Labor and Employment Law Commons^™

The Public’S Companies, Andrew K. Jennings

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This Essay uses a series of survey studies to consider how public understandings of public and private companies map into urgent debates over the role of the corporation in American society. Does a social-media company, for example, owe it to its users to follow the free-speech principles embodied in the First Amendment? May corporate managers pursue environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) policies that could reduce short-term or long-term profits? How should companies respond to political pushback against their approaches to free expression or ESG?

The studies’ results are consistent with understandings that both public and private companies have greater public …

Raising The Floor From The Back Door: Shareholder Proposals As A Mechanism For Raising Minimum Wage, Laura Carrier

Washington and Lee Law Review

When adjusted to reflect inflation, the federal minimum wage is almost 40 percent lower than it was in 1970. The Biden Administration tried and failed to legislatively raise the minimum wage, and political deadlock will continue to kill legislative change. The shareholder proposal, a nonbinding recommendation to management that shareholders can submit for a vote at a public corporation’s annual meeting, presents a path for improving the wages of many workers in the absence of federal legislation. This Note analyzes the best approach to crafting a shareholder proposal on minimum wage that will prompt an effective increase in the minimum …

Lifting Labor’S Voice: A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice And Power Within American Corporate Governance, Leo E. Strine Jr., Aneil Kovvali, Oluwatomi O. Williams

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

The dramatic decline in corporate gainsharing with American workers over the last two generations has contributed to stagnating wages, soaring inequality, and economic insecurity. There are global causes of greater inequality and depressed pay that go beyond the decline in workers’ share. But many public policymakers and economists believe that the reduced share of corporate prof its that American workers receive has been a major factor in the much larger increase in inequality that has occurred in the United States, compared to its market economy allies in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). To some, the explanation for …

Agents Of Inequality: Common Ownership And The Decline Of The American Worker, Zohar Goshen, Doron Levit

Faculty Scholarship

The last forty years have seen two major economic trends: wages have stalled despite rising productivity, and institutional investors have replaced retail shareholders as the predominant owners of the U.S. equity markets. A few powerful institutional investors — dubbed common owners — now hold large stakes in most U.S. corporations. And in no coincidence, when U.S. workers acquired this new set of bosses, their wages stopped growing while shareholder returns increased. This Article explains how common owners shift wealth from labor to capital, thereby exacerbating income inequality.

Powerful institutional investors pushing public corporations en masse to adopt strong corporate governance …

Caremark And Esg, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach To Implementing An Integrated, Efficient, And Effective Caremark And Eesg Strategy, Leo E. Strine Jr., Kirby M. Smith, Reilly S. Steel

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

With increased calls from investors, legislators, and academics for corporations to consider employee, environmental, social, and governance factors (“EESG”) when making decisions, boards and managers are struggling to situate EESG within their existing reporting and organizational structures. Building on an emerging literature connecting EESG with corporate compliance, this Essay argues that EESG is best understood as an extension of the board’s duty to implement and monitor a compliance program under Caremark. If a company decides to do more than the legal minimum, it will simultaneously satisfy legitimate demands for strong EESG programs and promote compliance with the law. Building on …

From Mandates To Governance: Restructuring The Employment Relationship, Brett Mcdonnell, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

Employers are saddled with a dizzying array of responsibilities to their employees. Meant to advance a wide array of workplace policies, these demands have saddled employment with the burden of numerous social ends. However, that system has increasingly come under strain, as companies seek to shed employment relationships and workers lose important protections when terminated. In this Article, we propose that employers and employees should be given greater flexibility with a move from mandates to governance. Many of the employment protections required from employers stem from employees’ lack of organizational power. The imbalance is best addressed by providing workers with …

From Mandates To Governance: Restructuring The Employment Relationship, Brett H. Mcdonnell, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

Employers are saddled with a dizzying array of responsibilities to their employees. Meant to advance a wide array of workplace policies, these demands have saddled employment with the burden of numerous social ends. However, that system has increasingly come under strain, as companies seek to shed employment relationships and workers lose important protections when terminated. In this Article, we propose that employers and employees should be given greater flexibility with a move from mandates to governance. Many of the employment protections required from employers stem from employees’ lack of organizational power. The imbalance is best addressed by providing workers with …

Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play In Recreating A Fair And Sustainable American Economy A Reply To Professor Rock, Leo E. Strine Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

In his excellent article, For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate Over Corporate Purpose, Professor Edward Rock articulates his understanding of the debate over corporate purpose. This reply supports Professor Rock’s depiction of the current state of corporate law in the United States. It also accepts Professor Rock’s contention that finance and law and economics professors tend to equate the value of corporations to society solely with the value of their equity. But, I employ a less academic lens on the current debate about corporate purpose, and am more optimistic about proposals to change our corporate governance …

A New Standard For Governance: Reflections On Worker Representation In The United States, Julian Constain

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The contemporary state of corporate law in the United States is one that is skewed toward the archaic principle of shareholder primacy. This narrow conception of corporate purpose has resulted in governance mechanisms that tend to overlook the many stakeholders that are affected by, and, in turn, affect the bottom line of modern corporations. In the wake of the recently proposed Accountable Capitalism Act, this Note investigates the viability of adopting a system of mandated worker board representation—codetermination—in the United States. The Note employs a comparative analysis of the German and Swedish experiences with codetermination, and then evaluates the policy, …

Labor Interests And Corporate Power, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

Labor unions exert significant power through collective bargaining, pension fund investing, and political advocacy. But in each of these areas, unions face inherent structural limitations that severely constrain these powers. Workers need participation rights in corporate governance to overcome the multiplicity of forces arrayed against them. And rather than obviating the need for unions, worker corporate power would facilitate a different kind of labor representation — a transition to labor power that advocates for occupational interests and forms coalitions across the shifting political interests of different worker groups.

Whistling In The Wind: Why Federal Whistleblower Protections Fall Short Of Their Corporate Governance Goals, Meera Khan

University of Miami Business Law Review

Teetering on the line between hero and villain, whistleblowers have a remarkably unusual role in contemporary American society. Those who blow the whistle on public sector activities, like Edward Snowden and the Watergate Scandal’s “Deep Throat”, are often vilified in history as treasonous and unprincipled rogues. In the private sector, however, whistleblowers are seen as moral compasses for corporate behavior, and are even afforded federal protections for speaking out against internal malfeasance. The piecemeal evolution of whistleblower legislation including the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 created regulatory and enforcement …

The Cambridge Handbook Of Social Enterprise Law, Lloyd Histoshi Mayer, Paul B. Miller

Books

Book Chapters

Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Creating a Tax Space for Social Enterprise, in The Cambridge Handbook of Social Enterprise Law 157 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018)

While still relatively few in number compared to traditional nonprofit and for-profit organizations, the rise of social enterprises represents a possible disruption of not only existing models of doing business but also areas of law that in many respects have seen little fundamental change for decades. One such area is domestic tax law, where social enterprises currently find themselves subject to the rules of for-profit activities and entities. Here, both scholars …

Wage-Setting Institutions And Corporate Governance, Matthew Dimick, Neel Rao

Journal Articles

Why do corporate governance law and practice differ across countries? This paper explains how wage-setting institutions influence ownership structures and investor protection laws. In particular, we identify a nonmonotonic relationship between the level of centralization in wage-bargaining institutions and the level of ownership concentration and investor protection laws. As wage setting becomes more centralized, ownership concentration within firms at first becomes more, and then less, concentrated. In addition, the socially optimal level of investor protection laws is decreasing in ownership concentration. Thus, as wage-setting institutions become more centralized, investor protection laws become less and then more protective. This explanation is …

Democracy In The Private Sector: The Rights Of Shareholders And Union Members, Michael Goldberg

Michael J Goldberg

In the years since Enron, there has been a lively debate over the value of shareholder democracy as a means to improve corporate performance and reduce the likelihood of future Enrons or Lehman Brothers. That debate has been enriched by comparative scholarship looking at corporate governance abroad, and comparing corporate governance with public government. This Article explores a different comparison, between corporations and their sometime adversaries across bargaining tables and picket lines – labor unions. More specifically, this article compares the regulation of corporate governance and the regulation of the internal affairs of unions, and the rights of shareholders and …

The Merits Of Cooperative Corporate Governance In The Digital Age, Meredith-Anne Kurz

Meredith-Anne Kurz

No abstract provided.

Reforming Executive Compensation: What Do We Know And Where Do We Go?, Priyanka Rajagopalan

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

In this Article, I study a fascinating problem - what are the legal, political and economic implications of regulating executive bonuses? While the Administration's recent consideration of proposals to tax bonuses of AIG executives has sparked a great deal of media speculation and attention, there has been little legal scholarship discussing the various possible consequences of this and other methods of regulating executive compensation. Especially given the growing interest in executive compensation and the possible benefits and costs of regulation in this arena, I believe this paper will make a significant scholarly contribution to the existing literature on corporate governance …

Who Should Talk? What Counts As Employee Voice And Who Stands To Gain, Aditi Bagchi

All Faculty Scholarship

This symposium piece responds to an article by Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt titled "Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A Call for Comprehensive Reform." Professor Schmidt argues in favor of increasing employee voice in corporate governance. In this reply, Professor Bagchi distinguishes between "hard voice," "soft voice" and information rights as three variants of employee voice. She casts doubt on the material benefits from Professor Dau-Schmidt's proposals, which focus on hard and soft voice, to either employees or corporate stakeholders more broadly. The present focus of corporate governance on the relationship between shareholders and managers, to the exclusion of employees, …

The Milieu Of The Boardroom And The Precinct Of Employment, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

This Commentary explores differences between employer-employee relationships and service on a board of directors. Against this backdrop, this Commentary argues that the research findings surveyed by Brooke and Tyler (Jennifer K. Brooke & Tom R. Tyler, Diversity and Corporate Performance: A Review of the Psychological Literature, 89 N.C. L. REV. 715 (2011)), although specific to the employment context, may be salient in assessing the impact of diversity among members of a board of directors.

Yes, Labor Markets Are Flawed--But So Is The Economic Case For Mandating Employee Voice In Corporate Governance, Scott A. Moss

Publications

No abstract provided.

Reforming The Taxation Of Deferred Compensation, Gregg D. Polsky, Ethan Yale

Scholarly Works

Executive pay is currently a topic of significant interest for policymakers, academics, and the popular press. Just weeks ago, in reaction to widespread press reports and academic criticism of extravagant executive perquisites, the SEC proposed new regulations designed to change fundamentally the manner in which executive compensation is reported to share-holders. Despite all of this attention, one significant aspect of executive deferred compensation has gone virtually unnoticed - the federal tax rules governing this form of compensation are fundamentally flawed and must be extensively over-hauled. These rules are flawed because they often create a significant incentive for companies and their …

Toward Common Sense And Common Ground? Reflections On The Shared Interests Of Managers And Labor In A More Rational System Of Corporate Governance, Leo E. Strine Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, Vice Chancellor Strine reflects on the common interests of those who manage and those who labor for American corporations. The first part of the essay examines aspects of the current corporate governance and economic environment that are putting management and labor under pressure. The concluding section of the essay identifies possible corporate governance initiatives that might — by better focusing stockholder activism in particular and corporate governance more generally on long-term, rather than short-term, corporate performance — generate a more rational system of accountability, that focuses on the durable creation by corporations of wealth through fundamentally sound, …

Two Goals For Executive Compensation Reform, Brett H. Mcdonnell

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model To Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, Richard E. Moberly

ExpressO

Recent corporate scandals demonstrate that rank-and-file employees often remain silent in the face of significant fraud. This silence is unfortunate because corporate employees have inside knowledge of misconduct that gives them an information advantage over more traditional corporate monitors, such as independent directors and government regulators. To address this problem, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act utilized a new approach that encourages employee whistleblowers to disclose information about corporate wrongdoing. This approach, which Professor Richard Moberly labels the “Structural Model,” requires that corporations provide a standardized channel for employees to report organizational misconduct to official monitors within the corporation. This Article offers an …

Is U.S. Ceo Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, Randall S. Thompson

Michigan Law Review

In Pay Without Performance, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried develop and summarize the leading critiques of current executive compensation practices in the United States. This book, and their highly influential earlier article, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, with David Walker offer a negative, if mainstream, assessment of the state of U.S. executive compensation: U.S. executive compensation practices are failing in a widespread manner, and much systemic reform is needed. The purpose of our Review is to summarize the book and to offer some counterarguments to try to balance what is becoming …

Worker Ownership In Enron's Wake - Revisiting A Community Development Tactic, Peter R. Pitegoff

Faculty Publications

Worker ownership of business enterprise has long been touted as a vehicle for community economic development. Employee stock ownership plans in leveraged buy-outs, ESOPs and broad-based stock options in going concerns, and worker cooperatives in selected sectors - the experience has varied widely in goals, method, and outcome.

This Article reflects on the continued utility of worker ownership as a component of community development and calls attention to contrasts with conventional corporate governance and goals. Rather than an end in itself or just another way of doing business, worker ownership can be a vital element of a broader job creation, …

Overcoming Resistance To Diversity In The Executive Suite: Grease, Grit, And The Corporate Tournament, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Once we open the corporate governance/human resources nexus to deeper inquiry, mutual scholarly interest in diversity and discrimination follows naturally. Firms have complex motives to take nondiscrimination and the promotion of diversity seriously. First, at least certain forms of discrimination are both unlawful and socially illegitimate and hence present threats of potential liability and injury to reputation. Second, human resources demands are such that attracting and motivating a diverse workforce is a competitive imperative. At the same time, however, offsetting economic forces may exist that favor subtle forms of discrimination and hostility to diversity, even if intentional and overt racial …

New Ways In Corporate Governance: European Experiments With Labor Representation On Corporate Boards, Klaus J. Hopt

Michigan Law Review

Corporate governance has been discussed in Europe for over 150 years. Indeed, in the 1840's, when the first Corporation Act was enacted in Prussia, three troubling features of the corporate organization form had already been discerned: (I) the vulnerability of small investors who lacked the influence and sophistication to. control the corporation; (2) the risk to creditors and the public created by the limited liability of the corporation, especially when combined with inadequate funds and poorly controlled management; and (3) the power that big corporations could amass economically, by monopolizing markets, and politically, by exerting influence on public opinion and …

Union Representatives As Corporate Directors: The Challenge To The Adversarial Model Of Labor Relations, Robert A. Mccormick

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article addresses these questions first by discussing the predominant philosophical approach adopted by unions in their dealings with management, and then describing several ways in which the labor laws reflect this traditional model of employment relations by showing, first, that the influence of unions has been limited to circumscribed categories of business decisions. The Article next examines decisions made by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") and the courts that have carefully sought to separate employer from employee, assuming their interests to be inherently antagonistic. Then follows an evaluation of the NLRB's treatment of deviations from the traditional model …

Employee Stock Ownership Plans: An Analysis Of Current Reform Proposals, Luis L. Granados

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This article surveys the battle between the critics and advocates of the ESOP, and scrutinizes various proposals currently being considered in the legislative arena. Part I examines the philosophy and history of the ESOP, particularly focusing upon the conceptual foundations provided by the writings of Louis Kelso. Part II explicates the various functions performed by the ESOP: as a tool of corporate finance, as an "in-house" market for the sale of stock held by a company's shareholders, and as a means of obtaining additional investment tax credit. Part III analyzes critically six proposed improvements of the ESOP system from both …