Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Labor and Employment Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Labor and Employment Law

Acqui-Hiring, Gregg D. Polsky, John F. Coyle Nov 2013

Acqui-Hiring, Gregg D. Polsky, John F. Coyle

Scholarly Works

Facebook, Google, and other leading technology companies in Silicon Valley have been buying start-up companies at a brisk pace. In many of these transactions, the buyer has little interest in acquiring the startup’s projects or assets. Instead, the buyer’s primary motivation is to hire some or all of the startup’s software engineers. These so-called “acqui-hires” represent a novel — and increasingly common — tool by which the largest and most successful technology companies in the world satisfy their intense demand for engineering talent.

To date, the acqui-hire has attracted no attention in the academic or professional legal literature. With this …


Trouble In Sin City: Protecting Sexy Workers' Civil Rights, Ann C. Mcginley Jan 2012

Trouble In Sin City: Protecting Sexy Workers' Civil Rights, Ann C. Mcginley

Scholarly Works

While Las Vegas has always been known for its libertarian attitudes toward gambling and sexually provocative shows, after a short, failed attempt during the 1990’s to characterize itself as a family destination, the City has turned up the heat. Las Vegas, which relies increasingly on selling sex appeal to promote its value to the public, has become the number one adult entertainment destination in the United States. There is, however, trouble in paradise. A number of the casino-based clubs (both day and night) have been sued; others have closed due to illegal prostitution; some have paid large fines to the …


The Diminishing Returns Of Incentive Pay In Executive Compensation Contracts, Gregg D. Polsky, Andrew Lund Dec 2011

The Diminishing Returns Of Incentive Pay In Executive Compensation Contracts, Gregg D. Polsky, Andrew Lund

Scholarly Works

For the past 30 years, the conventional wisdom has been that executive compensation packages should include very large proportions of incentive pay. This incentive pay orthodoxy has become so firmly entrenched that the current debates about executive compensation simply take it as a given. We argue, however, that in light of evolving corporate governance mechanisms, the marginal net benefit of incentive-laden pay packages is both smaller than appreciated and getting smaller over time. As a result, the assumption that higher proportions of incentive pay are beneficial is no longer warranted.

A number of corporate governance mechanisms have evolved to duplicate …