Jurisprudence Commons^™

American Legal Realism Today: An Idiosyncratic Restatement, Mark Tushnet

Northwestern Law Journal des Refusés

No abstract provided.

An Introduction To American Legal Realism, Noah Hornberger

Northwestern Law Journal des Refusés

No abstract provided.

Ordinary Causation: A Study In Experimental Statutory Interpretation, James Macleod

Indiana Law Journal

In a series of recent split decisions interpreting criminal and tort-like legislation, the Supreme Court has purported to give statutory causation requirements their ordinary, plain meaning. Armed with dictionaries, examples from everyday speech, and commonsense intuitions, the Court’s majority has explained that statutory phrases like “because of” and “results from” entail but-for causation as a matter of ordinary usage. There’s just one problem: The Court’s majority (and the many state and federal courts following its lead) is wrong on the facts—specifically, the facts about how people ordinarily interpret, understand, and use causal language.

This Article considers a novel approach to …

The Third Pillar Of Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory, Brian Z. Tamanaha

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.

Ethics In Legal Education: An Augmentation Of Legal Realism, Gerald R. Ferrera

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Clarifying The Normative Dimension Of Legal Realism: The Example Of Holmes's The Path Of The Law, Edmund Ursin

San Diego Law Review

In a recently published article, I examined the Legal Realism found in Leon Green's and Karl Llewellyn's tort scholarship. Brian Leiter had previously presented an insightful "philosophical reconstruction" of Legal Realism. In articulating what he sees as the descriptive and normative aspects of Legal Realism, Leiter drew most of his examples from the field of commercial law, which was the main focus of Llewellyn's scholarship. In this context he wrote that most Legal Realists made a descriptive claim about judicial decisions or, more specifically, decisions of appellate courts. Stated in its most succinct form, this descriptive claim was that judicial …

Cognitive Illiberalism And Institutional Debiasing Strategies, Paul M. Secunda

San Diego Law Review

This article investigates institutional debiasing strategies that may work to further minimize conflict in society over labor and employment law decisions. In this vein, Part II seeks to distill the essentials of culturally motivated cognition and how it relates to, yet differs from, other earlier studies on the role that values and assumptions play in labor and employment law cases. Part III then comprehensively explores a spectrum of debiasing strategies for legal decisionmakers, from opinion-writing debiasing strategies to institutional strategies involving specialized courts and judges. Finally, Part IV considers the arguments against such institutions, and finally, the promise of opacity …

Not Guilty, By Judge Jerome Frank And Barbara Frank In Association With Harold M. Hoffman, Edward Mcwhinney

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.