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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Gully And The Failure To Stake A 28 U.S.C. § 1331 'Claim', Lumen N. Mulligan
Gully And The Failure To Stake A 28 U.S.C. § 1331 'Claim', Lumen N. Mulligan
Faculty Works
In this piece, I argue that a return to Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian as an approach to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction is ill-conceived. In a recent thoughtful article, Professor Simona Grossi draws heavily upon the traditions of the legal process school’s approach to federal courts jurisprudence to support just such a resurrection of Gully as the lodestar for § 1331 doctrine. While embracing a return to the legal process school, I argue first that the Gully view — read as a call for judges simply to select sufficiently important matters, in relation to plaintiff’s case in …
You Can't Go Holmes Again, Lumen N. Mulligan
You Can't Go Holmes Again, Lumen N. Mulligan
Faculty Works
Under the standard interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the so called Holmes test, pleading a federal cause of action is sufficient for finding federal question jurisdiction. In January 2012, the Supreme Court, in Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, recharacterized this standard test for § 1331 jurisdiction as one that considers whether “federal law creates [both] a private right of action and furnishes the substantive rules of decision.” In this first piece to address the Mims Court’s significant change to the § 1331 canon, I applaud its rights-inclusive holding. I contend that this rights-inclusive view rests upon a firmer …
A Unified Theory Of 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 Jurisdiction, Lumen N. Mulligan
A Unified Theory Of 28 U.S.C. Section 1331 Jurisdiction, Lumen N. Mulligan
Faculty Works
Title 28, section 1331 of the United States Code provides the jurisdictional grounding for the majority of cases heard in the federal courts, yet it is not well understood. The predominant view holds that section 1331 doctrine both lacks a focus upon congressional intent and is internally inconsistent. I seek to counter both these assumptions by re-contextualizing the Court's section 1331 jurisprudence in terms of the contemporary judicial usage of right (i.e., clear, mandatory obligations capable of judicial enforcement) and cause of action (i.e., permission to vindicate a right in court). In conducting this reinterpretation, I argue that section 1331 …