Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
- Keyword
-
- Administrative law (2)
- Agency delegation (2)
- Auer v. Robbins (2)
- Bounded rationality (2)
- Content analysis (2)
-
- Deference (2)
- Discretion (2)
- Empirical legal studies (2)
- Hard look review (2)
- Interpretation (2)
- Perverse incentives (2)
- Regulations (2)
- Rulemaking (2)
- Separation of powers (2)
- AI (1)
- Antisubordination liberty (1)
- Artificial intelligence (1)
- Climate change (1)
- Data (1)
- Data protection (1)
- Due process (1)
- Greenhouse gasses (1)
- Health law (1)
- Intelligence augmentation (1)
- Interplay of tort law and regulation (1)
- Judicial discression (1)
- Obergefell (1)
- Public trust (1)
- Reasoned judgment (1)
- Regulation (1)
Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Gandhis Of The Deep State, Michael E. Herz
Gandhis Of The Deep State, Michael E. Herz
Online Publications
It is a truism that agency organizational charts are at least in part aspirational or idealized. The political appointees at the top lack perfect control over the career employees beneath them in the hierarchy. When all are rowing in the same direction, such agency costs matter little and may go unnoticed. But suppose they are not. What if they barely perceive themselves as in the same boat?
Does The Evolving Concept Of Due Process In Obergefell Justify Judicial Regulation Of Greenhouse Gases And Climate Change?: Juliana V. United States, Bradford Mank
Faculty Articles and Other Publications
Justice Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion, which held that same sex marriage is a fundamental right under the Constitution’s due process clause, reasoned that the principles of substantive due process may evolve because of changing societal views of what constitutes “liberty” under the clause, and that judges may recognize new liberty rights in light of their “reasoned judgement.” In Juliana v. United States, Judge Aiken used her “reasoned judgement” to conclude that evolving principles of substantive due process in the Obergefell decision allowed the court to find that the plaintiffs were entitled to a liberty right to a stable climate system capable …
Data-Informed Duties In Ai Development, Frank A. Pasquale
Data-Informed Duties In Ai Development, Frank A. Pasquale
Faculty Scholarship
Law should help direct—and not merely constrain—the development of artificial intelligence (AI). One path to influence is the development of standards of care both supplemented and informed by rigorous regulatory guidance. Such standards are particularly important given the potential for inaccurate and inappropriate data to contaminate machine learning. Firms relying on faulty data can be required to compensate those harmed by that data use—and should be subject to punitive damages when such use is repeated or willful. Regulatory standards for data collection, analysis, use, and stewardship can inform and complement generalist judges. Such regulation will not only provide guidance to …
The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference's Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters
The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference's Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters
All Faculty Scholarship
Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agencies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This doctrine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-comment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is necessary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doctrine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of powers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial deference—has helped …
The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’S Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters
The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference’S Effect On Agency Rules, Daniel E. Walters
Faculty Scholarship
Auer deference holds that reviewing courts should defer to agencies when the latter interpret their own preexisting regulations. This doctrine relieves pressure on agencies to undergo costly notice-and-comment rulemaking each time interpretation of existing regulations is necessary. But according to some leading scholars and jurists, the doctrine actually encourages agencies to promulgate vague rules in the first instance, augmenting agency power and violating core separation of powers norms in the process. The claim that Auer perversely encourages agencies to “self-delegate”—that is, to create vague rules that can later be informally interpreted by agencies with latitude due to judicial deference—has helped …