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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Emotional Common Sense As Constitutional Law, Terry A. Maroney
Emotional Common Sense As Constitutional Law, Terry A. Maroney
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In Gonzales v. Carhart the Supreme Court invoked post-abortion regret to justify a ban on a particular abortion procedure. The Court was proudly folk-psychological, representing its observations about women's emotional experiences as "self-evident." That such observations could drive critical legal determinations was, apparently, even more self-evident, as it received no mention at all. Far from being sui generis, Carhart reflects a previously unidentified norm permeating constitutional jurisprudence: reliance on what this Article coins "emotional common sense." Emotional common sense is what one unreflectively thinks she knows about the emotions. A species of common sense, it seems obvious and universal to …
The Law And Large Numbers, Paul H. Edelman
The Law And Large Numbers, Paul H. Edelman
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Can mathematics be used to inform legal analysis? This is not a ridiculous question. Law has certain superficial resemblances to mathematics. One might view the Constitution and various statutes as providing "axioms" for a deductive legal system. From these axioms judges deduce "theorems" consisting of interpretation of these axioms in certain situations. Often these theorems are built on previously "proven" theorems, i.e. earlier decisions of the court. Of course some of the axioms might change, and occasionally a theorem that was once true becomes false; the former is a common feature of mathematics, the latter, though theoretically not possible in …
The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again: Revisiting The Power Pageant Of The Justices, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen
The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again: Revisiting The Power Pageant Of The Justices, Paul H. Edelman, Jim Chen
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Who is the most powerful Supreme Court Justice? In 1996 we measured voting power on the Court according to each Justice's ability to form five-member coalitions. From the set of all coalitions formed by the Court during its 1994 and 1995 Terms, we developed a generalized Banzhaf index of the Justices' relative strength. Generally speaking, participating in a greater number of unique coalitions translates into greater judicial voting power. To supplement the small number of decisions then available, we derived hypothetical five-Justice coalitions from the intersections of actually observed coalitions involving more than five members. Professor Lynn Baker contested our …
Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, Jim Rossi, Susan Ackerman-Rose
Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, Jim Rossi, Susan Ackerman-Rose
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Constitutional takings protections, such as those in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, create a potential for state liability for changes in regulatory policy by governments. This Article critiques takings jurisprudence in the context of two infrastructure investment issues: the stranded cost problem facing United States utility industries, which has given rise to claims of compensation for deregulatory takings; and the development of standards to protect direct foreign investment in developing countries. In both contexts, traditional legal doctrines do not adequately provide for the type of remedy sought so courts are in need of standards to assist them …
Textualism And Judgment, Suzanna Sherry
Textualism And Judgment, Suzanna Sherry
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Textualism, like other foundationalist theories such as originalism, purports to be a grand theory of constitutional interpretation, answering all questions with the same single-minded and narrowly constrained technique. The inevitable result is a diminution of what one might call judgment. Judgment is what judges use to decide cases when the answer is not tightly constrained by some interpretive theory. It is an aspect of what others have called prudence, or pragmatism.' But if one has a theory of constitutional interpretation that is supposed to produce clear answers in a relatively mechanical way, there is little room for the exercise of …