Jurisprudence Commons^™

Cracking The Whole Code Rule, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Faculty Publications

Over the past three decades, since the late Justice Scalia joined the Court and ushered in a new era of text-focused statutory analysis, there has been a marked move towards the holistic interpretation of statutes and “making sense of the corpus juris.” In particular, Justices on the modern Supreme Court now regularly compare or analogize between statutes that contain similar words or phrases—what some have called the “whole code rule.” Despite the prevalence of this interpretive practice, however, scholars have paid little attention to how the Court actually engages in whole code comparisons on the ground.

This Article provides the …

Meta Rules For Ordinary Meaning, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

“Ordinary meaning” is a notoriously undefined concept in statutory interpretation theory. Courts and scholars sometimes describe ordinary meaning as the meaning that a “reasonable reader” would ascribe to the statutory language at issue, but it remains unclear how judges and lawyers should go about identifying such meaning. Over the past few decades, as textualism has come to dominate statutory interpretation, courts increasingly have employed dictionary definitions as (purportedly) neutral, and sometimes dispositive, evidence of ordinary meaning. And in the past few years especially, some judges and scholars have advocated using corpus linguistics — patterns of usage across various English …

The Sherlock Holmes Canon, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Faculty Publications

Many of the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation cases infer meaning from Congress’s failure to comment in the legislative record. Colorfully referred to as the “dog that did not bark” canon, after a Sherlock Holmes story involving a watchdog that failed to bark while a racehorse was being stolen, the interpretive presumption holds as follows: if a statutory interpretation would significantly change the existing legal landscape, Congress can be expected to comment on that change in the legislative record; thus, a lack of congressional comment regarding a significant change can be taken as evidence that Congress did not intend that interpretation. …

Due Process And Punitive Damages: The Error Of Federal Excessiveness Jurisprudence, A. Benjamin Spencer

Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court, in a line of several cases over the past decade, has established a rigorous federal constitutional excessiveness review for punitive damages awards based on the Due Process Clause. As a matter of substantive due process, says the Court, punitive awards must be evaluated by three "guideposts" set forth in BMW of North America v. Gore: the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, and a comparison of the amount of punitive damages to any "civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct." Following up on this pronouncement …