Labor and Employment Law Commons^™

Female Entrepreneurs And Equity Crowdfunding In The Us: Receiving Less When Asking For More, Seth C. Oranburg, Mark Geiger

Law Faculty Scholarship

In this paper, we explore the relationship between gender and funding raised through equity crowdfunding. Using data collected from the population of US equity crowdfunding campaigns, we find that campaigns receive significantly less funding when the primary signatory is female. Furthermore, we explore interactions between gender and a campaign's funding target. The results suggest that campaigns raise significantly less funding, as the target amount increases, when the primary signatory is female. These results are the first to suggest a relationship between gender and funding among the population of US equity crowdfunding campaigns. Implications and future directions are discussed.

Op-Ed: California’S Most Powerful Voice On Wall Street? Its Pensions, David H. Webber

Shorter Faculty Works

The fight over public pensions in California is almost exclusively described as a dispute between people worried about tax hikes and public servants wanting to get paid what they were promised. But this is only part of the pension story — one focused on the “liability” side of the balance sheet.

Holacracy And The Law, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

No law requires companies to have CEOs, officers, supervisors, chains of command, or even employees. But traditional managerial structures are so ingrained in our political economy that legal doctrines take them for granted. What if they were to disappear? Under holacracy, a new version of participatory management adopted at companies like Zappos and Medium, companies are replacing managers, organizational charts, and subordinates with governance circles, roles, and lead links. The promise of holacracy is a system of management that devolves responsibilities to teams, empowers workers to act freely within specified zones of authority, and energizes the entire organization around an …

Tournament Of Managers: Lessons From The Academic Leadership Market, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Why do firms usually make, not buy, their chief executive officers (CEOs)? Public corporations hire their CEOs from within the firm 78% of the time. They do so although earlier studies have found no clear evidence that internal hires perform better than external ones. So why do firms prefer them? Few scholars have focused on this simple question.

The reason why firms favor internal candidates matters not only in its own right, but also for an overlooked reason: it informs the controversial question of executive compensation. Currently board-compensation committees look to peer benchmarks to set executive pay. But, taking cues …

Center-Left Politics And Corporate Governance: What Is The 'Progressive' Agenda?, Christopher Bruner

Scholarly Works

For as long as corporations have existed, debates have persisted among scholars, judges, and policymakers regarding how best to describe their form and function as a positive matter, and how best to organize relations among their various stakeholders as a normative matter. This is hardly surprising given the economic and political stakes involved with control over vast and growing "corporate" resources, and it has become commonplace to speak of various approaches to corporate law in decidedly political terms. In particular, on the fundamental normative issue of the aims to which corporate decision-making ought to be directed, shareholder-centric conceptions of the …