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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Why Justice Scalia Should Be A Constitutional Comparativist ... Sometimes, David Gray
Why Justice Scalia Should Be A Constitutional Comparativist ... Sometimes, David Gray
David C. Gray
The burgeoning literature on transjudicialism and constitutional comparativism generally reaffirms the familiar lines of contest between textualists and those more inclined to read the Constitution as a living document. As a consequence, it tends to be politicized, if not polemic. This article begins to shift the debate toward a more rigorous focus on first principles. In particular, it argues that full faith to the basic commitments of originalism, as advanced in Justice Scalia's writings, opinions, and speeches, requires domestic courts to consult contemporary foreign sources when interpreting universalist language found in the Constitution. While the article does not propose a …
Medellin And Originalism, D. A. Jeremy Telman
Medellin And Originalism, D. A. Jeremy Telman
D. A. Jeremy Telman
In Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court permitted Texas to proceed with the execution of a Mexican national who had not been given timely notice of his right of consular notification and consultation in violation of the United States’ obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. It did so despite its finding that the United States had an obligation under treaty law to comply with an order of the International Court of Justice that Medellín’s case be granted review and reconsideration. The international obligation, the Court found, was not domestically enforceable because the treaties at issue were not self-executing. …
Original Intention And Public Meaning In Constitutional Interpretation, Richard Kay
Original Intention And Public Meaning In Constitutional Interpretation, Richard Kay
Richard Kay
In recent years academic explanations of the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation have shifted the relevant inquiry from the subjective intent of the constitution-makers to the "original public meaning" of the Constitution's words. This article is a critical analysis of that development. In the actual course of adjudication by honest and competent judges either method should usually yield the same result. The reliance on public meaning, however, distracts the interpreter from the connection between the normative force of the Constitution and the founding events, a link that is essential to the legitimacy of constitutional judicial review. In the hands of …