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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Crops, Guns & Commerce: A Game Theoretical Critique Of Gonzales V. Raich, Maxwell L. Stearns
Crops, Guns & Commerce: A Game Theoretical Critique Of Gonzales V. Raich, Maxwell L. Stearns
George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series
In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court sustained an application of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), banning all private use of marijuana, as applied to two women who had cultivated or otherwise acquired marijuana for the treatment of severe pain pursuant to the California Compassionate Use Act. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens placed Raich at the intersection of two landmark Commerce Clause precedents: Wickard v. Filburn, the notorious 1942 decision, which upheld a penalty under the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938 applied to a local farmer who violated his wheat quota but who had used the modest excess portion …
What Is Legal Doctrine, Emerson Tiller, Frank B. Cross
What Is Legal Doctrine, Emerson Tiller, Frank B. Cross
Public Law and Legal Theory Papers
Legal doctrine is the currency of the law. In many respects, doctrine is the law, at least as it comes from courts. Judicial opinions create the rules or standards that comprise legal doctrine. Yet the nature and effect of legal doctrine has been woefully understudied. Researchers from the legal academy and from political science departments have conducted extensive research on the law, but they have largely ignored the others’ efforts. Part of the reason for this unfortunate disconnect is that neither has effectively come to grips with the descriptive meaning of legal doctrine. In this article, we attempt to describe …
Victims And Perpetrators: An Argument For Comparative Liability In Criminal Law, Vera Bergelson
Victims And Perpetrators: An Argument For Comparative Liability In Criminal Law, Vera Bergelson
Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers
This article challenges the legal rule according to which the victim’s conduct is irrelevant to the determination of the perpetrator’s criminal liability. The author attacks this rule from both positive and normative perspectives, and argues that criminal law should incorporate an affirmative defense of comparative liability. This defense would fully or partially exculpate the defendant if the victim by his own acts has lost or reduced his right not to be harmed.
Part I tests the descriptive accuracy of the proposition that the perpetrator’s liability does not depend on the conduct of the victim. Criminological and victimological studies strongly suggest …
Trumps, Inversions, Balancing, Presumptions, Institution Prompting, And Interpretive Canons: New Ways For Adjudicating Conflicts Between Legal Norms, Carlos E. Gonzalez
Trumps, Inversions, Balancing, Presumptions, Institution Prompting, And Interpretive Canons: New Ways For Adjudicating Conflicts Between Legal Norms, Carlos E. Gonzalez
Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers
This article begins by reviewing the axiomatic principles that govern courts when dealing with cases in which two legal norms are interpreted as standing in conflict. The article then makes three distinct contributions.
First, the article explicates the central justification behind the use and perpetuation of the extant principles. In briefest terms, the extant principles are best justified as an attempt to resolve cases in which legal rules stand in conflict in a way that enhances or preserves the democratic legitimacy of law. They do this by favoring norms created by entities of relatively strong democratic legitimacy over norms created …
Morals-Based Justifications For Lawmaking: Before And After Lawrence V. Texas, Suzanne B. Goldberg
Morals-Based Justifications For Lawmaking: Before And After Lawrence V. Texas, Suzanne B. Goldberg
Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers
Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas looks in depth at the dissonance between the Supreme Court’s rhetorical support for morals-based lawmaking and the Court’s jurisprudence. In taking this approach, the article responds to a central post-Lawrence question regarding the sufficiency of a government’s moral agenda as a justification for restricting individual rights. It turns out, on close review of the cases going back to the mid-1800s, that the Court has almost never relied explicitly on a morals rationale to sustain an allegedly rights-infringing government action.
The article develops several explanations for this avoidance of explicit morals …