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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Labor and Employment Law
On Firms, Sanjukta Paul
On Firms, Sanjukta Paul
Law & Economics Working Papers
This paper is about firms as an instance of economic coordination, and about how we think about them in relation to other forms of coordination as well as in relation to competition and markets. The dominant frame for thinking about firms--which has strongly influenced contemporary competition law as well as serving as a vital adjunct to the fundamental concepts of neoclassical price theory that guide many areas of law and policy--implicitly or explicitly explains and justifies the centralization of both decision-making rights and flows of income from economic activity on productive efficiency grounds. We have very good reasons to doubt …
Subjective Beliefs About Contract Enforceability, Jj Prescott, Evan Starr
Subjective Beliefs About Contract Enforceability, Jj Prescott, Evan Starr
Law & Economics Working Papers
This article assesses the content, role, and adaptability of subjective beliefs about contract enforceability in the context of postemployment covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”). We show that employees tend to believe that their noncompetes are enforceable, even when they are not. We provide evidence for both supply- and demand-side stories that explain employees’ persistently inaccurate beliefs. Moreover, we show that believing that unenforceable noncompetes are enforceable likely causes employees to forgo better job options and to perceive that their employer is more likely to take legal action against them if they choose to compete. Finally, we use an information experiment …
President Biden's Executive Order On Competition: An Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
President Biden's Executive Order On Competition: An Antitrust Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In July, 2021, President Biden signed a far ranging Executive Order directed to promoting competition in the American economy. This paper analyzes issues covered by the Order that are most likely to affect the scope and enforcement of antitrust law. The only passage that the Executive Order quoted from a Supreme Court antitrust decision captures its antitrust ideology well – that the Sherman Act:
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time …
The Economic (In) Significance Of Executive Pay Esg Incentives, David I. Walker
The Economic (In) Significance Of Executive Pay Esg Incentives, David I. Walker
Faculty Scholarship
The hottest topic in corporate governance circles today involves company commitments to and pursuit of ESG (environmental, social, and governance) initiatives in addition to the traditional pursuit of profits. One facet of this debate has to do with how to motivate executives to pursue ESG goals. Increasingly, companies tie executive pay to ESG performance, although even strong ESG advocates debate the advisability of doing so. This Article joins the fray by closely examining ESG-based CEO pay arrangements at a subset of companies with leadership positions on the Business Roundtable, an industry trade group that embraced ESG in a 2019 statement …
The Remainder Effect: How Automation Complements Labor Quality, James Bessen, Erich Denk, Chen Meng
The Remainder Effect: How Automation Complements Labor Quality, James Bessen, Erich Denk, Chen Meng
Faculty Scholarship
This paper argues that automation both complements and replaces workers. Extending the Acemoglu-Restrepo model of automation to consider labor quality, we obtain a Remainder Effect: while automation displaces labor on some tasks, it raises the returns to skill on remaining tasks across skill groups. This effect increases between-firm pay inequality while labor displacement affects within-firm inequality. Using job ad data, we find firm adoption of information technologies leads to both greater demand for diverse skills and higher pay across skill groups. This accounts for most of the sorting of skills to high paying firms that is central to rising inequality.
Block Rewards, Carried Interests, And Other Valuation Quandaries In Taxing Compensation, Henry M. Ordower
Block Rewards, Carried Interests, And Other Valuation Quandaries In Taxing Compensation, Henry M. Ordower
All Faculty Scholarship
In this article, Ordower contextualizes block rewards litigation with historical failures to tax compensation income paid in kind. Tax fairness principles demand current taxation of the noneconomically diluting block rewards’ market value.
The American Experience With Employee Noncompete Clauses: Constraints On Employees Flourish And Do Real Damage In The Land Of Economic Liberty, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Xiaohan Sun, Phillip J. Jones
The American Experience With Employee Noncompete Clauses: Constraints On Employees Flourish And Do Real Damage In The Land Of Economic Liberty, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Xiaohan Sun, Phillip J. Jones
Articles by Maurer Faculty
Agreements not to compete are generally an anathema to free market advocates. Independent profit maximization is one of the fundamental assumptions of the neoclassical economic model and necessary to its conclusion that markets yield results that are Paraeto efficient. Consistent with this theory, and practical experience, agreements among competitors, or potential competitors, to divide a market, or fix price or quantity are per se violations under our antitrust laws.
Despite this fact, even some ardent free market advocates have argued on behalf of the enforcement of covenants not to compete in the employment relationship. The traditional economic argument in favor …
A Miser’S Rule Of Reason: The Supreme Court And Antitrust Limits On Student Athlete Compensation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
A Miser’S Rule Of Reason: The Supreme Court And Antitrust Limits On Student Athlete Compensation, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The unanimous Supreme Court decision in NCAA v. Alston is its most important probe of antitrust’s rule of reason in decades. The decision implicates several issues, including the role of antitrust in labor markets, how antitrust applies to institutions that have an educational mission as well as involvement in a large commercial enterprise, and how much leeway district courts should have in creating decrees that contemplate ongoing administration.
The Court accepted what has come to be the accepted framework: the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of competitive harm. Then the burden shifts to the defendant to produce …