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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

An Empirical Study Of Implicit Takings., James E. Krier, Stewart E. Sterk Oct 2016

An Empirical Study Of Implicit Takings., James E. Krier, Stewart E. Sterk

Articles

Takings scholarship has long focused on the niceties of Supreme Court doctrine, while ignoring the operation of takings law "on the ground" in the state and lower federal courts, which together decide the vast bulk of all takings cases. This study, based primarily on an empirical analysis of more than 2000 reported decisions ovcr the period 1979 through 2012, attempts to fill that void. This study establishes that the Supreme Court's categorical rules govern almost no state takings cases, and that takings claims based on government regulation almost invariably fail. By contrast, when takings claims arise out of government action …


Thin Rationality Review, Jacob Gersen, Adrian Vermeule Jun 2016

Thin Rationality Review, Jacob Gersen, Adrian Vermeule

Michigan Law Review

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts review and set aside agency action that is “arbitrary [and] capricious.” In a common formulation of rationality review, courts must either take a “hard look” at the rationality of agency decisionmaking, or at least ensure that agencies themselves have taken a hard look. We will propose a much less demanding and intrusive interpretation of rationality review—a thin version. Under a robust range of conditions, rational agencies have good reason to decide in a manner that is inaccurate, nonrational, or arbitrary. Although this claim is seemingly paradoxical or internally inconsistent, it simply rests on an …


The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley Mar 2014

The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley

Articles

The presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of administrative law, accepted by courts and commentators alike as both legally appropriate and obviously desirable. Yet the presumption is puzzling. As with any canon of statutory construction that serves a substantive end, it should find a source in history, positive law, the Constitution, or sound policy considerations. None of these, however, offers a plausible justification for the presumption. As for history, the sort of judicial review that the presumption favors - appellate-style arbitrariness review - was not only unheard of prior to the twentieth century, but …


Interpreting Regulations, Kevin M. Stack Dec 2012

Interpreting Regulations, Kevin M. Stack

Michigan Law Review

The age of statutes has given way to an era of regulations, but our jurisprudence has fallen behind. Despite the centrality of regulations to law, courts have no intelligible approach to regulatory interpretation. The neglect of regulatory interpretation is not only a shortcoming in interpretive theory but also a practical problem for administrative law. Canonical doctrines of administrative law - Chevron, Seminole Rock/Auer, and Accardi - involve interpreting regulations, and yet courts lack a consistent approach. This Article develops a method for interpreting regulations and, more generally, situates regulatory interpretation within debates over legal interpretation. It argues that a purposive …


Assessing Divisibility In The Armed Career Criminal Act, Ted Koehler Jun 2012

Assessing Divisibility In The Armed Career Criminal Act, Ted Koehler

Michigan Law Review

When courts analyze whether a defendant's prior conviction qualifies as a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act's "residual clause," they use a "categorical approach," looking only to the statutory language of the prior offense, rather than the facts disclosed by the record of conviction. But when a defendant is convicted under a "divisible" statute, which encompasses a broader range of conduct, only some of which would qualify as a predicate offense, courts may employ the "modified categorical approach." This approach allows courts to view additional documents to determine whether the jury convicted the defendant of the Armed Career …


The Real Formalists, The Real Realists, And What They Tell Us About Judicial Decision And Legal Education, Edward Rubin Apr 2011

The Real Formalists, The Real Realists, And What They Tell Us About Judicial Decision And Legal Education, Edward Rubin

Michigan Law Review

The periodization of history, like chocolate cake, can have some bad effects on us, but it is hard to resist. We realize, of course, that Julius Caesar didn’t think of himself as “Classical” and Richard the Lionhearted didn’t regard the time in which he lived as the Middle Ages. Placing historical figures in subsequently defined periods separates us from them and impairs our ability to understand them on their own terms. But it is difficult to understand anything about them at all if we try to envision history as continuous and undifferentiated. We need periodization to organize events that are …


The Myth And The Reality Of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, Stephen Gardbaum Dec 2008

The Myth And The Reality Of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, Stephen Gardbaum

Michigan Law Review

This Article critically evaluates the widely held view inside and outside the United States that American constitutional rights jurisprudence is exceptional. There are two dimensions to this perceived American exceptionalism: the content and the structure of constitutional rights. On content, the claim focuses mainly on the age, brevity, and terseness of the text and on the unusually high value attributed to free speech. On structure, the claim is primarily threefold. First, the United States has a more categorical conception of constitutional rights than other countries. Second, the United States has an exceptionally sharp public/private division in the scope of constitutional …


Not Just Doctrine: The True Motivation For Federal Incorporation And International Human Rights Litigation, Daniel Abebe Jan 2007

Not Just Doctrine: The True Motivation For Federal Incorporation And International Human Rights Litigation, Daniel Abebe

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Article challenges the universalist theory of international law upon which federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation rely. It unpacks the international relations (IR) theory paradigms that support the universalist theory, and discusses a competing theory that views state compliance with international law as a function of national self-interest. Working from this perspective, it proposes a framework to evaluate the wisdom of federal incorporation of CIL and the wisdom of international human rights litigation. The framework suggests that federal incorporation of CIL generates sovereignty costs for the United States, and that international human rights litigation complicates the …


A Theory In Search Of A Court, And Itself: Judicial Minimalism At The Supreme Court Bar, Neil S. Siegel Aug 2005

A Theory In Search Of A Court, And Itself: Judicial Minimalism At The Supreme Court Bar, Neil S. Siegel

Michigan Law Review

According to the prevailing wisdom in academic public law, constitutional theory is a field that seeks to articulate and evaluate abstract accounts of the nature of the United States Constitution. Theorists offer those accounts as guides to subsequent judicial construction of constitutional provisions. As typically conceived, therefore, constitutional theory tends to proceed analytically from the general to the particular; its animating idea is that correct decisions in constitutional cases presuppose theoretical commitments to the methodological principles that should guide constitutional interpretation and the substantive values such interpretation should advance. In its enthusiasm for abstraction, constitutional theory has, at times, generated …


Against Interpretive Supremacy, Saikrishna Prakash, John Yoo May 2005

Against Interpretive Supremacy, Saikrishna Prakash, John Yoo

Michigan Law Review

Many constitutional scholars are obsessed with judicial review and the many questions surrounding it. One perennial favorite is whether the Constitution even authorizes judicial review. Another is whether the other branches of the federal government must obey the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution and what, if anything, the other branches must do to execute the judiciary's judgments. Marbury v. Madison has been a full-employment program for many constitutional law scholars, including ourselves. Larry Kramer, the new Dean of Stanford Law School, shares this passion. He has devoted roughly the last decade of his career, with two lengthy law review …


Terry Firma: Background Democracy And Constitutional Foundations, Frank I. Michelman Jan 2001

Terry Firma: Background Democracy And Constitutional Foundations, Frank I. Michelman

Michigan Law Review

Ages ago, I had the excellent luck to fall into a collaboration with Terrance Sandalow to produce a casebook now long forgotten. There could have been no more bracing or beneficial learning experience for a fledgling legal scholar (meaning me). What brought us together indeed was luck from my standpoint, but it was enterprise, too - the brokerage of an alert West Publishing Company editor picking up on a casual remark of mine as he made one of his regular sweeps through Harvard Law School. A novice law professor, I mentioned to him how much I admired a new essay …


Democratic Credentials, Donald J. Herzog Jan 1994

Democratic Credentials, Donald J. Herzog

Articles

We've made a mistake, urges Bruce Ackerman. We've failed to notice, or have forgotten, that ours is a dualist democracy: ordinary representatives passing their statutes are in fact the democratic inferiors of We the People, who at rare junctures appear on the scene and affirm new constitutional principles. (Actually, he claims in passing that we have a three-track democracy.)' Dwelling lovingly on dualism, Ackerman doesn't quite forget to discuss democracy, but he comes close. I want to raise some questions about the democratic credentials of Ackerman's view. Not, perhaps, the ones he anticipates. So I don't mean to argue that …


Legislative Inputs And Gender-Based Discrimination In The Burger Court, Earl M. Maltz Mar 1992

Legislative Inputs And Gender-Based Discrimination In The Burger Court, Earl M. Maltz

Michigan Law Review

In An Interpretive History of Modem Equal Protection, Michael Klarman poses a powerful challenge to the conventional wisdom regarding the structure of Burger Court jurisprudence. Most commentators have concluded that during the Burger era the Court lacked a coherent vision of constitutional law, and was given to a "rootless" activism or a "pragmatic" approach to constitutional analysis. Klarman argues that, at least in the area of equal protection analysis, the Burger Court's approach did reflect a unifying theme, which he describes as a focus on "legislative inputs." According to Klarman, this approach "directs judicial review towards purging legislative decision-making of …


Original Intent: "With Friends Like These…", Thomas Gibbs Gee May 1990

Original Intent: "With Friends Like These…", Thomas Gibbs Gee

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Original Intent and the Framer's Constitution by Leonard W. Levy


The Eighteenth-Century Background Of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, William E. Nelson May 1978

The Eighteenth-Century Background Of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, William E. Nelson

Michigan Law Review

This analysis of Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence avoids the pitfalls of previous theories. It does not see the Federalist political program as the source of Marshall's constitutional doctrines and thus does not need to explain how Marshall qualified his political principles or how he convinced non-Federalist judges to accept them. Instead, this essay argues that legal, not political, principles underlay Marshall's jurisprudence, but it attempts to understand those principles in a manner consistent with the unavoidable twentieth-century assumption that law is a body of flexible rules responsive to social reality rather than a series of immutable, unambiguous doctrines derived from a …


Haines: The Revival Of Natural Law Concepts, Edwin W. Tucker Jan 1966

Haines: The Revival Of Natural Law Concepts, Edwin W. Tucker

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Revival of Natural Law Concepts by Charles Grove Haines


Hyneman: The Supreme Court On Trial, William W. Van Alstyne Nov 1964

Hyneman: The Supreme Court On Trial, William W. Van Alstyne

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Supreme Court on Trial. By Charles S. Hyneman


Llewellyn: The Common Law Tradition- Deciding Appeals, Luke K. Cooperrider Nov 1961

Llewellyn: The Common Law Tradition- Deciding Appeals, Luke K. Cooperrider

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Common Law Tradition- Deciding Appeals. By Karl N. Llewellyn.


Administrative Law - Judicial Control - Appellate Review Of Federal Trade Commission Proceedings, David A. Nelson S. Ed. Jun 1959

Administrative Law - Judicial Control - Appellate Review Of Federal Trade Commission Proceedings, David A. Nelson S. Ed.

Michigan Law Review

During its forty-five year life the Federal Trade Commission has gone through some difficult periods to emerge today as one of the fundamental instrumentalities of government in the regulation of business. Its vast powers and influence, well known to lawyers, will not be explored here. Rather, the purpose of this comment is to appraise the extent of control which the judiciary now exercises over the commission in its adjudicative functions, so as to offer some indication to the practitioner of the probabilities regarding the outcome of judicial review on an appeal beyond the full commission. The approach to be used …


Judicial Review In Europe, Gottfried Dietze Feb 1957

Judicial Review In Europe, Gottfried Dietze

Michigan Law Review

The years following the Second World War witnessed a wave of constitution making in Europe. In East and West alike, popular government was instituted through new basic laws. But whereas the constitutions of Eastern Europe established a Rousseauistic form. of democracy through the creation of an omnipotent legislature, those of the West, while reflecting a belief in parliamentary government, to a larger or smaller degree limited the power of the legislature through the introduction of judicial review. This acceptance of judicial review can be attributed mainly to two factors. It sprung from a distrust of a parliamentarism under which, during …


Gray Vs. Powell And The Scope Of Review, Bernard Schwartz Nov 1955

Gray Vs. Powell And The Scope Of Review, Bernard Schwartz

Michigan Law Review

In dissenting from the decision of the Supreme Court in a celebrated administrative-law case, Justice Jackson once declared: "I give up. Now I realize fully what Mark Twain meant when he said, 'The more you explain it, the more I don't understand it.' " It cannot be denied that the learned justice's reaction is one which is often felt by students of Supreme Court jurisprudence. This has been particularly true of the field involved in the case which called forth Justice Jackson's plaint--i.e., that of administrative law. American administrative lawyers have not infrequently had this same response to decisions of …


Justice Jackson And The Judicial Function, Paul A. Weidner Feb 1955

Justice Jackson And The Judicial Function, Paul A. Weidner

Michigan Law Review

Much of the pattern of division in the present Supreme Court is traceable to basic differences of opinion regarding the proper role of a judge in the process of constitutional adjudication. Some students of the Court, yielding to the current fashion of reducing even intricate problems to capsule terms, have tried to explain the controversy by classifying the justices as either "liberals" or "conservatives." A second school poses the disagreement largely in terms of judicial "activism" as opposed to judicial "restraint." It is this view that has the greater relevance for the present discussion. C.H. Pritchett, one of the leading …


Constitutional Interpretation And Judicial Self-Restraint, Vincent M. Barnett Jr. Dec 1940

Constitutional Interpretation And Judicial Self-Restraint, Vincent M. Barnett Jr.

Michigan Law Review

The newly reconstituted Supreme Court of the United States has become the center of an earnest controversy with respect to the true role of the Court in constitutional interpretation. The general controversy is, of course, far from new. What makes it of more than ordinary significance is that the Court itself is revealing a tendency substantially to alter the extent, if not the nature, of judicial review. This tendency has not yet become clearly dominant, but it is apparent enough to shake the implicit faith in the Court of many of those to whom, before 1937, any criticism of the …


Social And Economic Interpretation Of The Fourteenth Amendment, Robert Eugene Cushman May 1922

Social And Economic Interpretation Of The Fourteenth Amendment, Robert Eugene Cushman

Michigan Law Review

For those who love precision and definiteness the question of the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to social and economic problems remains an irritating enigma. The judicial construction of due process of law and the equal protection of the law has from the first discouraged systematic analysis and defied synthesis. More than one writer has emerged from the study of the problem with a neat and compact set of fundamental principles, only to have the Supreme Court discourteously ignore them in its next case. But paradoxical as it may seem, those who long for a wise and forward-looking solution of …