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Today economic inequality is greater in the United States than in any other advanced nation. Bringing the minimum wage up to a true living wage is a crucial step forward, as are other employment-related benefits like broadening access to overtime and instituting paid sick leave. But employment statutes such as minimum-wage regulations cannot replace the broad-based benefits that come from organized labor. Unionization places the ability to influence what happens in the workplace directly in workers’ own hands, even as it creates institutions that can advocate for working people at the community, state, and national level. Under an effective labor-law …

The Union As Broker Of Employment Rights, Stewart J. Schwab

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Most employment-law rights are mandatory. Individual workers cannot decline the protections the law gives them. For example, a nonexempt worker must get at least $7.25 per hour and time-and-a-half for overtime, even if she would agree to less. A worker’s pension must vest within five years. If she is injured on the job, a worker is entitled to compensation through a state system and cannot opt out in advance.

Interestingly, in these examples and others like them, the law forces its protection only on nonunionized workers. Unions in a collective bargaining contract can bargain away these rights, acting as broker …

Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, Stewart J. Schwab, Randall S. Thomas

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Union Raids, Union Democracy, And The Market For Union Control, Stewart J. Schwab

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In this article, Professor Schwab compares the union member-leader relationship to the corporate shareholder-manager relationship and examines what can be learned from the voluminous literature regarding corporate control about problems of internal union democracy. Specifically, he questions whether a viable market for union control does or could exist that might induce leaders to act in the interests of their members. He analyzes the structural weaknesses in the market for union control and the legal factors inhibiting a union takeover market. Schwab concludes that a weak market does exist, despite the nonprofit nature of unions that limits the ability of leaders …