Labor and Employment Law Commons^™

Labor Law, Ownership, And The Firm, Sanjukta Paul

Law & Economics Working Papers

Labor law has its own working theory of the business firm, not derivable from another area of law. This "theory of the firm," which the affirmative provisions of labor law are taken to both modify and preserve, is more overtly hierarchical than in other areas. This is true across the main functional domains of labor law: union formation; expressive and associational rights; and the scope of collective bargaining. A rich vein of existing scholarship deals with both hierarchy and deference to property within labor law. The arguments of this essay emerge from considering these aspects of labor law in conjunction …

On Firms, Sanjukta Paul

Law & Economics Working Papers

This paper is about firms as an instance of economic coordination, and about how we think about them in relation to other forms of coordination as well as in relation to competition and markets. The dominant frame for thinking about firms--which has strongly influenced contemporary competition law as well as serving as a vital adjunct to the fundamental concepts of neoclassical price theory that guide many areas of law and policy--implicitly or explicitly explains and justifies the centralization of both decision-making rights and flows of income from economic activity on productive efficiency grounds. We have very good reasons to doubt …

Subjective Beliefs About Contract Enforceability, Jj Prescott, Evan Starr

Law & Economics Working Papers

This article assesses the content, role, and adaptability of subjective beliefs about contract enforceability in the context of postemployment covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”). We show that employees tend to believe that their noncompetes are enforceable, even when they are not. We provide evidence for both supply- and demand-side stories that explain employees’ persistently inaccurate beliefs. Moreover, we show that believing that unenforceable noncompetes are enforceable likely causes employees to forgo better job options and to perceive that their employer is more likely to take legal action against them if they choose to compete. Finally, we use an information experiment …

Noncompete Agreements In The U.S. Labor Force, Evan P. Starr, J.J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara

Articles

Using nationally representative survey data on 11,505 labor force participants, we examine the use and implementation of noncompete agreements and the employee outcomes associated with these provisions. Approximately 18 percent of labor force participants are bound by noncompetes, with 38 percent having agreed to at least one in the past. Noncompetes are more likely to be found in high-skill, high-paying jobs, but they are also common in low-skill, low-paying jobs and in states where noncompetes are unenforceable. Only 10 percent of employees negotiate over their noncompetes, and about one-third of employees are presented with noncompetes after having already accepted job …

The Behavioral Effects Of (Unenforceable) Contracts, Evan Starr, Jj Prescott, Norman Bishara

Articles

Do contracts influence behavior independent of the law governing their enforceability? We explore this question in the context of employment noncompetes using nationally representative data for 11,500 labor force participants. We show that noncompetes are associated with reductions in employee mobility and changes in the direction of that mobility (i.e., toward noncompetitors) in both states that do and do not enforce noncompetes. Decomposing mobility into job offer generation and acceptance, we detect no evidence of differences in job search, recruitment, or offer activity associated with noncompetes. Rather, we find that employees with noncompetes—even in states that do not enforce them—frequently …

Building Labor's Constitution, Kate Andrias

Articles

In the last few years, scholars have sought to revitalize a range of constitutional arguments against mounting economic inequality and in favor of labor rights. They urge contemporary worker movements to lay claim to the Constitution. But worker movements, for the most part, have not done so. This Essay takes seriously that choice. It examines reasons for the absence of constitutional argumentation by contemporary worker movements, particularly the role of courts and legal elites in our constitutional system, and it contends that labor’s ongoing statutory and regulatory reform efforts are essential prerequisites to the development of progressive constitutional labor rights. …

Employment Law And Social Equality, Samuel R. Bagenstos

Law & Economics Working Papers

What is the normative justification for individual employment law? For a number of legal scholars, the answer is economic efficiency. Other scholars argue, to the contrary, that employment law protects against (vaguely defined) imbalances of bargaining power and exploitation. Against both of these positions, this paper argues that individual employment law is best understood as advancing a particular conception of equality. That conception, which many legal and political theorists have called social equality, focuses on eliminating hierarchies of social status. Drawing on the author’s work elaborating the justification for employment discrimination law, this paper argues that individual employment law is …

Employment Market Institutions And Japanese Working Hours, Mark West

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009

Why do Japanese workers work such long hours? Beginning with a series of cases in the 1950s, Japanese courts drastically curtailed firms’ abilities to dismiss workers. As a consequence of the inability to dismiss workers legally, large Japanese firms hired a smaller number of workers than were necessary to fulfill capacity without overtime. Employers rely on the working hours of this undersized cadre of workers, carefully screened to rule out the slothful, as a buffer. In bad times, the size of the work force makes dismissal unnecessary. In good times, workers are forced to work long hours. While these court …

Section 1: Nuts And Bolts, David A. Santacroce

Other Publications

Workers facing plant closing and permanent or long-term layoffs now have a little more legal protection to give them some time to plan for retraining and to look for new jobs.

The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act provides for 60 days advance notice to certain workers affected by a plant closing or mass layoff. This law was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1988 after having been sought for many years by unions and other workers' rights advocates.

Vigorous action by the labor movement and strong public support led to passage of the WARN Act in spite of …

The Right To An Adequate Income And Employment: A Reply To Professor Bernstein, David L. Chambers

Book Chapters

Bernsteins's Paper advances no constitutional arguments for requiring the government to ensure economic security for retarded citizens. His omission is justified not merely by the alternative focus he has chosen, but also by the absence of any sound or vendible constitutional arguments to advance. There remain, however, important roles for attorneys.