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University of Michigan Law School

United States Supreme Court

Supreme Court of the United States

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Predicting Supreme Court Behavior In Indian Law Cases, Grant Christensen Feb 2021

Predicting Supreme Court Behavior In Indian Law Cases, Grant Christensen

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This piece builds upon Matthew Fletcher’s call for additional empirical work in Indian law by creating a new dataset of Indian law opinions. The piece takes every Indian law case decided by the Supreme Court from the beginning of the Warren Court until the end of the 2019-2020 term. The scholarship first produces an Indian law scorecard that measures how often each Justice voted for the “pro- Indian” outcome. It then compares those results to the Justice’s political ideology to suggest that while there is a general trend that a more “liberal” Justice is more likely to favor the pro-Indian …


The Keyes To Reclaiming The Racial History Of The Roberts Court, Tom I. Romero, Ii Sep 2015

The Keyes To Reclaiming The Racial History Of The Roberts Court, Tom I. Romero, Ii

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Article advocates for a fundamental re-understanding about the way that the history of race is understood by the current Supreme Court. Represented by the racial rights opinions of Justice John Roberts that celebrate racial progress, the Supreme Court has equivocated and rendered obsolete the historical experiences of people of color in the United States. This jurisprudence has in turn reified the notion of color-blindness, consigning racial discrimination to a distant and discredited past that has little bearing to how race and inequality is experienced today. The racial history of the Roberts Court is centrally informed by the context and …


Sense And Nonsense: Standing In The Racial Districting Cases As A Window On The Supreme Court's View Of The Right To Vote, Judith Reed Jan 1999

Sense And Nonsense: Standing In The Racial Districting Cases As A Window On The Supreme Court's View Of The Right To Vote, Judith Reed

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

Congressional redistricting draws the lines within which battles for political power will be fought. It is no surprise, therefore, that the redistricting process has long been the subject of social debate and legal dispute. The Supreme Court has not been able to resolve this dispute, in part, because the Justices have conflicting interpretations of the right to vote. While some Justices view voting as an individual right, others maintain that voting is correctly perceived as group right. This lack of consensus regarding the definition of the right to vote has led to a confusing articulation of the harm implicated by …


An Analysis Of The Supreme Court's Reliance On Racial "Stigma" As A Constitutional Concept In Affirmative Action Cases, Andrew F. Halaby, Stephen R. Mcallister Jan 1997

An Analysis Of The Supreme Court's Reliance On Racial "Stigma" As A Constitutional Concept In Affirmative Action Cases, Andrew F. Halaby, Stephen R. Mcallister

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

The Article's focus is confined to discussions of race-based affirmative action; it does not consider stigmatization arguments in the context of discrimination involving gender or disabilities, for example. Further, the Article's scope is limited to the stigmatization issue as between Whites and African Americans. Although similar issues exist with respect to other ethnic or racial groups, we view the White/African American paradigm as providing the clearest framework for analysis. Moreover, the cases of Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education, joint progenitors of stigmatization as a concept having constitutional significance in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of …


Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny Of Affirmative Action, Brent E. Simmons Jan 1996

Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny Of Affirmative Action, Brent E. Simmons

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

Under the artificial constraints of strict scrutiny, however, the courts are free to veto the government's choice of more effective, race-conscious means. The Supreme Court's unfortunate and ill-conceived adoption of strict scrutiny as the constitutional standard for reviewing race-conscious affirmative action should be reconsidered for several reasons. This Article examines those reasons.